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Abstract 
Over the last decade, Australian industry has overwhelmingly embraced the 
concept of Zero Harm as a mantra for espousing their commitment to safety. The 
goal is to create an injury and incident free work environment where injuries are not 
acceptable and everything possible is undertaken to prevent them. Whilst Zero Harm 
is an admirable goal, the question remains as to what exactly does Zero Harm mean 
for employees’, is Zero Harm achievable and can Zero Harm actually influence 
workplace behaviour?  
The purpose of this research was to enhance scientific knowledge on Zero 
Harm and its applicability to workplace health and safety using a conceptual 
framework developed on organisational alignment. To achieve this, a mixed methods 
design was employed consisting of two separate but interrelated studies which 
focused on obtaining managers’ and employees' perceptions and experiences 
regarding: (a) an insight into the meaning of Zero Harm and whether Zero Harm is 
an achievable organisational objective, (b) exploring how the organisation promotes 
and supports Zero Harm, and (c) examining the manifestation of Zero Harm as it 
relates to individual, group or organisational safety behaviour. Both studies involved 
participants from various countries within the Asia Pacific operations of a large 
global oil and gas contracting company.  
Study One consisted of a quantitative examination that explored managers’ and 
employees’ self-reported perceptions and experiences of Zero Harm. This 
examination included the meaning of the Zero Harm concept, its manifestation and 
the self-reported impact that Zero Harm has on safety behaviours within the work 
environment.  Study Two comprised of a complementary qualitative exploration that 
further unpacked individuals’ perceptions and experiences of Zero Harm. Both 
studies utilised Semler’s organisational alignment model as a conceptual framework. 
Although the utilisation of the conceptual framework was not a direct test of the 
model itself, the conceptual framework did provide the necessary structure and 
guidance for the data collection.  
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The findings of the research suggest that generally, employees agreed on the 
meaning of Zero Harm by articulating ‘no harm to anyone, anytime while at work’. 
Zero Harm was also deemed a priority within the organisation which was 
demonstrated through management’s commitment towards employees’ safety. The 
core findings of the research were that the measurement of Zero Harm was 
predominately through the use of injury statistics and injury rates. Both studies also 
suggest that the majority of employees also believe that Zero Harm was an 
achievable goal and that management was a driving factor to the commitment of 
Zero Harm. This research also identified that the organisations safety initiatives were 
communicated and understood by the majority of employees and that the majority of 
employees participated within the safety initiatives. Finally, it was identified that 
when carrying out Zero Harm principles, employees had a high level of self-efficacy. 
However, it was noted that employees under the age of 50 years of age who were in 
non-supervisory or management roles, indicated that negative work practices have 
occurred. 
This thesis presents the findings from two interrelated studies through the 
undertaking of an enquiry and examination into Zero Harm. The findings from these 
studies suggest that Zero Harm can have a positive influence on workplace health 
and safety.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter provides an introduction to this thesis. The thesis commences with 
a background into Zero Harm including its application and debate regarding 
relevance and effectiveness. The research aims and objectives are then presented as 
well as the significance of the research program. This chapter will conclude with an 
outline of the remaining chapters within the thesis. 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Zero Harm has been adopted by industry as a cornerstone for workplace health 
and safety management on an international scale and particularly within Australia. 
Organisations such as BHP Billiton, Shell, QGC, BP, Xstrata, Anglo American, Blue 
Scope, Leighton’s, Tenix, Calibre, Energex, Ergon, Arrow Energy and Arrium, use 
or have used the term ‘Zero Harm’ and/or other bespoke slogans including ‘vision 
zero’, ‘goal zero’, ‘target zero’, ‘zero accidents’ and ‘zero incidents’ as their mantra 
for improved safety performance. Zero Harm represents the organisational mantra of 
‘no accidents or injuries’. This is where all incidents are viewed as preventable and 
that an absence of accidents and injuries is the only acceptable level. Whilst this is an 
admirable goal, there is considerable debate regarding what Zero Harm actually 
means to workers and whether it is achievable. 
It is estimated that one quarter of all serious workplace injury claims result in 
more than 12 weeks off work (Safe Work Australia, 2014). This has a considerable 
impact on industry (e.g. lost time and productively) when considering that there were 
117,815 serious workplace related reported injury claims reported between 2013 and 
2014 (Safe Work Australia, 2015). Aside from the serious injury claims it has also 
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been estimated that approximately 531,800 people during 2012 to 2013 suffered 
some form of work related injury or illness such as a first aid or minor medical 
treatment injury. During this same period, 196 work related fatalities were also 
recorded (Safe Work Australia, 2015). However, the number of fatalities is argued to 
be higher as there is no reliable data that provides information on the number of 
deaths that are directly related to occupational exposure to hazardous substances. As 
such, based on this lack of reliable data, it has been estimated that each year there are 
over 2,000 additional deaths from occupational and workplace disease (National 
Occupational Health & Safety Commission, 2002). 
The economic impact and cost to Australia from workplace injuries is 
estimated at $61.8 billion, which represents approximately 4.8 per cent of the 
Australian GDP (Gross Domestic Product) (Safe Work Australia, 2015). This burden 
as well as the requirement to achieve the continuing changing workplace health and 
safety legislative requirements, has driven various industry organisations to strive for 
improved workplace safety performance. In doing so they have adopted the Zero 
Harm mantra as a workplace environment, which is embodied by a core safety value 
that no workplace death or injury is acceptable (O’Rourke, 2010).  Whilst Zero Harm 
has been popularised as a mantra, industry is also actively implementing Zero Harm 
as a goal or vision and even as a numerical target based on the concept that if a single 
day without an injury can be achieved, then 365 days without an injury is also 
achievable (Burnham, 2015).  
However, there are sceptics of Zero Harm who consider Zero Harm as neither 
credible nor realistic (Roughton & Mercurio, 2002).  For example, Douglas (2011) 
suggests that Zero Harm is a safety concept based purely on hope and that a false 
belief that all incidents are preventable may actually cause harm. Although from an 
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alternative perspective, Zero Harm is portrayed as a program, not a target, and that 
Zero Harm focuses on exposure to workplace hazards rather than injury (O’Rourke, 
2010 & Spigener, 2009).  Essentially, the opposing body of researchers believe that 
the concept of Zero Harm, whilst being honourable, postulate that it is unachievable 
(Byard, 2009 & Douglas, 2011).  As such, if Zero Harm is deemed unrealistic or 
attainable, it will be regarded as “utopic nonsense” (Zwtsloot, Aaltonen, Wybo, 
Saari, Kines & Beeck, p.45, 2013). Furthermore Douglas (2011) insinuates that Zero 
Harm may in fact have negative consequences such as reductions in injury reporting 
or the fact that some employees do not believe in it. It is seen as subterfuge by the 
organisations management to avoid liability and accountability for idealistic safety, 
which in reality, may not exist.  It is proposed that this scepticism can negatively 
affect the organisations safety culture.  For example, under-reporting or hiding of 
incidents may encourage supervision and managers to avoid poor statistics through 
fear of failure (QRMC, 2011).   It is also interesting that opponents of Zero Harm 
have coined the concept of “binary opposition” (Long p. 51, 2012) or binary thinking 
in their justification by suggesting that one must want harm if they are not an 
advocate of Zero Harm (Long, 2012).   
Zero Harm supporters counter this argument by proposing that moral 
condemnation of organisations would exist if they ‘just accepted’ incidents (Byard, 
2009), especially those that may lead to fatalities or have a significant environmental 
impact.  It is also proposed that there is minimal empirical research that supports the 
concept of Zero Harm however, organisations continue to embrace Zero Harm as the 
next paradigm of workplace safety to protect their employees from workplace related 
harm (O’Rourke, 2010; Young, 2014; Zwtsloot, et al., 2013).  
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1.2 ZERO HARM  
From an industry perspective, the evidence of the effectiveness of Zero Harm 
is also mixed.  For example, the DuPont Group, a global leader in workplace safety 
(Zwtsloot, et al., 2013) postulate that all incidents and accidents are preventable, 
which is a core constituent of Zero Harm. However, they recently suffered a 
chemical leak at a plant near La Porte in the US that resulted in the death of four 
employees (Chemistry World, 2014). BHP and BP also use the mantra of Zero Harm 
but have recently had significant incidents. Specifically, BHP Billiton (22 
September, 2012) had a contractor fatality at the Pinto Valley operation in Arizona 
USA (BHP Billiton, 2012). Prior to this incident, there was another BHP Billiton 
fatality (7 July, 2011) at its port operations in Port Hedland, Western Australia (ABC 
News, 2011). From a global perspective, in the last decade, 45 workers have died at 
BHP sites (Stevens, 2015). Further, BP, at its Deepwater Horizon operations in 2010, 
which previously achieved 7 years without a lost time injury, had a major catastrophe 
that resulted in 11 fatalities and an estimated spillage of 4.9 million barrels of crude 
oil. This resulted in the largest marine spill in history (BP Deepwater Horizon 
Accident Investigation report, 2010). This incident also resulted in a compensation 
cost against BP of $24 Billion. The above evidence casts further doubt on the 
efficiency of Zero Harm to create lasting change in the real world.   
There are many reasons why organisations use the Zero Harm concept (mantra, 
vision or goal) such as it is a catalyst for improving safety. Nelson (1996) suggests 
that when management clearly communicates their zero injury goals it becomes the 
catalyst for employees to believe that management are serious about their safety. 
This has led to organisations introducing programs and training initiatives, which 
have become empowering. These initiatives investigate when an injury occurs so that 
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the organisation can critique what was missed, what was not understood and what 
was not taken into account. This is then used in the prevention of future events 
within the organisations control (Deery, 2013).  
Zero Harm from an ethical perspective postulates there is a duty of care on 
behalf of the organisation (Grossbard, Atkinson, Cass, Woolley, Corben & Whear, 
2013). The ethical maxims ‘do no harm’ is a frequently accepted laudable aim of any 
organisation and its management (Kavanagh, 2012). Zero Harm has also become an 
organisational competitive advantage such as when the organisations safety 
performance is a significant factor to secure contracts (Stewart, 2008). Not 
surprisingly, the Zero Harm concept is not for any one specific industry. It is one that 
has morphed in its many incarnations across various industries from mining, oil and 
gas, construction to road safety as well as in the health and patient care services to 
name a few. From a road safety perspective, there has been considerable research 
into Vision Zero. Vision Zero is a philosophy, which promotes the eventual 
elimination of deaths or serious injuries within the road transport network (Tingvall 
& Haworth, 1999).  Another research example of Zero Harm being adopted by other 
industries is within health care and patient safety, which posits that the provision of 
medical services without causing harm to a patient is a primary core value (Davis, 
2015; Hoppes, Mitchell, Venditti & Bunting, 2012).  
1.3 ZERO HARM IS PROBLEMATIC  
Zero Harm is problematic. In one corner it is portrayed as the ultimate safety 
goal and in the converse corner it is deemed impossible to achieve. Studies such as 
Sherratt (2014), who focused on zero target programs within the UK construction 
industry, suggest that the workforce consider the Zero Harm concept as something 
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that is incompatible with day-to-day realities and is an unachievable target. However 
as suggested by Burnham (2015) and Stewart (2008), if you can achieve one day 
without an injury then it is possible to achieve two days without an injury which 
builds on a foundation for an escalating process. Thus, the Zero Harm concept 
underpins that if an organisation can achieve one week without an injury, then why 
cannot the organisation achieve two weeks or one month or six months or even a 
year without an injury. The debate continues as Sherratt (2014) argues that a focus on 
Zero Harm has the capability to motivate or inspire and increase the commitment for 
safety. Conversely a focus on Zero Harm also has the capability to demotivate those 
who believe that it is unachievable.  This can also be further compounded when Zero 
Harm is so embedded in organisational mindset that when it is challenged it is 
likened to being ‘burned for heresy’ (Stewart, 2008).  
Taking the above into consideration, Zero Harm has been widely adopted as an 
organisational concept for improved safety performance. However, there is a lack of 
empirical investigation into employee’s perceptions of Zero Harm, which is arguably 
the cornerstone that will drive the Zero Harm philosophy and its effect on workplace 
safety. From a high-risk industry perspective, there is some empirical research, while 
minimal, it suggests there is some anecdotal correlation between Zero Harm and 
improved workplace safety performance. This includes within construction; 
(Sherratt, 2014 & Zou 2011); and smelting (Young, 2014). However, this research 
significantly lacks the perceptions and attitudes of Zero Harm from employees and 
managers perspective. Understanding individual and organisational perceptions of 
Zero Harm and identifying what are the drivers that support Zero Harm, are critical 
to establishing any correlation between improved safety performance and Zero 
Harm.  
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1.4 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES  
The aim of this research program is to obtain a comprehensive understanding 
and insight into the meaning and self-reported impact of the Zero Harm concept 
within the Asia Pacific operations of a large global oil and gas contractor, with a 
view to ascertain how the Zero Harm concept impacts on individual perspectives and 
behaviours. 
The objectives of the research program are to: 
1. To gain an insight into the perceived meaning and or language of Zero Harm 
among employees. 
2. Explore the manifestation of Zero Harm through self-reported data and potential 
influence between Zero Harm and improved individual, group or organisational 
safety behaviour. 
Conceptualising and operationalising Zero Harm can be problematic and its 
meaning is likely to differ both within industry and between individuals (as well as 
sub-groups). In its literal sense, Zero Harm means no harm at all, however this is 
modified within various industry to represent no lost time injuries or some other form 
of measurable worker injury statistic. It has also been argued that employees do not 
believe in Zero Harm and that Zero Harm is not achievable (Sherratt, 2014). 
Therefore critical to this research is to identify the meaning of Zero Harm and how is 
Zero Harm prioritised by those who are required to operate within its framework. 
Further as previously discussed, organisations have adopted the mantra of Zero Harm 
as a panacea for improved workplace safety performance. However, it is also argued 
that the adoption of Zero Harm has not been demonstrated to be any more successful 
than other forms of safety programs (Donaldson, 2013). As such, exploring the 
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meaning and utility of Zero Harm to promote safety is another critical focus point 
within this research. Finally, an inquiry into Zero Harm and its manifestation within 
an organisation is warranted to explore if Zero Harm has any impact on the 
individual behaviours or organisational safety performance.   
Therefore to achieve the aim and objectives of the research program, the 
following research questions where developed: 
1. What is the meaning and priority of Zero Harm from an employee and 
employer perspective? 
2. From an employee and employer perspective is Zero Harm 
a relevant framework to promote safety? 
3. From an employee and employer perspective, what are the manifestations of 
Zero Harm outcomes on safety behaviour and performance? 
The research project will also address various deficits of significance within 
the concept of Zero Harm, including the lack of a common understanding of what 
Zero Harm means. The research program strives to achieve the aim and objectives 
through two empirical studies that addressed each of the objectives. 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE 
As identified within the background of this chapter, there is considerable 
research that has been conducted over the last 15 years into Zero Vision and its 
applicability to road safety. However minimal empirical research has been 
undertaken that is focused on the concept of Zero Harm and its ability to impact 
workplace safety from an employee and employer perspective. This is problematic, 
as it is arguably the perceptions and attitudes of employees and employers that drives 
the success or failure of the Zero Harm theory.  The scientific evidence is also 
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conflicting for example; does zero harm mean no incidents, no lost time injuries, no 
medical treatment injuries or no injuries at all? As identified by Donaldson (2013), 
the meaning of Zero Harm is selective; where some organisations may count cuts and 
bruises but they don’t count work related psychosocial illness. This suggests that 
Zero Harm means different things to different people. Further proposed deficits in 
relation to Zero Harm include the lack of empirical research into the effectiveness of 
Zero Harm and its influence on organisational safety performance and individual 
safety behaviours. The capacity to capture, collect and analyse self–reported data on 
the perceptions of Zero Harm from employees and employers has clear implications 
for the successful application of the Zero Harm concepts in the workforce. 
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
Two individual, but interrelated studies form the foundation of this thesis in its 
aim in addressing the research projects aim and objectives. This research involves 
employees and management from 13 different Asia Pacific countries within a large 
oil and gas contracting company. The research program design was structured around 
Semler’s organisational alignment model as derived from the literature research, 
utilising a mixed method approach. An outline of this thesis is provide below. 
Chapter 1 has provided the contextualisation of the research program including 
its background aim, objectives and significance of the study. 
Chapter 2 provides a critical review of contemporary literature on workplace 
safety, Zero Harm and safety culture. Various constructs of workplace safety are 
discussed including the impact of workplace incidents, the evolution of Zero Harm 
its, application and debate. This chapter also reviews safety culture as it aligns to 
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Zero Harm, as well as industry application to workplace safety, including its 
strategies and limitations.  
Chapter 3 provides the research aims and questions. This chapter also briefly 
describes the research methodology and its interaction within the overall research 
design, which was utilised to achieve the research objectives. Chapter 3 also provides 
an impression of the conceptual framework employed within the research project that 
provided guidance and structure for the research program.  
Chapter 4 provides a description of Study One. This study was quantitative in 
design and included a self-reported questionnaire that was used to survey 
participants’ perceived perceptions, experiences and impacts of Zero Harm.  
Chapter 5 describes Study Two within the research program. This study was 
qualitative in design and included the undertaking of semi-structured qualitative 
individual interviews with employees and managers. The semi-structured interview 
questions were developed from the findings of the quantitative survey seeking a 
deeper investigative analysis that will build on the foundation from the first phase of 
the research program.  
Chapter 6 presents a synthesis of the results from both studies as they relate to 
the research aims and objectives, which are used to conclude the thesis. This chapter 
will also present recommendations for future research including potential and 
practical implications, strengths and/or limitations of applying Zero Harm concepts.  
1.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 This chapter presents a brief overview and summary of the current research 
program including the background to the research problem and rationale. The need to 
improve workplace health and safety within industry is critical for organisational 
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survival. Globally the Zero Harm concept is being used to achieve this improvement. 
Taken the above, it is obvious that there is still considerable debate on Zero Harm 
and its application. Therefore this research program aims to explore Zero Harm and 
its manifestation from an employee and employer perspective within a large global 
oil and gas contracting company and in particular within its Asia Pacific operations. 
The next chapter (Chapter 2) presents and discusses the literature that will 
provided the foundation to address the aims of the research program, including 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The literature relevant to the research program will be presented within this 
chapter. Firstly, a background literature review is provided which contextualises the 
foundation for the research program. Next, a description of the evolution of 
workplace safety is provided from an Australian perspective, which sets the 
operationalisation framework for workplace safety. The impact of workplace 
incidents and its association to workplace safety failures is discussed; this will be 
followed by an evaluation of the current understanding of Zero Harm.  The chapter 
will then explore safety culture and safety climate in relation to Zero Harm, followed 
by a review of industry application of workplace safety strategies. Finally a chapter 
summary will be provided summarising the key findings from the literature review.  
2.1 BACKGROUND  
There is a significant body of knowledge on the determinants on workplace 
health and safety (WHS) and safety performance (Robson, Amick III, Moser, Pagell, 
Mansfield, Shannon, Swift, Hogg-Johnson, Cardoso & South, 2016). However, this 
chapter is not intended to be a comprehensive review of the extent literature of all 
determinants, it will although, provide a synthesis of the current literature that 
supports this research program. Therefore this review shall focus on the workplace 
health and safety determinants that underpin Zero Harm. This chapter shall also, 
where possible, focus on workplace health and safety determinants as they relate to 
high-risk industries and in particular within the oil & gas, mining and construction 
industries. 
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2.2 A CONTEXTUAL EVOLUTION OF WORKPLACE SAFETY: AN 
AUSTRALIAN POLICY PERSPECTIVE 
Within an Australian context, workplace health and safety has always been 
governed by legislation and policy for the protection and safety of workers. To 
understand how legislation supports the safety of workers, a brief understanding of 
the evolution of Australian legislation is warranted. From an Australian perspective, 
the history of legislation that provides protection for workers health and safety can be 
traced back to the 1800’s in Britain when this was the first Factory Acts that were 
developed and adopted by Australia (Windholz, 2013). This resulted in the first 
Australian Factories and Shops Acts that were independently adopted by each state, 
but all based on the UK Factories Acts that were enforced at the time. These included 
Victoria in 1873 & 1885; Tasmania in 1884 & 1910; South Australia in 1894; New 
South Wales in 1896; Queensland in 1896; and Western Australia in 1904 
(Johnstone, 2012). 
As Australia evolved in the early industrial age, the state, territory and federal 
governments oversaw Australian legislation. This legislation was very prescriptive 
including highly technical specifications that required organisational adherence for 
the management of workplace safety. This implied that organisational adherence to 
the prescriptive legislation and regulation resulted in the effective management of 
workplace safety. This legislation was supported by the powers of governmental 
inspectorates (Thomas, 2012).  Governmental inspectors had very broad powers of 
enforcement up to and including pursing formal prosecution. However, it was 
identified that this legislative approach did not engage industry, workers and/or 
unions and due to its technical nature, it was difficult to keep up to date and interpret 
it (Workplace Relations Ministers Council, 2008). 
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During the 1970s, workplace health and safety legislation within Australia 
moved from this very prescriptive model to a self-regulatory model that was again 
derived from the United Kingdom and referred to as the Robens model. This new 
approach of workplace legislation was developed from the recommendations of a 
1972 British report on safety and health at work. A general theme within this 
watershed Robens report was that health and safety was currently managed by 
external regulations and external agencies, therefore there were minimal 
requirements imposed on organisations or workers to manage health and safety 
issues (Hofmann, Jacobs & Landy, 1995).  
The core recommendations of the Robens model includes two principle 
elements: (1) a single umbrella statute based on broad general duties founded on the 
principles of common law duty of care, supported by regulation and (2) the notion of 
managers and workers encouraged to participate in order to address workplace health 
and safety issues (Windholz, 2013). Therefore, this radical reform included replacing 
the plethora of highly prescriptive legislation (Windholz, 2013), to one of self-
regulation where each organisation has an onus and responsibility for health and 
safety including management and workers working together in the making and 
monitoring of workplace safety arrangements (Hofmann, et al., 1995; Windholz, 
2013). 
This Robens model evolved into OHS (Occupational Health and Safety) 
legislation within Australia for the governance of workplace health and safety. This 
legislation was developed independently by each state, territory and commonwealth 
governments.  This included, Western Australia in 1984; South Australia in 1986; 
The Commonwealth in 1991; Queensland and Tasmania in 1995; New South Wales 
in 2000; Victoria in 2004; and the Northern Territory in 2007 (Bluff, 2012). 
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Although independently developed, they all have commonalities including (Bluff, 
2012);  
• Three types of industrial instruments: This includes Occupational Health and 
Safety Acts which are underpinned by regulations and supported by approved 
code of practices; 
• Each legislation also incorporates general duties for persons whose actions 
(either individuals or corporate entities) may impact upon health and safety; 
and  
• Duty holders have a continuing obligation and that employee and 
management consultation is the cornerstone of all Australian workplace 
safety legislation.  
Even though each of these individual state acts had commonalities, there were 
also differing jurisdiction specific requirements that had resulted in additional 
compliance costs for those organisations or employers who operate in multiple 
jurisdictions (Foster, Sherriff, Windholz, Johnstone & Ruschena, 2012). Since 2008 
commonwealth, state and territory governments have applied a concerted effort to 
achieve a national workplace health and safety legislative model, which was 
underpinned by both social and economic factors that drove the initial impetus for a 
national model (Windholz, 2011). This was portrayed as the most significant reform 
to workplace health and safety legislation within Australia since the adoption of the 
Robens (Windholz, 2011). However, not all states have accepted the new legislation 
with Victoria confirming that it will not implement the new legislation and Western 
Australia is still considering implementation options for the legislation (Safe Work 
Australia 2017). Further, it may be argued that it is doubtful that there ever will be a 
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single national legislation when one considers the various safety legislation within 
the resource industries such as Queensland coal Mining Safety and Health Act 1999; 
Queensland Mining and Quarry Safety Act 1999; Western Australia Mines Safety 
and Inspection Act 199; and the New South Wales Work Health and Safety (Mines 
and Petroleum Sites) Act 2013. 
Although in its many forms, workplace health and safety legislation is a 
necessity. It has been progressively developed to regulate, promote and improve 
workplace practices (Bahn & Barratt-Pugh, 2014). Legislation provides a safety net, 
a minimum standard, that must be attained by an employer (Windholz, 2013). 
However, legislation approaches can be described as a minimalistic approach, that 
being, it only requires an employer to achieve what is within the Act so that they are 
not seen to be breaching any legal requirement, rather than developing and 
empowering employee behaviours. 
In Practice 
Continuing the evolution of workplace health and safety within Australia, all 
Australian governments, the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI) 
and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) agreed upon a national 
occupation health and safety strategy (2002-2012).  The 2002 to 2012 National OHS 
strategy was a key initiative with an espoused vision of an injury, disease and death 
free workplace within Australia, which are the core constructs of Zero Harm. This 
strategy has been promoted as providing the foundation for developing sustainable, 
safe and healthy work environments and for reducing injuries and fatalities at work 
(Safe Work Australia, 2002). 
The foundation priorities of the National OHS Strategy 2002 – 2012 are 
(National Occupational Health & Safety Commission, 2002): 
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• Reduce the high incidence and severity risks; 
• Develop the capacity of business operators and workers to manage 
OHS effectively; 
• Prevent occupational diseases more effectively; 
• Eliminate hazards at the design stage; and 
• Strengthen the capacity of government to influence OHS outcomes. 
To support the National OHS Strategy 2002–2012, aggressive targets were 
introduced to improve Australia’s workplace health and safety performance 
including a reduction of work related fatalities by 20 per cent and a reduction in 
workplace injuries by 40 per cent (National Occupational Health & Safety 
Commission, 2002). It is debatable how successful this strategy had been. During the 
life of this strategy, improvements to workplace health and safety have been 
achieved for example, the fatality rate (injury fatalities per 100,000 workers) has 
reduced from approximately 2.70 for calendar year 2003 to 1.70 for calendar year 
2013 (Safe Work Australia, 2015). Although a measurable improvement in the 
fatality rate, in 2013 there was still an estimated 196-workplace fatalities, which 
were directly related to a workplace incident (Safe Work Australia, 2015).  There is 
also an estimated 2000 workplace deaths due to work related illnesses each year 
(National Health and Safety Commission, 2002). However, Safe Work Australia 
(2012) claims the strategy was held in high regard internationally as there was a 
significant reduction in work-related fatalities and injuries as a combined effort of 
governments, unions and industry working in collaboration. 
At the conclusion of the National OHS Strategy 2002–2012, the Australian 
Work Health and Safety Strategy 2012-2022 was developed. This new strategy 
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provides a foundation for the effective and systematic management of workplace 
risks and improves the health and safety of workers and productivity by:  
• “Preventing and reducing the number, severity and costs associated to 
workplace injuries and illness; 
• Promotion of worker health and wellbeing to enhance capacity to work; 
and 
• Fostering innovation, quality and efficiency through continuous 
improvement” (Safe Work Australia, 2012, p.5). 
To support this vision the strategy has been developed to provide foundation 
principles, with a focus on four specific outcomes that needed to be achieved, they 
are:  
• “Reduce the incidence of work related death, injury and illness; 
• Reduced exposure to hazards and risks; 
• Improved hazard controls; and supported by 
• Improved work health and safety infrastructure” (Safe Work Australia, 
2012, p.6). 
This strategy includes national targets that will be used to measure the 
performance and successes of the strategy. These targets include a 20 per cent 
reduction in fatalities, a 30 per cent reduction in incidence rate of claims that result in 
one or more weeks off work and a 30 per cent reduction in musculoskeletal injuries. 
Although as previously discussed, the intent of the legislation and national strategies 
is to improve workplace safety and specifically reduce workplace incidents and 
injuries. However, a recent report commissioned by Safe Work Australia (2013, 
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p.10) identified that “we do not know whether many of the strategies used on a 
regular basis by work health and safety regulators, such as introducing regulations, 
conducting inspections, imposing penalties for non-compliance and running industry 
campaigns are effective in achieving the desired policy outcome of reducing work 
related deaths, injuries and disease”. In support of these national strategies, 
individual state governments have also developed and implemented various Zero 
Harm programs designed to assist in reducing workplace incidents. These include the 
South Australian and Queensland ‘Zero Harm at Work Leadership Programs’. 
Launched in 2013, the South Australian Zero Harm Leadership Program provided 
industry body forums from regional cities a platform to gain a collective approach 
and commitment to the reduction of workplace injuries by 5 per cent per year. To 
achieve this reduction of workplace injuries the program provided forums for 
industry bodies to share learning’s with a focus on; safety culture, safety 
management systems, contractor safety, high risk activities including hazardous 
manual tasks as well as risks exposed to the driving industry and traffic management. 
The Zero Harm Leadership Program also focused on the employment of people with 
disabilities (Safe Work Australia 2014). Workplace Health and Safety Queensland 
introduced a similar program on the recommendation from of Queensland’s 
Workplace Health and Safety Board, which has representation from unions, 
employers and industry experts (Donaldson, 2013). The Queensland Zero Harm at 
Work Leadership Program has over 250 member industry and government 
organisations that has a collective focus on changing workplace safety culture and 
the way that organisations reason about workplace safety with an aspiration that Zero 
Harm will become the norm (Workplace Health and Safety, 2011). 
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In summary, Australia’s legislative framework is structured on reducing 
workplace health and safety risks as low as reasonably possible. There is also a 
requirement to exercise a duty of care by employers and employees and in particular 
employers are required as far as reasonable practicable to provide a safe work 
environment as well as information, instruction, training and supervision. 
Furthermore, employees must take reasonable care for themselves and others at the 
workplace (Cliff, 2012). As an outcome of self-regulation it can be argued that to 
achieve the intent of the legislation such as, organisations taking responsibility for 
the management of workers health and safety as well as managers and workers 
working together, there has been a significant drive for those organisations to adopt 
Zero Harm. In doing so, promoting their commitment to workplace safety and 
driving the creation of a vision and/or goal to achieve an injury and incident free 
work environment.  
2.3 THE IMPACT OF WORKPLACE INCIDENTS 
Workplace incidents have adverse impacts to an organisations performance 
including a decrease in productivity, decreased quality, negative public image, poor 
safety climate and financial costs (Fernandez-Muniz, Montes-Peon & Vazquez-
Ordas, 2009). The most recent cost estimate to the Australian economy as a result of 
workplace injury and illness is $61.8 billion for the financial year 2012 - 2013, which 
as previously discussed, represents approximately 4.8 per cent of the Australian GDP 
(Safe Work Australia, 2015).  As suggested by Safe Work Australia (2014) this 
significant economic cost is not only borne by employers and workers, but also by 
the broader community. In a recent study conducted by Safe Work Australia (2015) 
which included the effects of economic agents due to workplace incidents, it was 
identified that the total cost of workplace fatalities, injuries and illness that is borne 
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by the employer is equivalent to 5 per cent of the total cost, whereas the impact that 
is borne by workers equates to 74 per cent of the total cost. Finally, the research also 
identified that the impact of workplace fatalities, injuries and illness that is borne by 
the community is 21 per cent of the total cost. However, it was noted that the level of 
cost to those economic agents will vary and are dependent on the severity of the 
injury or disease. From an employer perspective, an understanding of injury cost 
estimates, can provide a comprehensive measure capability that will measure the cost 
of workplace injuries relative to other costs of business and can be used for the 
benefit of cost analysis for workplace health and safety interventions (Miller, 1997). 
When determining the cost of workplace injuries, illnesses or deaths, in general 
there are two factors that are considered (Lebeau & Duguay, 2013; O’Neill, Cheung 
& Holley, 2014; Waehrer, Dong, Miller, Haile & Men, 2007); (1) direct costs and (2) 
indirect costs. Direct costs are tangible costs that are associated with a workplace 
injury. They include the direct spend such as, workers compensation payment to the 
injured or incapacitated employee, or workers compensation premium. However, this 
does not take into account the indirect costs of workplace injuries, which are much 
harder to quantify. Indirect costs include an increase in workers compensation 
premiums, overtime to cover injured employees, investigation costs, retraining costs, 
plant and equipment damage, potential regulator fines, loss of production and loss of 
organisational image and the impact on the injured parties family and social 
networks to name a few. Table 2.1 provides a summarised approach to classifying 
direct and indirect costs (Massey, Lamm & Perry 2007, p. 9).  
Table 2.1 
 Intangible and Tangible costs of workplace incidents (Massey, Lamm & Perry 2007, 
p.9) 
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  Intangible (Indirect costs) Tangible (Direct Costs) 
Victim • Pain and suffering. 
• Moral and psychological 
suffering (especially in the 
case of a permanent 
disability). 
• Loss of salary and 
premiums. 
• Reduction of professional 
capacity. 
• Loss of time (medical 
treatments).
Family & Friends • Moral and psychological 
suffering. 
• Medical and family burden.
• Financial loss. 
• Extra costs. 
Colleagues • Bad feeling. 
• Worry or panic (case of 
serious or frequent 
incidents). 
• Loss of time and possibly 
also of premiums. 
• Increased workload. 
• Training of temporary 
workers.
Company • Deterioration of the social 
climate. 
• Bad reputation. 
• Weakening of human 
relations. 
 
• Internal audit. 
• Decrease in production. 
• Damages to the equipment, 
material. 
• Quality losses. 
• Training of new staff. 
• Technical disturbances. 
• Organisational difficulties. 
• Increase of production 
costs. 
• Increase of the insurance 
premium or reduction of the 
discount. 
• Administrative costs. 
• Legal sanctions. 
Society • Reduction of the human 
labour potential. 
• Reduction of the quality of 
life. 
• Loss of production. 
• Increase of social security 
costs. 
• Medical treatment and 
rehabilitation costs. 
• Decrease of the standard of 
living.
 
Further research by Massey, et al. (2007) has also identified that these direct 
and indirect costs can be divided into three categories; (1) the costs of anticipation, 
which are costs associated with intervention strategies to prevent or mitigate injury 
or illness; (2) the costs as a consequence, which are the overt and hidden costs in 
relation to injury or illness; and (3) the costs in response, which include 
organisational and government responses such as investigation of the injury or 
illness.  
 Literature Review 23 
Numerous studies have been undertaken to understand and measure the 
economic costs as an outcome from workplace injuries and illnesses (Kiel, Kolsen & 
Smith, 2000). There is no exact science for economic costing which are dependent on 
costing approaches, the ability to cost components and the quality of the data (Safe 
Work Australia, 2015). Of note, it is also suggested that there is the potential that if 
the economic costs are not provided or understood the onus or incentive for 
employers to invest in safe workplaces or employees to take ownership and 
responsibility for care will be diminished (Kiel, et al., 2000). Furthermore, evidence 
suggest that employees can be motivated to respond to economic incentives for 
workplace safety (Miller & Haslam, 2008). 
There are various models for estimating the total cost that have traditionally 
been calculated by multiplying the direct costs by an indirect cost multiplier. This is 
the same as the ratio of indirect costs to direct costs (Everett & Frank, 1996). Various 
studies estimate that this multiplier can range from 2 to 20 (Everett & Frank, 1996; 
Usmen, 1994). In more recent studies, it has been identified that it can vary by 
anywhere between 0.5 and 20 (Massey, et al., 2007). Also a study by Huang, 
Leamon, Courtney, DeArmond, Chen and Blair (2009) suggests that on average the 
estimated ratio of indirect cost to direct costs as a result of workplace injuries is 2.12 
to 1, which equates for every dollar directly spent there is an indirect cost of $2.12. 
However, the most cited ratio is the 4-to-1 ratio as postulated and published by 
Heinrich in 1926, who was one of the foremost pioneers in accident prevention 
(Manuele, 2002).  
Although there is some debate on the use of cost ratios, research has identified 
that calculating occupational accident costs can create value to the organisation. This 
will significantly assist organisations in improving the business case for workplace 
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safety investment and providing the organisation with empirical data that will meet 
the needs of the organisations decision makers (Miller & Haslam, 2008). Taken 
together, it is for these reasons that organisations, such as those that have adopted the 
Zero Harm concept positively manage workplace safety so they can be rewarded 
with decreased incident rates, improved productivity, improved internal safety 
climate, improved financial performance and improved competitiveness (Fernandez-
Muniz, Montes-Peon & Vazquez-Ordas, 2009). Furthermore, as previously 
discussed, an organisations safety performance may dictate if a contract is won or 
lost (Stewart, 2008). 
2.4 ZERO HARM: EVOLUTION, APPLICATION AND DEBATE 
From an oil & gas industry perspective there have been various incidents that 
have resulted in industry seeking the next paradigm to improve workplace health and 
safety. For example, the 1982 Ocean Ranger offshore drilling rig which sank in 
severe weather resulting in the loss of 84 lives, the 1988 Piper Alpha offshore 
drilling rig disaster which resulted in a loss of 167 lives, the Petrobras P-36 offshore 
drilling platform explosion in 2001 resulting in loss of 11 lives, the 2009 West Atlas 
offshore drilling rig blowout and fire disaster resulting in the rig leaking product for 
74 days prior to being stopped and more recently, the 2010 Deepwater Horizon 
offshore drilling rig disaster involving 11 fatalities and resulting in the largest marine 
spill in history (Park, 2012). Incidents such as these have resulted in organisations 
and in particular the oil and gas industry searching, researching and developing 
innovated safety programs including the adoption of Zero Harm to improve their 
safety performance.  It has been suggested by O’Rourke (2010), that Zero Harm has 
become a mantra for a new approach to workplace safety. Companies who move to 
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Zero Harm do so affirming that this is the only acceptable safety goal (Spigener, 
2009). Therefore to gain a greater insight to Zero Harm, its evolution and application 
shall be reviewed as well as the ongoing debate between proponents and opponents 
of Zero Harm. 
2.4.1 The evolution of Zero Harm  
It is proposed that the concept of Zero Harm as a vernacular, evolved (figure 
2.1) from the quality ‘zero defects’ concept which arose in the 1960’s (Zwtsloot, et 
al., 2013). This ‘zero’ approach then evolved to the concept of ‘zero tolerance’ which 
was first used in the 1970’s & 1980’s in the United States of America in combating 
crime from the philosophical origins of ‘Broken Windows’ (Griffith, 1999; Sherratt, 
2014). The focus of zero tolerance has since evolved into other areas including 
violence at schools, bullying, drugs and alcohol (NASP, 2012). The underlying 
principle of zero tolerance is that certain actions will not be tolerated under any 
circumstances.  
 
Figure 2.1. Zero Harm its beginnings and evolution 
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More recently, the workplace health and safety movement has embraced the 
concept of Zero Harm. Zero Harm is similar in some aspects to zero tolerance in that, 
injuries within the workplace will not be accepted.  Zero Harm is focused on creating 
an injury and incident free work environment where injuries are not acceptable and 
everything possible is undertaken to prevent them (Spigener, 2009).  Essentially, the 
vision is zero acceptances of injuries or fatalities (O’Rourke, 2010). From an 
Australian perspective, industry has readily adopted the Zero Harm concept such as 
BHP Billiton (Zero Harm); Anglo (Target Zero) and Arrium (Goal Zero). Although 
the adoption of Zero Harm has been prolific, it is also acknowledged that Zero Harm 
has been a controversial concept between Zero Harm proponents and opponents. 
However, it has been argued that it is an important stepping-stone to engage 
organisations and their employees in thinking about safety and how it is applied 
within their workplace (Ernst & Young, 2016). 
In the literal sense Zero Harm is an absolute, it means zero injuries, zero 
occupational illness, zero incidents, zero damage, zero environmental impacts, zero 
near misses and zero mistakes which is impossible (Hosier, 2012). Spigener (2009, 
p.32) suggest, “Zero Harm is about creating environments where injuries are not 
acceptable and where we do everything possible to prevent them”. However, for the 
current program of research, the definition of Zero Harm ‘no harm to anyone, 
anytime while at work’ by Workplace Health and Safety Queensland (p.1, 2010) 
shall be adopted. 
2.4.2 Zero Harm as a goal 
Nelson (1996, p.23) argues that “zero is the only supportable goal; any other 
delivers the subtle message that injuries will occur and are acceptable” (Nelson, 
1996, p.23). This is supported by Johnson (2010), who implies that if Zero Harm is 
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not your goal, then you must be willing to accept that some injuries will occur and 
that this is tolerable and or satisfactory. However, it is also suggested that Zero Harm 
is no more than a catch phrase (Leemamn, 2010) or a trendy slogan (Donaldson, 
2013). Whilst “Zero Harm may be portrayed as a laudable aspiration” (Donaldson 
p23, 2013), Zero Harm as a goal is contemptible as employees are mindful that there 
are always risks in the activities that they undertake (Leemann, 2010) which, if the 
controls fail, may lead to an incident or injury. Further, as argued by Long (2012), 
the majority of the workforce does not believe that Zero Harm is achievable.   
It is also suggested that organisations that portray Zero Harm as a goal, creates 
a potential to drive the underreporting of injuries (Nelson, 1996). Although it is 
acknowledged that the reporting of injuries has always been historically problematic 
regardless of the organisations’ injury goal (Nelson, 1996).  Zero Harm as an 
organisational goal is admirable, however Zero Harm does not clearly convey how to 
achieve this goal (Leemamn, 2010). It is suggested that employees must see the goal 
as realistic and achievable, as they will not be motivated to strive for goals that they 
deem unattainable (Livingston, 2009, p.26). Conversely, as stated by Nelson (1996, 
p.23) “a safety performance mentality of zero injury is a worthy objective. Negative 
thinkers should not be allowed to deny employees the positive results that stem from 
pursuit of the zero concept. It is a sound, socially responsible management attitude 
regarding the ongoing health of any business’ most important asset – employees.” 
Yet as suggested by Donaldson (2013, p.23) “there is no evidence available that 
demonstrates Zero Harm is more successful than any other form of safety 
intervention”. 
 28 Literature Review  
2.4.3 Safety substituted by Zero Harm 
Interestingly Ormond & Soloman (2014) suggest the Zero Harm has now 
become so ubiquitous it is the only thing that anyone associates with safety. Through 
the marketing of the phrase ‘Zero Harm’, it has become a substitute for the words 
safety and risk (Long, 2012, p.17). For example, a search of online recruitment sites 
(www.seek.com.au, www.thesafestep.com.au) and through the Safety Institute of 
Australia (www.sia.org.au) has yielded advertised workplace health and safety 
positions such as ‘National Zero Harm Manager’, ‘Zero Harm Reporting 
Coordinator’, ‘Zero Harm Advisor’ and ‘Zero Harm Regional Co-ordinator’. 
Historically, these roles would have used the term ‘safety’. Other examples of Zero 
Harm terminology replacing safety include; a safety and training organisation called 
Zero Harm Safety & Training (www.zeroharm.com.au) and a ‘zero harm reporting 
app’ developed by New Zealand Transport Agency for the reporting of safety 
incidents (https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/nzta-zero-harm/id941478708?mt=8). The 
term ‘zero harm culture’ or ‘zero accident culture’ are becoming more prevalent and 
in some instances has commenced to replace the term ‘safety culture’ for example 
Zero Harm Culture @ Siemens’ (Siemens, 2014), zero accident culture (Zurich, 
2011) and zero harm culture change leadership (Safe Work Australia, 2014). 
2.4.4 Measuring Zero Harm 
Zero Harm revolves on the premise that if you can work without an injury for 
one day, this can lead to working without an injury for one week, which can lead to 
working without and injury for one month or even one year (Burnham, 2015). As 
suggested by Nelson (1996), Zero Harm is about working injury free ‘one day at a 
time’ for an extended period. Thus, the measuring of injury free days would indicate 
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a sound measure of Zero Harm. However, it has become obvious that industry has 
modified the intent of ‘an injury free day’ to no ‘lost time injuries’ or ‘no recordable 
injuries’ and does not factor measuring less severe injuries such as first aid injuries 
or workplace psychological injuries. Therefore when measuring Zero Harm it 
becomes a numerical gymnastics where organisations reclassify injuries through 
injury management practice to avoid lost time or medical treatment injury 
classification (Dekker, 2015). 
Further pressure is place on organisations to manage statistics rather than 
safety when they are required by governmental jurisdictions, to report on incidents 
involving fatalities and lost time injuries. Again, when tendering for work, most 
organisations must also report on their LTIFR (Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate) 
and RIFR (Recordable Injury Frequency Rate) (Stewart, 2008) implying a lower 
LTIFR and/or RIFR would be seen as more favourable.  A review of various 
companies that use Zero Harm as a mantra identified through their 2015 Annual 
Reports that each company measures Zero Harm with lagging accident indicators 
which is problematic for a myriad of reasons which will be discussed further within 
this chapter. Examples of various organisations who operate in high-risk industries 
that use Zero Harm as a mantra, and how they measure Zero Harm are described in 
the following 2015 Annual Reports; 
• BHP Billiton measures the total number of fatalities and TRIF (Total 
Recordable Injury Frequency) 
http://www.bhpbilliton.com/investors/annualreporting2015/key-
documents 
• Arrium measures the LTIFR (Lost Time Injury Frequency Rate), 
MTIFR (Medical Treatment Injury Frequency Rate) & RIFR 
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(Recordable Injury Frequency Rate) http://www.arrium.com/investor-
centre/reports-presentations 
• BP measures the RIF (Recordable Injury Frequency) 
http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/investors/bp-annual-report-and-
form-20f-2015.pdf 
• Shell measures the TRCF (Total Recordable Case Frequency), LTIF 
Lost Time Injury Frequency) and FAR (Fatality Accident Rate) 
As identified previously, measuring lagging accident or outcome measures are 
problematic (Oleinick, Guire, Hawthorne, Schork, Gluck, Lee & La, 1993; Probst, 
Brubaker & Barsotti, 2008; Probst & Estrada, 2010). However, as implied within 
these annual reports, the organisations measures their lagging indicators with the 
intent that it is moving towards Zero Harm and will eventfully achieve Zero Harm. 
As suggested by Nelson (1996) once a goal of zero lost time injuries has been 
achieved the focus and commitment can then be placed on achieving zero recordable 
injuries. This has a flow on effect that when the goal of zero recordable injuries is 
achieved, the organisation can then focus and commit to achieving zero first aid 
injuries and so on. This provides a platform that zero accidents today delivers the 
potential and reassurance that there will be zero accidents tomorrow (Sherratt, 2014).   
When organisations measure Zero Harm based on workers injury rates and 
statistics the success or failure of the organisation safety program will be measured 
by these statistics (Stewart, 2008). This is an important concept as investors 
favourably review organisations that have a strong safety record including a low 
number of lost time or recordable injuries (Ekevall, Gillespie & Riege, 2008). 
Measuring Zero Harm and attaining lower injury rates has other benefits for 
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organisations such as reduced costs from accident damage, insurance costs and 
litigation as well as avoiding production delays (Ekevall, et al., 2008). 
2.4.5 The Zero Harm debate 
QRMC, (2011, p.1) argue that, “since its popularisation the philosophy of zero 
harm has polarised debate” which can be demonstrated by the many online blogs and 
online forums. These online blogs and forums have become polemical opportunities 
for ‘proponents’ of Zero Harm to do battle with ‘opponents’ of Zero Harm. Three of 
the most popular online forums include LinkedIn, Safetyrisk.net and Safety at Work 
Blog. Examples of these debates include ‘zero harm and the killing fields’, ‘the zero 
harm dream’, ‘creative and seductive target setting’ ‘SMART zero harm’ and ‘the 
zero harm debate’ which can be found on LinkedIn (www.linkedine.com). Others 
include, ‘Thinking about harm’, ‘binary opposites and safety goal strategy’, ‘the zero 
harm ethos’, ‘the ideology of zero harm’, ‘could zero harm be unlawful’, ‘what is the 
issue with the language of zero’ and ‘the madness of measuring nothing’ which can 
be found on Safetyrisk.net (www.safetyrisk.net). The final example is ‘zero harm is a 
fallacious deception – thoughts on the 2012 safety in action conference’, ‘do some 
good sounds more effective than achieving zero harm’, ‘zero harm persists in 
confusing companies on safety’, and ‘zero accident vision and its OHS potential’ 
which can be located on (http://safetyatworkblog.com). 
The review of the literature is hotly debated which postulates that there will 
always be proponents who believe in Zero Harm as the only acceptable goal, while 
there will always be opponents who do not believe it is a credible goal and one that is 
impossible to achieve. Zero Harm proponents have a premise that all injuries and 
incidents are preventable (Derry, 2013; Stewart, 2008). Furthermore, that no other 
goal is acceptable (Johnston, 2012). While Zero Harm opponents suggest that there is 
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no evidence that demonstrates that Zero Harm is more effective than any other safety 
program and that Zero Harm is nothing more than an organisational slogan 
(Donaldson, 2013). 
One of the main criticisms of Zero Harm is its language (Donaldson, 2013; 
Long, 2012). Organisations speak of Zero Harm as an achievable goal that is 
positioned as a future reality (Sherratt, 2013). Whereas the workforce positions zero 
harm as unachievable target (Sherratt, 2013). Long, (2012) reports that using the 
MiProfile© safety culture diagnostic survey on over 21,000 participants it found that 
only 35% of the participants believe in the concept of Zero Harm (Long, 2012, p.42) 
This survey has been used since 2006 and includes participants from mining, 
building and construction, manufacturing industries and government agencies (Long, 
2012). As stated by Long (2012, p.126), ‘the discourse of zero harm is a fallacy. It is 
based on ignorance of heuristics and anchored in simplistic naivety’.  
2.4.6 Industry application of Zero Harm 
It is suggested that for organisations whose safety performance has plateaued, 
the next evolutionary construct for improving safety performance is the 
manifestation of Zero Harm or zero target programmes that are used as platforms to 
communicate the Zero Harm message to their employees and the wider society 
(Sherratt, 2013). The popularity of zero accident cultures and zero target programmes 
has expanded (Sherratt, 2014; Wilkins, 2011). However, Zero Harm and zero target 
programmes not only have the potential to inspire an increased commitment to 
safety, they also have the potential to cause a detachment through a view that Zero 
Harm is unattainable (Sherratt, 2014). Interestingly a study on five construction 
organisations that had introduced zero target programmes (Zou, 2011), suggests that 
zero incidents and injuries is attainable but only if all other stakeholders, including 
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management and workers, have the right beliefs, values, attitudes and behaviours. 
However, and intrinsic to achieving this end state, it must be supported by a safety 
management system that not only integrates the legislative requirements but also the 
organisations’ policies and site standards as well as human factors (Zou, 2011). This 
study included four large global construction companies and one large Australian 
construction company. The study involved a comprehensive qualitative data 
collection including a review of published literature, online websites, as well as 
direct interviews and discussions with senior executives and personnel (Zou, 2011).  
Although it has been argued that Zero Harm or zero target program objectives 
are not always well defined (Sherratt, 2014) within a study by Zou (2011) involving 
high-risk industry, it was identified that there are seven common constructs. Whilst 
there may be nuanced distinctions in the approach to zero target programmes, within 
each organisation the overriding constructs identified by Zou (2011, p.31) are; (1) 
human factors including attitudes, beliefs, values, mindsets (2) a belief and value of 
workers and management that all incidents and injuries are preventable and 
unacceptable, (3) strong commitment from top management, (4) engagement of all 
stakeholders, (5) the development of safety risk management systems and reviewing 
safety performance, (6) clear authority and accountability and rewarding safe 
behaviour, and (7) establishment of a safety knowledge database for capturing 
lessons learned and identifying corrective actions. This study was a comparison only 
and did not indicate how each organisation measured its Zero Harm performance. 
However, as noted by Sherratt (2013), zero target programmes when positioned as a 
numerical target are problematic. Should the target not be reached it opens the 
chance of the programmes failure should just one accident occur. Furthermore as 
suggested by Sherratt (2013), measuring safety performance has arguably been 
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focused on statistical numbers, rather than safety practices and the people behind 
them. 
Andreschefski & Geersten (2010) have also presented findings from a case 
study that was deemed as a successful intervention of Zero Harm. The Ells River 
appraisal project team (oil and gas delineation drilling) adopted and implemented its 
‘zero is attainable’ (ZIA) safety initiative. Within three years of the implementation 
of ZIA and working in very harsh conditions, including winter temperatures of minus 
45 degrees, the project recoded a TRIR (Total Recordable Injury Rate) of zero and 
also recorded zero Days Away From Work (DAFW). This project operated under 
two guiding principles, “do it safely or not at all” that resulted in empowering the 
workforce which included reward and recognition for individuals, improved work 
environment, changes to business processes. This also enabled the project to achieve 
benefits from an economic, social and environmental perspective, which also 
included the local communities. Further, the project was able to significantly 
maintain a return rate for contractor personnel. This was achieved through best 
practice sharing, and developing of supporting safety programs, which created and 
maintained ongoing partnerships with the local communities and their labour force. 
The success of the project, through the ZIA program, has been directly attributed to 
consistent personalised leadership messaging, engaging and empowering contractors, 
supervisors, and workers, as well as communicating clear expectations, and the 
collective belief that zero is attainable. Whilst the project achieved its target of zero 
TRIR and zero DAFW and should be applauded for its efforts, there is no 
information on how many first aid injuries or incidents that may have occurred to 
determine if the project truly did achieve Zero Harm. As previously discussed, 
measuring Zero Harm is problematic and is dependent on what an organisations goal 
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is and the setting of the target key performance indicators (KPI) to achieve that goal. 
Within this case study it was also difficult to identify the methodology used to 
determine how the ZIA program was analysed and measured other than the use of a 
scorecard, which was populated with lagging and leading indicators.  
Young (2014) presents another case study on injury reduction through the zero 
accident vision (ZAV) ‘our goal is zero’ program adopted by New Zealand 
Aluminum Smelters Limited (NZAS). This study involved a mix method approach 
with a quantitative review of LTI data between 1972 and 2011. This was followed by 
qualitative enquiry through semi-structured interviews with a cross section of 
employees. In total there were 23 participants, which is a relatively small sample size 
from a workforce of approximately 2100 employees. NZAS introduced the ZAV, 
supported by the slogan ‘our goal is zero’ in 1990 and interestingly, NZSA has been 
acknowledged as the safest aluminum smelter of its class in the world (New Zealand 
Aluminum Smelters Limited, 2007). Young’s (2014) research involved a qualitative 
review of the four interventions strategies that where implemented within the 
organisation; (1) automation, (2) personal protective equipment, (3) incident 
investigation and, (4) proprietary behavioural interventions. The organisational 
outcome measure that was used to measure the efficacy of these intervention 
strategies and the organisations overall safety performance was the number of LTI’s 
(Lost Time Injuries) and the LTIFR. Curiously, the research included the previous 40 
years of the organisations safety performance (1972 – 2011). NZAS achieved 12 
months without a LTI in 2010, however NZAS recorded 7 LTI’s the following year 
and the annual LTI’s from the previous 12 years vary between one and seven 
(Young, 2014). Although NZAS introduced its ZAV program some 20 years prior, it 
has not yet achieved its goal of zero but as stated by Young (2014, p.106) “it has 
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brought LTI numbers tantalizingly close to zero”. Again this organisation is using 
accident outcomes as a measure for Zero Harm. Although, in comparison to the Ells 
River example above, NZAS is measuring the number of LTI’s only, whereas the 
Ells River project measures not only the number of LTI’s but also the number of 
medical treatment injuries. This demonstrates how problematic measuring Zero 
Harm can be. It is well known that caution should be taken when measuring LTI’s, 
LTIFR and TRIR as there is the potential to reclassify and underreport injuries 
(Dekker, 2015; Sherratt, 2014). Although the findings from this research not only 
confirmed the establishment of a declining LTIFR, it also confirmed that 
underreporting of LTI’s was not an explanatory factor in the LTIFR decline. But it 
must be reiterated, that even though there is an observable improvement in the 
reduction of LTI’s and LTIFR within NZAS, the organisation has not achieved Zero 
Harm.  
Another research study within five large UK construction contractors that had 
introduced zero target programs, found that there was inconsistency and incoherence 
in the comprehension of Zero Harm (Sherratt, 2014). This research involved a social 
constructionist methodology including analysis of published reports, corporate 
websites, promotional material and discussions with a cross section of employees. 
Whilst the methodology was sound, the sample size of the discussions comprised of 
only nine workers (three managers and six operators) from a total of two sites. 
The findings from this study suggest the practical success of Zero Harm, may 
be affected due to its potential lack of understanding by employees, this may also 
result in low efficacy of the zero target programmes (Sherratt, 2014). This research 
suggests that, despite the iconoclastic position of the workforce, that may believe that 
zero is an unachievable target, as well as organisations that use Zero Harm as a 
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numerical target; a focus on Zero [Harm] is very necessary for safety management 
and future safety improvements which should be firmly supported (Sherratt, 2014).  
2.5 SAFETY CULTURE 
Phrases such as Zero Harm culture or zero accident culture are becoming more 
prevalent in recent times. For example; Siemens (2014) uses the phrase in their ‘Zero 
Harm Culture @ Siemens’ vision document, Zurich (2011) uses zero accident culture 
in their ‘HelpPoint’ newsletter and Safe Work Australia (2014) use the phrase zero 
harm at work culture and the phrase ‘zero harm culture change leadership’ which is 
used to describe the Queensland Zero Harm at Work program (The Morning 
Bulletin, 2010). O’Rouke (2010), suggests that Zero Harm is a workplace culture and 
climate with a core safety value that no workplace death or injury is acceptable. 
Whilst it is debatable if the term Zero Harm culture will become as synonymous as 
the term safety culture, this section shall review organisational culture, safety culture 
and safety climate to further understand Zero Harm as a workplace culture and 
climate.  
2.5.1 Organisational culture 
As suggested by Glendon & Stanton (2000), it is well known that 
organisational culture is critical to an organisations success or organisational failure. 
However, an understanding of just what is organisational culture, by its very 
definition, is elusive, intangible, and implicit and is taken for granted (Deal & 
Kennedy, 1983). Although it is argued that every organisation has a culture and that 
culture will influence safety behaviours, by analysing how this occurs will create 
opportunities to identify how to modify the organisations culture to elevate safety as 
a higher priority (Hopkins, 2006).  
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Organisational culture is not just a determinant of economic activity but it is 
also a result of economic activity (Martinez, Beaulieu, Gibbons, Pronovost & Wang, 
2015). Furthermore as stated by Schein (2010, p.18) “organisational culture can be 
defined as a pattern of basic assumptions learned by a group to solve its problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration which has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (Schein, 1990; 2004; 2010). 
An alternative and more simplistic definition, if not the most commonly known 
definition (Hopkins, 2006) for organisational culture is “the way we do things around 
here” (Deal & Kennedy, 1983, p.501). 
The manifestation of organisational culture can be articulated within three 
major levels (Schein, 2010). This is a useful heuristic in examining and analysing the 
various elements of organisational culture (Miller, 2012; Yilmaz, 2014). These levels 
as suggested by Schein (2010) are (1) artefacts; including structures and processes 
that are visible, heard and felt as well as observed behaviour, (2) espoused beliefs 
and values; ideas, goals, values, aspirations, ideologies and rationalization, and (3) 
basic underlying assumptions; which are the unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs 
and values. A deeper exploration reveals that, the first level refers to the observable 
behaviours and social context created by the organisations employees. The second or 
intermediate level is focused on the official values and expectations, as there may be 
discrepancies between the official values of the organisation and the actual 
manifestation of those values. The third and final layer is focused on how individuals 
within the organisation perceive the world and its core principles underlying their 
world-view (Yimaz, 2014). 
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Schein (2010) argues that if an organisation fails to decipher the pattern of 
basic underlying assumptions then it will fail to correctly interpret the artefacts’ as 
well as the level of credence within the organisations espoused values. As stated by 
Schein (2010, p.32), “the essence of a culture lies in the pattern of basic underlying 
assumptions, and after you understand those, you can easily understand the other 
more surface levels and deal appropriately with them”. 
2.5.2 Safety culture origins 
As positioned by Clarke, (1999) and Wu, Lin & Shiau (2010), safety culture is 
a subset of organisational culture, involving beliefs and values that are specifically 
focused on safety within the organisation. Globally, there is an increasing interest 
from industry into the concept of safety culture to enhance safety outcomes and 
improve organisational safety performance. Safety culture has the potential in 
minimising accidents and disasters that may be associated with every day routine 
tasks (Cooper, 2000). Safety culture as a concept is comparatively new and was first 
documented as an outcome of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster (Cooper, 2000). In this 
disaster, it was identified that a contributing factor was the poor safety culture within 
the Chernobyl plant as well as within the former Soviet nuclear industry 
(International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], 1988). As an outcome of the 
Chernobyl disaster, the IAEA (1991, p.1) defined safety culture as “that assembly of 
characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals which establishes that, 
as an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive attention warranted by 
their significance”.  
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2.5.3 Safety culture and safety climate 
There has been an abundance of research on safety culture and safety climate 
over the last three decades. However, there is still significant debate and a lack of 
universal agreement on what their definitions are (Guldenmund, 2010). The use of 
safety climate versus safety culture has also developed into long-standing debates 
between safety professionals and researchers on the nature, supremacy and 
applicability within organisational literature (Ashforth, 1985; Flin, Means, O’Connor 
& Bryden, 2000; Rousseau, 1988; Schneider & Gunnarson, 1996). This has resulted 
in a proliferation of definitions, which are outlined in Table 2.2, which provides the 
most commonly cited definitions of safety culture. This is supported by Table 2.3, 




Commonly cited definitions of safety culture 
Reference Definition 
Cox & Cox (1991) Safety cultures reflect the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and values 
that employees share in relation to safety 
International Atomic 
Energy Agency  (1991) 
Safety Culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in 
organisations and individuals which establishes that, as an overriding 
priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by 
their significance 
Pidgeon (1991 The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and social and technical 
practices that are concerned with minimizing the exposure of 
employees, managers, customers and members of the public to 
conditions considered dangerous or injurious 
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Reference Definition 
Ostrom, Wilhelmsen & 
Kaplan (1993) 
The concept that the organisations beliefs and attitudes manifested in 
actions, policies, and procedures , affect its safety performance 
Geller (1994) In a Total Safety Culture (TSC), everyone feels responsible for safety 
and pursues it on a daily basis 
Berends (1996) The collective mental programming towards safety of a group of 
organisation members 
Lee (1996) The safety culture of an organisation is the product of individual and 
group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of 
behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and 
proficiency of, and organisations health and safety management  
Reason (1997) An ideal safety culture is the engine that continues to propel the 
system towards the goal of maximum safety health, regardless of the 
leaderships personality or current commercial concerns  
Kennedy & Kirwan 
(1998) 
An abstract concept, which is underpinned by the amalgamation of 
individual and group perceptions, thought processes, feelings and 
behaviours, which in turn gives rise to the particular way of doing 
things in the organisation 
Clarke (1999) That safety culture is a subset of organisational culture, their beliefs 
and values specifically in relation to matters of health and safety 
Hale (2000)  Refers to ‘the attitudes, beliefs and perceptions shared by natural 
groups as defining norms and values, which determine how they act 
and react in relation to risk an risk control systems’ 
Cooper (2000) That observable degree of effort by which all organisational members 
directs their attention and actions towards improving safety on a daily 
basis  
Guldenmund (2000) Those aspects of organisational culture which will impact on attitudes 
behaviour related to increasing or decreasing risk. 
Mohammed (2003) A sub-facet of organisational culture, which affects workers attitudes 
and behaviour in relation to an organisations on going safety 
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Reference Definition 
performance. 
Richter & Koch (2004) Shared and learned meanings, experiences and interpretations of 
work and safety – expressed partially symbolically – which guide 
people’s actions towards risk, accidents and prevention 
Fang, Chen & Lousia 
(2006) 
A set of prevailing indicators, beliefs and values that the organisation 
owns in safety 
 
Table 2.3. 
Commonly cited definitions of safety climate 
Reference Definition 
 Zohar (1980) A summary of molar perceptions that employees share about their 
work environments 
 Brown & Holmes 
(1986) 
A set of perceptions and beliefs held by an individual and or 
group about a particular entity 
 Dedobbeleer & Beland 
(1991) 
 Molar perceptions people have of their work settings 
Niskanen (1994) Safety climate refers to a set of attributes that can be perceived 
about particular work organisations and which may be induced by 
the policies and practices that those organisation impose upon 
their workers and supervisors 
Cooper & Phillips (1994) Safety climate is concerned with the shared perceptions and 
beliefs that workers hold regarding safety in their work place 
Coyle, Sleeman & 
Adams (1995) 
The objective measurement of attitudes and perceptions toward 
occupational health and safety issues 
 Zohar (2000) Safety climate as a multi-level construct rests on the 
differentiation between respective sources of climate perceptions 
at the organisational and group levels of analysis 
Mohamed (2002) Workers perception of safety in the work environment  
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Reference Definition 
Neal & Griffin (2006) Individual perceptions of policies, procedures, and practices 
relating to safety in the workplace 
 Taking into account the above, there are obvious similarities between safety 
culture and safety climate and this confusion has resulted in both concepts being used 
interchangeably (Glendon & Stanton, 2000) they are not however, synonymous 
(Bjerkan, 2010). Conceptually, safety culture as previously discussed is a subset of 
organisational culture with a concern of the values and beliefs that influence 
behaviours in relation to safety (Clarke, 1999; Guldenmund, 2000). Whereas safety 
climate may be described as individual perceptions in matters of workplace safety 
(Neal & Griffin, 2006; Zohar, 1980). It may also be argued, that due to this 
proliferation of differing definitions and lack of agreement on the definitions of 
safety culture and safety climate, it creates confusion from an organisational 
perspective, which may impede on organisational safety culture or safety climate 
initiatives for improved organisational safety performance such as organisations 
adopting or implementing Zero Harm. 
2.5.4 Safety culture models and Zero Harm 
The concept of safety culture and its capacity to influence organisational 
behaviours, as a means of reducing workplace incidents is increasingly been pursued 
by industry (Cooper, 2000).  In particular, from an energy, and oil & gas industry 
perspective, this has led to the development of specific HSE (Health Safety 
Environment) culture models that have been designed to improve organisational 
safety culture and organisational safety performance. There are many safety culture 
models that have been adopted by organisations and industry such as, Geller’s Total 
Safety Culture model (1994); Cooper’s Reciprocal Safety Culture model (2000); 
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Reason’s Components of Safety Culture (1997) and DuPont’s Bradley Curve (2011). 
However, within the oil and gas industry the most prevalent safety culture model is 
arguably Hudson’s HSE culture ladder model which is the accepted industry standard 
by the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (Hudson, 2007). 
Hudson (2007) suggests that technology and the systems approach to safety, in 
particular to reducing incident rates, had reached a plateau and that the next approach 
is safety culture (Figure 2.2). Hudson suggests that technology and systems 
approaches to managing safety such as adoption of safety management systems have 
plateaued and will not achieve the levels of safety performance required. The missing 
link was identified as the human factor, ‘people’, which is posited as next level for 
improved safety performance and to reach the target of zero accidents. This is based 
on a premise of cultural approaches including behaviours, leadership, accountability 
and attitudes (Hudson, 2007). 
 
Figure 2.2. Safety development line (Hudson, 2007) 
To attain the next paradigm in safety Hudson developed a HSE culture ladder 
model (Figure 2.3) that demonstrates a pathway for organisations to move from its 
present state to a more advanced culture. Based on the original work of Westrum 
(1991) that identified three stages of culture evolution; pathological, bureaucratic and 
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generative, Hudson has adapted this to now include; pathological, reactive, 
calculative, proactive and generative. This model has also been referred to as a 
maturity model.  
 
Figure 2.3. HSE culture ladder (adapted from Hudson, 2003) 
The premise of Hudson’s model is that culture will mature on increasing levels 
of trust and informedness and that it will be adaptable to change as well as being 
worried, or in a state of chronic unease. This state of worry or chronic unease is a 
healthy discomfort and wariness to risk and complacency (Hudson, 2003). 
Hudson describes the five distinct ladders or levels as (Hudson, 2003, p.9): 
• Pathological: safety is a problem caused by workers. The main drivers 
are the business and a desire not to get caught by the regulator. 
• Reactive: organisations start to take safety seriously but there is only 
action after accidents. 
• Calculative: safety is driven by management systems, with much 
collection of data. Safety is still primarily driven by management and 
imposed rather than looked for by the workforce. 
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• Proactive: with improved performance, the unexpected is a challenge. 
Workforce involvement starts to move the initiative away from a purely 
top down approach. 
• Generative: there is an active participation at all levels. Safety is 
perceived to be an inherent part of the business. Organisations are 
characterised by chronic unease as a counter to complacency. 
Within the oil and gas industry as previously mentioned, the Hudson HSE 
culture ladder model is the industry standard which has been supported by research 
including its implementation within a major oil and gas multi-national organisation 
under the  organisations ‘Heart and Minds’ brand (Hudson, 2007). 
2.6 WORKPLACE SAFETY: INDUSTRY APPLICATION, ITS 
STRATEGIES AND LIMITATIONS 
2.6.1 Organisational visions and goals 
As previously discussed, industry has overwhelmingly embraced Zero Harm as 
a concept to demonstrate its commitment to workplace safety. Thus, an 
understanding of the organisational use of vision and setting of goals is warranted. 
As stated by Collins & Porras (1991, p.30) “the few truly great companies have 
known for years – in some cases for over a hundred years – the importance of having 
a vision. Recently a wider range of companies (those that want to attain greatness) 
have come to believe in the importance of this elusive, yet vitally important 
component of corporate success”. As suggested by Johnson (1998), vision is our 
directional compass and, an organisation literally has to see something in order to 
create it. Once the vision is shared not only does the vision provide direction, it can 
also create a sense of purpose (Sinkula, Baker & Noordewier, 1997). A vision will 
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help an organisation to be adaptive, innovative and supported by creative employees 
(Johnston, 1998). A vision has shown a nexus with individual creativity, employee 
inspiration as well as individual, team and organisational achievement (James & 
Lahti, 2011). 
The setting of organisational safety goals can be traced back to the Robens 
Report (1972), which identified that self-regulation, provided the most effective way 
to manage and improve workplace safety (Ledsome, 1994). A goal can be described 
as a level of proficiency that an organisation wishes to achieve. Using this descriptor, 
a goal is discrepancy; creating process by creating constructive discontent within the 
organisations present performance and committing for a higher level of performance 
(Latham & Locke, 2006). Thus, the intent of goal setting is to place sufficient 
demands and challenges upon people that will motivate them to achieve higher levels 
of performance (Cooper, 1993). There is substantial research on managing behaviour 
through goal setting (Marsh, Robertson, Duff, Phillips, Cooper & Weyman, 1995). 
When goals are well communicated and individuals are committed, the more 
challenging the goal the more effort individuals will exert to achieve that goal, as 
more attention is required therefore developing a sense of achievement and self-
satisfaction (Cooper, 1993; Gomez-Minambres, 2012; Latham & Locke, 2006; 
Locke & Latham,1990; Locke & Latham, 2006; Wood, Mento & Locke, 1987). It is 
argued that Zero Harm as a goal, has the potential to change behaviours, which can 
be demonstrated in the case study previously presented by Young (2014) which 
included the proprietary behavioural intervention program that resulted in a 
significant improvement in the reduction of lost time injuries. 
As discussed by Cooper (1993), it should also be noted that people will be 
reluctant to commit to a goal that they themselves believe is unrealistic such as zero 
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accidents within the workplace. Furthermore, that unrealistic goals can adversely 
affect and demotivate people which will compound the achievement of realisable 
safety goals (Reason, 1999). It is argued by Long (2012) that when Zero Harm is set 
as a goal it is in fact an avoidance goal, which is negative in context and is not 
inspirational (Moswkowitz & Grant, 2009). 
Leadership behaviour 
Underpinning an organisations vision and goal is the behaviours of its leaders. 
Management behaviour can be one of the most important factors that mould 
employees’ perceptions of safety behaviours (Gahan, Sevewright & Evans, 2014). 
Leaders of an organisation can improve the performance of their organisations by 
directly influencing the performance determinants such as their interactions with 
subordinates and peers (Yukl, 2008). Leadership may also be considered as an 
essential construct in the managing of safe organisations (Martinez-Corcoles, Garcia, 
Tomas & Peiro, 2011). While the importance of safety leadership may seem very 
obvious, it can however, become quite a complex process.  
Leadership is about influencing employees in performing their work correctly 
as well as establishing a positive relationship with those employees (Krause & 
Weekley, 2005). Leadership can influence the organisation to achieve a better safety 
culture, better safety performance and ultimately Zero Harm (QRMC, 2011). This 
has been supported by research that has identified that there is a nexus between 
management commitment and workplace injuries with management commitment to 
workplace health and safety being the most obvious and valid predictor of workplace 
injuries (Beus, Payne, Bergman & Arthur, 2010). 
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2.6.2 Organisational investment in safety 
Traditionally investment in safety was looked upon as being expensive but a 
necessity cost to ensure legislative compliance (Linhard, 2005). There is an argument 
that the management of safety is now evolving to ‘best in class’ organisation 
performance, through strategically viewing safety as a positive input to the business 
rather than a negative outcome (Smallman & John, 2001). This occurs in an 
environment where ‘safe and healthy’ organisations deem their workforce to be a 
strategic resource to be developed rather than assets that need protection (Zwetsloot, 
van Scheppingen, Dijkman, Heinrich & den Besten, 2010). Evidence has established 
that the total cost directly related to workplace injuries and incidents are significantly 
greater than the cost that should have been outlaid on prevention (O’Neill, Cheung & 
Holley, 2014). It is also well known that poor safety performance can not only 
impact adversely on the organisations reputation, but it may also lead to a 
competitive disadvantage through negative connotations with its stakeholders 
(Smallman, et al., 2001). An investment in safety can therefore have a positive effect 
on the competitiveness variables and the organisations financial performance 
(Fernandez-Muniz, Montes-Peon & Vazquez-Ordas, 2009). 
Research undertaken by the British Safety Council (Maniati, 2014), established 
that investing in workplace safety will yield a return on investment. Further, research 
has also identified that there is a direct, positive association between an investment in 
safety and any subsequent return on that investment (ASSE, 2002; Huang, Leamon, 
Courtney, DeArmond, Chen & Blair, 2009). Safety investment can be defined as the 
organisational cost which are incurred as a result of an emphasis being placed on 
safety control such as investing in training, safety incentives, staffing for safety and 
personal protective equipment (Feng, Teo, Ling & Low, 2014). Over 60 per cent of 
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chief financial officers involved in a review on financial returns on investment 
identified that there is the potential to generate $2 for every $1 that is invested in 
injury prevention (Shaw, Armstrong & Rae, 2007).  
2.6.3 Models for improved safety performance  
Potentially, two of the most common interventions that are adopted by 
organisations for improving workplace health and safety performance are; the 
adoption of safety management systems and behaviour based system (Wachter & 
Yorio, 2014). Whereas, safety management systems (SMS) provide a framework for 
organisations to manage workplace safety, the implementation of a behavioural 
based or behavioural change program are designed to discourage workers unsafe 
behaviour and promote safe behaviour. Both safety management systems and 
behavioural change programs are foundational constructs of Zero Harm, which is 
considered to be the next evolutionary step for safety management (Sherratt, 2013). 
2.6.3.1 Safety Management Systems 
A review of causal factors of the majority industrial disasters that have 
occurred in the past has identified that they can be traced back to a lack of an 
adequate safety management system (SMS) (Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2011). 
Objectively, SMS is a systematic approach and application to address workplace 
health and safety risks (Matinov-Bennie, O’Neill & Cheung, 2014), which reflects 
the organisations commitment and priority to workplace safety (Fernandez-Muniz, et 
al., 2007). SMS’s are also a core construct of Zero Harm and zero target intervention 
programs (Zou, 2011). It has been suggested that a SMS has the capability to create a 
safety culture within the workplace (Matinov-Bennie, et al., 2014). Intriguingly, 
although a SMS has become fashionable in recent years within organisations, recent 
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research suggests a lack of consensus of what a SMS is exactly (Robson, Clarke, 
Cullen, Bielecky, Severin, Bigelow, Irvin, Culyer & Mahood, 2007). 
A simplistic definition for SMS is; it is a documented, planned and 
demonstrable methodology of managing safety hazards and their associated risks 
(Bottomley, 1999). Standards Australia (2001, p4)  describes safety management 
systems as “part  of the overall management system which includes organisational 
structure, planning activities, responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes and 
resources for developing, implementing, achieving and maintaining the OHS policy 
and so managing the risks associated with the business of the organisation”. Other 
scholars posit that SMS’s as a collective arrangement of policies, strategies, 
practices, procedures, roles and any functions that are associated to workplace health 
and safety (Kirwan, 1998). Fernandez-Muniz et al., (2007) describes a SMS as the 
organisations policies and practices that have been developed to positively influence 
worker’s attitudes and behaviours in risk taking, thereby mitigating unsafe 
behaviours. Although there are differing descriptions of what a SMS is, collectively, 
a SMS can be described as an organisational approach to managing workplace health 
and safety that provides a systematic and comprehensive guidance to address 
organisational workplace health and safety risks (Glendon, Clarke & McKenna, 
2006). 
Benefits and issues with safety management systems 
Although previous reviews of SMS research have not resulted in empirical 
evidence that support benefits of adopting a SMS (Thomas, 2012), work undertaken 
by Matinov-Bennie, et al., (2014) suggest that direct and indirect benefits can be 
realised through reduced workplace safety incidents. These benefits include reduced 
costs as well as strategic and organisational competitive benefits. Matinov-Bennie, et 
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al., (2014) suggests the organisations can achieve strategic and competitive benefits 
and in particular those organisations that have achieved accreditation. These 
organisations have benefited through improved public image, stakeholder and 
workplace relations and commitment to social responsibility as a platform to 
compete against the organisations competitors for consumers. Other benefits of a 
SMS include organisational reduction in financial losses such as from medical costs, 
associated legal costs, as well as workers compensation, insurance premiums and 
worker absenteeism. A further benefit is minimal production disruptions to processes 
as well as minimising damage to equipment (Matinov-Bennie, et al., 2014).  
Lutchman, Maharaj & Ghanem, (2012) suggest that the implementation of a SMS 
will add to the profitability and sustainability of an organisation and describes the 




Benefits of SMSs (Lutchman, Maharaj & Ghanem, 2012, p.42). 
Quantifiable Benefits Less Quantifiable Benefits
• Fewer incidents and injuries 
• Less severe injuries 
• Fewer work-related fatalities and diseases 
• Reduced loss time away from work 
• Reduced health care treatment costs 
• Fewer employee turnovers 
• Reduction in insurance cost 
• Lowered operating and production cost 
• A more motivated workforce 
• Ability to attract and retain the best and 
brightest 
• Greater stakeholder commitment 
• More community support and engagement 
• Higher trust and credibility among all 
stakeholders 
 
To achieve these benefits it is argued that an organisation must obtain 
employee involvement. When an organisation has employee ‘buy in’, they will then 
be able to change behaviours through participation in the identification of risks and 
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hazards as well as active involvement in the design of the controls that workers will 
have to work under. In doing so, the SMS will promote a positive safety climate 
(Fernandez-Muniz, et al., 2007). Further, Fernandez-Muniz, et al., (2007) argue the 
adoption of workplace health and safety management systems is an organisations 
most efficient methodology for safety resources allocation, improving working 
conditions and positively influencing employees safety attitudes and safety 
behaviours.  
Although there are various scholars who suggest the implementation of SMSs 
contribute to safe and healthier workplaces (Bottani, Monica & Vignali, 2009; 
Fernandez-Muniz, et al., 2007; Zwetsloot, 2003). Conversely, there are some who do 
not support that SMS improve workplace safety. For example criticism has been 
labelled at safety management systems as being paper tigers (Saksvik & Nytro, 1996) 
and that paper based systems do not make any difference to the shop floor safety 
performance. Furthermore these SMS’s are developed on fundamentally flawed 
systems and methodology, which is deliberately resisted (Berger, 1999). Berger 
(1999) also suggests that SMS are flawed due to the underlying assumption that 
human behaviour can be modified by reading policies and procedures. A study by 
Gallagher, Underhill & Rimmer (2003) into barriers to the success of occupational 
safety and health management systems within Australia identified, from a union 
perspective that SMS’s simply do not work and should be dismissed as an evasive 
employer tactic.  
In Practice  
A synthesis of research into the effectiveness and implementation of SMS’s 
has identified there is overwhelmingly organisational support for the adoption of 
SMS’s within organisations to manage and improve their workplace health and 
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safety performance.  For example, the work undertaken by Bottani et al., (2009) 
involving 116 companies in a comparison of organisations that adopted SMS’s and 
those that did not; identified that those organisations that adopted a SMS experienced 
significantly higher workplace health and safety performance. This is supported by 
Fernandez-Muniz, et al., (2007) study which involved 455 Spanish companies who 
recognised that the implementation of a SMS provides the most effective capability 
to allocate resources as well as improving working conditions and influencing 
employees’ attitudes and behaviours. Another study by Gunningham and Sinclair 
(2011) involving various Australian mining companies identified those companies 
who demonstrated commitment to SMS’s also experienced improve workplace 
health and safety performance.  
However, it has also been argued that organisations that portray the existence 
of world-class safety management systems such as Esso’s Longford gas plant in 
Victoria, have not avoided the catastrophic event that occurred in September 1998 
(Borys, Else & Leggett, 2009). This incident resulted in the deaths of 2 employees 
and the cessation of total gas supplies to the State of Victoria resulting in an 
estimated total cost of almost of 1.3 billion dollars. The Esso Longford gas incident 
(Hopkins, 2000) demonstrates the potential limitations of SMSs. Esso portrayed a 
model SMS, yet an explosion occurred killing two workers and injuring eight others. 
The investigation identified that there were systemic failures including ineffective 
auditing, lack of hazard identification and reporting, managements’ ‘hands off’ 
approach as well as inefficient procedures, training and communication (Hopkins, 
2000). Nevertheless, the research has shown that SMSs have the potential to improve 
the organisations overall workplace health and safety performance, which will 
support an organisation attaining an environment of zero accidents and to be 
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successful it needs management’s full commitment and the involvement of its 
employees in managing workplace health and safety (Fernandez-Muniz, Montes-
Peon & Vazquez-Ordas, 2012; Mansilla & Rodriguez de Roa, 2005). 
2.6.3.2 Behavioural change programs 
It has been argued that human factors are a significant contributor to incidents 
and accidents (Vogt, Leonhardt, Koper & Pennig, 2010; Reason, 1995). Human 
factors focuses on the aspects that influence people and their behaviour (Vogt et al., 
2010). One of the most popular constructs to influence employees’ behaviours are 
behavioural change programs which provide a systematic approach to changing and 
promoting behaviour to reduce injuries in the workplace (Hopkins, 2006; Sulzer-
Azaroff & Austin, 2000). Behavioural change programs, or behavioural-based safety 
programs commonly known as BBS have become a popular industry strategy for 
improved organisational workplace health and safety performance (Hopkins, 2006). 
Further, these programs have become a core construct that is readily incorporated 
within Zero Harm organisations. Intrinsic to BBS programs is that they are primarily 
focused on human error and modifying worker’s behaviours (Zhang and Fang, 2013). 
However, BBS programs have also been accused of blaming the worker by shifting 
the responsibility for safe work conditions to the worker and then blame them should 
an incident occur (Atkinson, 2000). For example, as discussed by Frederick & Lessin 
(2000); a Midwest tyre manufacturer worker slipped and fell on ice in the car park. 
The investigation identified that the ‘workers eyes not on path’ as the causation 
factor for the incident. Yet it did not mention anything about removing the ice and 
snow from the car park or the sidewalk, which is required to be used by the workers, 
and which had not been cleared of ice and snow for several weeks prior to the 
incident. 
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The origins of behavioural safety programs can be aligned to the work of 
Heinrich in the 1930’s. Heinrich was the Assistant Superintendent for an insurance 
company who reviewed over 12,000 insurance company accident reports. Heinrich 
concluded from this review that 88% of the accident reports he reviewed were the 
result of unsafe acts of the worker (Atkinson, 2000; Miozza & Wyld, 2002). BBS 
programs work on the premise that workers behaviours are the majority causation 
factors of all accidents. Various studies attribute between 80% and 90% of all 
workplace accidents are the result of unsafe acts (Hollnagel, 1993; Health and Safety 
Executive, 2002; Reiman and Rollenhagen, 2011). A more recent study undertaken 
by DuPont in the 1980’s, that included an analysis of all incident experiences within 
the company over a 10 year span, identified that 96% of DuPont’s accidents were the 
result of unsafe acts (McSween, 2003; United Steelworkers International Union, 
2005). Whilst this may seem reasonable at first sight due to human intervention in 
designing, constructing, operating and maintaining socio-technical systems, this 
assumption is based on a theory from almost 100 years ago, yet it still constitutes the 
basis and foundation of many behavioural safety programs of today (Reiman & 
Rollenhagen, 2011). Advantages of BBS intervention programs, either as a zero 
target program or as safety management intervention program, has shown that 
organisations have been able to significantly reduce the number of injuries through 
the adoption and the successful implementation of BBS programs (Fulwiler, 2000). 
In Practice 
There has been significant research into the effectiveness of the 
implementation of behavioural safety programs such as by DePasquale & Geller 
(1999). This study involved 20 organisations that included the undertaking of one-
on-one interviews with focus groups enabling a comparison between organisations 
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that mandatorily implemented a BBS program to organisations that voluntarily 
implemented BBS program. In reviewing the results of all organisations reporting 
positive results, it was interesting that there was no significant difference between 
those organisations that mandatorily implemented the program compared to those 
who voluntary implemented the program (DePasquale & Geller, 1999). Various 
other studies have confirmed the effectiveness of BBS programs; these include a 
study of three reactor sites over a 4-year period (Cox, Jones & Rycraft, 2004). This 
study included qualitative semi-structured interviews, quantitative questionnaires and 
plant observations focussing on personal inputs and workers experiences of 
behavioural safety. Another study by Zohar and Luria (2002) involved three 
companies (Oil Refinery/Canning, Processing baked goods and Processing Mild 
products). This study involved three intervention studies involving supervision self-
oriented behavioural interaction with employees to improve workers safety 
behaviour. The final study conducted by Chen & Hanzhi (2012) involving a Chinese 
construction project and included behavioural base training, supervisory observations 
and supervisor - employee discussion.  
2.6.4 Measuring safety performance 
It is suggested that there is no, or minimal, standardise workplace health and 
safety performance indicators that have been universally accepted by industry in the 
measuring an organisations business and safety performance at the organisational 
level (O’Neill, Wolfe & Holley, 2015). Further, as previously discussed, measuring 
Zero Harm continues to complicate this. As postulated by Glendon, et al., (2006); 
Ducker’s maxim of ‘what gets measured gets done’ is significantly important when 
measuring an organisations safety performance. Most organisations and government 
agencies, measure their safety performance to benchmark success or failures.  
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However, the measurement of safety performance is well known to be notoriously 
problematic (Cooper & Phillips, 2004) and when using injury outcome measures 
they may not reflect the organisations commitment to workplace safety. Further, it 
can be argued that there is no nexus between the absence of injuries and the safety 
efforts of an organisation. Measuring safety can be viewed as a negative and positive 
aspect (Reason, 2008). The negative aspect is focused on outcome measures such as 
accidents and injuries, whereas the positive aspect is focused on leading inputs and 
proactive approaches to managing safety. 
Kjellen (2000; 2009) defines a workplace safety performance measure as a 
quantitative metric that is used to measure the organisations capability to manage and 
control its risks of accidents. The most commonly used performance measures are 
indicators that measure outcome of events that have already occurred, or more 
commonly known as lagging indicators (Reiman & Pietikainen, 2012). Within 
Australia, as with most developed counties, there is a significant reliance on the lost 
time injury (LTI) or recordable injury as a measure of safety performance.  In spite 
of its substantial criticism, industry is also fixated on measuring workplace health 
and safety through lagging indicators such as Lost Time Injury Frequency Rates 
(LTIFR) and Total Recordable Injury Frequency Rates (TRIFR) on the premise that 
there is a nexus between management intervention and reducing injuries (O’Neill, et 
al, 2015). Although, this can be somewhat rebutted as it is also suggested that 
organisations who strive for lower numbers of accidents are fully aware that what 
gets measured gets managed (Roberts, Bea & Bartles, 2001). 
In Practice 
It must be acknowledged, that organisations that achieve low levels of LTI or 
injury rates should be congratulated for lowering the number of workers injuries 
 Literature Review 59 
(Anderson, 2005). However, the Longford Esso gas plant explosion provides an 
example that demonstrates the absence of LTI’s as a measure of safety, does not 
guarantee good safety performance. Prior to this disaster, Longford Esso gas plant 
regarded itself as a proactive safety company that achieved over thirteen million 
work hours free without a lost time injury. Another tragic example of an organisation 
that was fixated on its LTI performance is BP at its Deepwater Horizon off shore rig, 
which had achieved seven years without a LTI prior to its disaster. There are 
significant limitations when using LTI’s and injury rates, which include (van 
Kampen, van der Beek, Groeneweg, 2014, p.131); 
• Incidents only provide an insight into the outcome of a lack of safety, 
• Incidents are very susceptible of being underreported,  
• The amount of incidents is often too small to generate significant 
statistics, and 
• Indicators focusing on personal safety, such as the frequency of lost-
time injuries, have little or no predictive value for the occurrence of 
process- related incidents. 
Another common limitation on the use of use of LTI’s and injury rates include 
the practice of reclassifying injuries to lower the level of severity which will be 
further discussed (Dekker, 2015; Sherratt, 2014). 
Not only are there limitations to the use of injury rates as an organisational 
measure, there are also disadvantages. Daniels & Marlow (2005) identified a number 
of powerful disincentives to reporting injuries including safety incentive 
programmes, which are focused on reducing workplace incidents. These are often 
supported by rewards, as such they may encourage under-reporting through the 
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receiving of a benefit. When injury rates are related to bonus calculations, they will 
almost inevitably be manipulated where eventually they may bear no relationship to 
the true rate of injury (Hopkins, 2016). Interestingly, research has identified that 
under-reporting of incidents and injuries can vary from 68 per cent to 78 per cent 
(Probst, Brubaker & Barsotti, 2008; Probst & Estrada, 2010; Rosenman, Kalush, 
Reilly, Gardiner, Reeves & Luo, 2006). This research confirms the limitation of the 
use of, injury numbers, rates or frequencies as an organisational performance 
measure. Another anecdotal claim that demonstrates the disadvantages of using 
injury rates include the manipulation of the injury classification (O’Neill, Martinov-
Bennie & Cheung, 2013). For example, lost time injuries are converted to non-lost 
time injuries through challenging doctors certificates (Hopkins, 2016) or an 
organisation providing work for the injured party in their home environment and 
considering this as an active work duty (Prvulovic, 2015). There are also anecdotal 
claims that employees are returned to work with little, if any, capacity to perform any 
meaningful work to avoid a lost time injury (Prvulovic, 2015). 
Leading Indicators 
Over the last decade, industry and organisations appear to be moving away 
from measuring safety through lagging indicators including injuries and incident 
rates, towards leading safety indicators, such as safety climate (Flin, Means, 
O’Connor & Bryden, 2000). It has been identified by Seo, Torabi, Blair & Ellis 
(2004) that measuring safety climate is a reliable and valid indicator that has 
significant advantages over the traditional lagging indicators of accident and incident 
rates.  Measuring safety climate can provide information prior to a safety problem 
developing into an incident. Furthermore; as described by Payne, Bergman, Beus, 
Rodríguez & Henning (2009); safety climate measurements are assessed via 
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employee surveys because safety climate is, by its definition, the perceptions of the 
organisations employees in relation to workplace safety. A key attribute of this is that 
safety climate measurement involves the employees’ perceptions regarding selected 
characteristics or features of their organisational environment (Zohar, 2009) such as 
employees’ perceptions of safety including norms, values and their attitudes (Gadd, 
2002).  
2.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, and as discussed within this chapter, legislation has evolved in the 
management of workplace safety from a very prescriptive approach to one of self-
regulation that encourages employer and worker cooperation for the management of 
workplace safety. This evolution has resulted in legislation that is heavily reliant on 
self-compliance and organisational investment in safety. As a result of poor safety 
performance the burden of workplace safety, in terms of fatalities and injuries, is 
evidently concerning as well as the economic impact that is placed on industry and 
the wider society.  
As a result of self-regulation, compliance and the personal and economic 
burden of workplace injuries, industry is seeking the next paradigm for safety 
excellence and in doing so driving a strong safety culture. For some organisations 
this next paradigm is Zero Harm. Zero Harm has grown in popularity as a mantra, 
vision or goal for improved workplace health and safety performance and to promote 
demonstrable management commitment. However, research has demonstrated that 
there is a lack of empirical evidence on organisational employee’s perceptions and 
attitudes of Zero Harm, which is a significant oversight as employees are critical and 
are key players that will influence the success or failure of Zero Harm. Therefore it is 
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crucial that an examination is undertaken to explore employee’s core beliefs and 
perceptions of Zero Harm and its determinants.  
The next chapter will present and describe the conceptual framework that will 
be used to guide this examination of beliefs and perceptions of Zero Harm within the 
research program. A description of the research design for each study will also be 
presented as well as an outline of the research methodology. Ethical considerations 
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
This chapter outlines the conceptual framework, research design and 
methodology that were adopted by this research study to address the following 
research questions: 
• RQ1: What is the meaning and priority of Zero Harm from an employee and 
employer perspective? 
• RQ2: From an employee and employer perspective is Zero Harm 
a relevant framework to promote safety? 
• RQ3: From an employee and employer perspective, what are the 
manifestations of Zero Harm outcomes on safety behaviour and performance? 
Within this chapter the conceptual framework discusses how the research was 
structured, followed by a discussion on the research methodology and approach. 
Finally ethical considerations are outlined including any implications.   
3.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
For the purpose of this research, Semler’s organisational alignment theory has 
been employed as a conceptual framework to guide the process of inquiry. As 
described by Semler; organisational alignment is “the degree to which an 
organisations design, strategies, structures, and culture are cooperating to achieve the 
same desired goals” (Semler, 1997, p.23). Semler’s organisational alignment theory 
is therefore well positioned to provide the necessary structure to explore employees 
and employers perceptions of Zero Harm as they align to the organisational 
constructs as described by Semler and their correlation to Zero Harm.  
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Semler’s alignment model (Figure 3.1) is developed from the applied field of 
human resource development. It articulates that the theory of organisational 
alignment is based on a relationship of organisational strategy, structure, and culture. 
This creates an environment that nurtures and facilitates the achievement of that 
organisations goal and also provides a multidimensional view of the organisational 
constructs and their complexities as well as identifying opportunities in creating 
synergies between these constructs (Alagaraja & Shuck, 2015).  Various studies have 
utilised alignment as either a framework or validation model. For example, 
Montesino (2002) research into the exploration of an organisations training program 
and practices with its strategic direction, Avison, Jones, Powell and Wilson (2004) 
research in the validation of alignment and information technology integration, and, 
Alagaraja and Shuck (2015) research on organisational alignment and employee 
engagement. Although Semler’s alignment model is used within this research, it has 
been utilised as a framework to provide a structural guidance only.  There is no 
intention to use Semler’s alignment model as a direct test of the model itself. 
However, Semler’s alignment model provides the necessary alignment framework to 
explore the perceptions of Zero Harm from employees and employers in which the 
organisational alignment and the relationship between the variables may enhance the 
organisations effectiveness including the achieving of goals and objectives and 
creating an organisational competitive advantage (Way & Johnson, 2005). Therefore, 
Semler’s alignment model as previously discussed is well positioned to provide a 
structure and framework to guide this research. Semler’s alignment model includes 
the nine constructs that represent major elements of an organisation that 
demonstrates how alignment affects organisational performance (Semler, 1997; 
1999; 2000).  
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Figure 3.1. Semler’s alignment model (Semler, 2000) 
The nine constructs of Semler’s alignment model are: 
1. Environment: (Independent variable) provides the context within which 
the organisation exists and operates including economic, political, 
cultural, technological and social environment. The context of the 
environment has the potential to influence the organisations’ actions 
through opportunities or constraints as well as intelligence on customers’ 
needs and expectations. 
2. Vision, values and purpose: focuses on the organisations’ goal of the 
alignment, which defines the organisations purpose. 
3. Strategy:  is focused in placing the organisation in an advantageous 
position and or configuration with the environment. It also includes 
planning and the communication of the goals within all levels of the 
organisation. 
4. Culture:  refers to implicit and explicit preferences and judgments 
concerning what can be defined as qualitatively good or bad, desirable or 
undesirable within the organisation. Cultural values of the organisation 
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are transmitted from the organisations individuals to new members of the 
organisation. 
5. Structure and Systems:  reflects the organisations’ structure, its design of 
processes including information and training. 
6. Rewards:  include benefits, incentive programs, promotion and 
disciplinary systems that provided tangible and intangible incentives or 
disincentives to individuals within the organisation. 
7. Practices:  include cultural assumptions that are in action and how they 
are applied daily within the organisation. 
8. Behaviour: is the observable activity of individuals or groups within the 
organisation. These behaviours may or may not contribute or be intended 
to contribute to the organisations goals 
9. Performance: is the collective output of individual and group behaviour 
within the organisation (Semler, 1999; 2000). 
These nine constructs are the foundational constructs for the development of 
the quantitative and qualitative research phases. 
3.2 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research program comprised of two individual, but interrelated studies that 
were designed to explore Zero Harm including its meaning, priority and relevance to 
influence safety as well as its manifestation on safety behaviour and organisational 
safety performance from an employee and employer perspective. 
3.2.1 Methodology 
The research methodology used for this research was a mixed methods study.  
Mixed methods research can be best described as research that combines quantitative 
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and qualitative research methods or techniques into a single or the same research 
study (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Venkatesh, Brown & Bala, 2013). As stated 
by Venkatesh et al., (2013, p.21) “such work can help develop rich insights into 
various phenomena of interest that cannot be fully understood using only a 
quantitative or qualitative method”.  A significant advantage of utilising a mixed 
method research approach is the capability to simultaneously answer confirmatory 
and exploratory questions as well as generating and verifying theory within the same 
study (Tashakkori & Teddlie 2003). As suggested by Creswell and Plano Clark 
(2011) there are six major mixed method designs to undertaking research into a 
phenomena being; (1) convergent parallel design, (2) explanatory sequential design, 
(3) exploratory sequential design, (4) embedded design, (5) transformative design 
and (6) multiphase design. For this research the explanatory sequential design 
structured on Semler’s alignment model will be utilised.  
Within the explanatory sequential design as shown in Figure 3.2, research 
commences with the quantitative data, which has priority for addressing the research 
questions and is subsequently followed up by the qualitative phase.  Interpretation 
involves the analysis of the qualitative data and how it explains the initial 
quantitative results.  
 
Figure 3.2. Explanatory sequential design 
This involved the quantitative collection of data from the self-reported 
questionnaire. This was then analysed and used to inform the development for the 
semi-structured interview questions within the qualitative phase of the research. The 
qualitative data collected through the semi-structured interviews is complementary to 
 68 Research Design  
the quantitative data collection and enabled a deeper exploration and seek rich data 
into core issues of interest. This research methodology, using the explanatory design, 
is most suited to assess trends and relationships with quantitative and qualitative data 
and explain the mechanism of the resultant trends (Creswell et al., 2011) and in 
doing so will provide necessary rigor to address the research questions. 
3.2.2 Participating Organisation  
A large oil and gas company consented to participate in the program of 
research.  The research candidate was formerly employed in this company as the 
Australasian QHSSE (Quality, Health, Safety, and Security & Environment) Manager. 
However, at the time of data collection, the candidate was no longer an employee of the 
company (or associated with the company). Despite this, it is accepted that research 
participation was obtained due to the strong former relationship with the company. 
3.2.3 Research Design Study 1 
Research study one consisted of a quantitative questionnaire comprising of 
series of closed-ended questions categorised and aligned with the constructs of 
Semler’s alignment model. This questionnaire was designed to provide the capability 
to probe into the participant’s perceptions and experience to Zero Harm as they 
related to each construct of Semler’s alignment model. 
3.2.3.1 Participants 
Participants for research design Study One consisted of 299 workers. These 
participants were employed within a large global multinational oil and gas-
contracting organisation. This company has a global footprint providing services 
such as drilling and formation evaluation, well construction, completion and 
stimulation and production. At the commencement of the research, the organisation 
had some 60,000 employees and revenue greater than US 12 Billion.  The research 
 Research Design 69 
participants where based in various countries in the Asia Pacific region including 
Australia; Bangladesh; Brunei; Singapore; China; Indonesia; Malaysia; Thailand, 
Vietnam, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, New Zealand and Myanmar. Participants 
included management, supervision, general labouring employees, tradespersons, and 
technical employees. The total numbers of workers within the organisations Asia 
Pacific operations were approximately 2,700. Participants roles varied from support 
roles such as finance, human resources, maintenance and operational employees that 
specialise in onshore and offshore operations providing drilling, formation and 
evaluation; well construction; completions and stimulation as well as artificial lift 
products and production optimization. All participation was voluntary, confidential 
and anonymous.   
3.2.3.2 Instrument 
A self-reported questionnaire was deployed to facilitate the collection of data. 
The questionnaire required each participant to respond to Likert-based questions 
rating individual perceptions or exposure to Zero Harm and included 98 items that 
were informed by the theoretical outcomes from the literature review as well as 
supported by various adaptations of current safety culture and safety climate 
questionnaires. The questionnaire statements (Appendix A), which will be further 
discussed in Chapter 4, were informed and designed so as to capture the perceptions 
of the participants in relation to their exposure and experiences of Zero Harm. The 
questionnaire statements were then structured on Semler’s nine constructs, which 
provided a focus on organisational design, planning and performance (Semler, 2000). 
Questions 1 to 8 supported the environmental construct; questions 9 to 19 vision, 
values and purpose; questions 20 to 33 culture; questions 34 to 41 strategy; questions 
42 to 47 rewards; questions 48 to 57 structures and systems; questions 58 to 77 
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practices; questions 78 to 92 behaviour, and questions 93 to 98 supported the final 
construct of Semler’s organisational align model, performance. The quantitative self-
reported questionnaire was measured through a five point Likert scale. 
3.2.3.3 Procedure 
The distribution of the self-reported questionnaire was through internal 
organisational mail, email, in person and/or at toolbox talks or team meetings. The 
questionnaire was also supported by the use of the Queensland University of 
Technology (QUT) online ‘key survey’ electronic tool. Participants individually 
completed the self-report questionnaire, which was conducted primarily at the 
workplace with the option to complete the questionnaire outside of the work 
environment. 
3.2.3.4 Analysis 
Data analysis was undertaken on the quantitative results utilizing IBM’s 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 21, including a factor 
analysis and MANOVA analysis. 
A Factor analysis was employed to investigate the variable relationships by 
analysing the large number of variables within the quantitative questionnaire to 
determine which ones correlated with each other and not with other variables (Aron, 
Aron & Coups, 2006). These correlated variables are then represented with a smaller 
set of derived variables for interpretation. Five one-way between groups multivariate 
analyses of variances (i.e., MANOVAs) were conducted to investigate whether any 
differences existed on responses to each core Zero Harm construct depending on job 
position, gender, age, total years’ experience, and country of employment.  
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3.2.4 Research Design Study 2 
Research Study Two consisted of semi-structured interviews that were 
designed to explore and gain a further insight and understanding of Zero Harm. The 
semi structured interview questions were designed to provide the capability to 
investigate and provide a deeper exploration into key concepts of Zero Harm from 
the participants as they related to each construct of Semler’s alignment model. 
3.2.4.1 Participants 
Participants for research design Study Two consisted of 23 workers that 
included 15 participants from Australia, 7 from Singapore and 1 from Papua New 
Guinea. To attract participants for Study 2, the ‘Participant Information Sheet’ 
(Appendix B) was provided to all business units within the organisation requesting 
for volunteers and inviting employees to participate within the research. As with 
research Study One, these participants included management, supervision, general 
employees, tradespersons, and technical employees who are employed in the Asia 
Pacific region. Participation within the semi-structured interviews was voluntary and 
confidential. All participants signed a consent form (Appendix C) prior to 
undertaking the semi-structured interviews.  
3.2.4.2 Instrument 
The Zero Harm questions for the semi-structured interviews were developed 
from the identified gaps within the literature review and to illuminate a deeper 
understanding of various core components that emerged from Study One. In total 
there were 12 questions within the semi-structured interviews that were designed to 
explore and gain further insight into the participants’ perceptions and experiences of 
Zero Harm concepts. As with Study One, the semi-structured interview questions 
were framed around Semler’s alignment model, which allowed for the investigative 
 72 Research Design  
individual perceptions and experiences of the Zero Harm concept as they are aligned 
to Semler’s alignment constructs. The interview questions (Appendix D) were 
categorised into the nine constructs of Semler’s’ alignment model which included 
questions 1 to 2 supporting the environmental construct; questions 3 to 5 vision, 
value and purpose; question 6 culture; question 7 strategy; question 8 rewards; 
question 9 structure and systems; question 10 practices; question 11 behaviours, and 
question 12 supporting the last construct of Semler’s organisational alignment model, 
performance. 
3.2.4.3 Procedure 
The interviews were conducted face to face or over the telephone. All 
interviews were undertaken while the participants were at the workplace during their 
normal working hours. In agreement with the participants the interviews were audio 
recorded except for one interview as a result of recording device failure. In depth 
notes were also taken during each interview. All audio recordings and notes were 
transcribed as they related to each question. Data cleansing involved the removing of 
any names or identifying markers. 
3.2.4.4 Analysis 
A thematic analysis was employed to analyse the responses from the 
qualitative semi-structured interviews. A thematic analysis is a widely used, highly 
flexible qualitative research methodology for identifying, analysing and reporting on 
themes or patterns within data (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  A coding book was 
developed and utilised in highlighting key themes. Two researchers, to improve 
inter-rater reliability, also reviewed identified key themes. 
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3.3 ETHICS AND LIMITATIONS 
This research study involved the participation of adult humans within an 
organisational context and was considered negligible or low risk by the Queensland 
University of Technology Ethics Committee. The research study was granted ethics 
approval – approval number 1400000732. However, there were several ethical 
considerations that were considered and which influenced the design of the research.  
As the research was designed and structured on investigating the opinions and 
perceptions of the participants and in particular when the semi-structured interviews 
were undertaken, there was the potential for the participants to feel discomfort in 
providing responses. To mitigate this, the researcher provided participation 
information sheets (see Appendix B & E) that provided each participant with clear 
facts on their involvement prior to them consenting to any involvement within the 
research. The participation information sheets also included the researchers contact 
details if any participant required further information.  
A limitation of the research is that only a single organisation is used within the 
research.  However, this organisation is a global organisation operating in over 100 
countries with over 50,000 employees. This specific research was undertaken on its 
Asia Pacific operations involving thirteen different countries and approximately 2700 
employees. Further research limitations shall be discussed in section 6.3 of this thesis 
‘Strengths and Limitations’.  
3.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed and presented the conceptual framework and the 
research methodology that was adopted to address the three research questions: 
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• RQ1: What is the meaning and priority of Zero Harm from an employee and 
employer perspective? 
• RQ2: From an employee and employer perspective is Zero Harm 
a relevant framework to promote safety? 
• RQ3: From an employee and employer perspective, what are the 
manifestations of Zero Harm outcomes on safety behaviour and performance? 
Using the conceptual framework to frame and categorise; (1) self-reported 
questions and (2) semi-structured interview questions it has provided an avenue to 
explore deeper into individual perceptions of Zero Harm across all of Semler’s 
organisational alignment constructs, thereby providing more detailed and richer 
information.  
The next chapter (Chapter 4) presents and describes the Study One conducted 
within the research program. This study investigates participant’s perceptions and 
experiences of Zero Harm. This chapter will further discuss the methodology, 
procedure and data analysis of the quantitative study as well as discussing the results 
as they relate to the research questions.  
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Chapter 4: Study 1 
This chapter describes and documents Study One which is the first phase of the 
research program. Study One involves a quantitative questionnaire to seek and gain 
an understanding of the participants’ experiences and perceptions to Zero Harm its 
meaning and how it impacts on safety behaviours. This chapter also provides a 
detailed description of this study, as well as discussing the findings in addressing the 
research questions. Finally, this chapter concludes with a succinct summary of the 
completed first phase of the research program. 
4.1 STUDY AIM 
The aim of Study One is to identify and analyse employees’ (including 
supervision and management) perceptions and experiences in relation to Zero Harm. 
This phase of the research will address the following research questions: 
• RQ1: What is the meaning and priority of Zero Harm from an employee and 
employer perspective? 
• RQ2: From an employee and employer perspective is Zero Harm 
a relevant framework to promote safety? 
• RQ3: From an employee and employer perspective, what are the 
manifestations of Zero Harm outcomes on safety behaviour and performance? 
4.2 METHOD 
This study required the development of a structured quantitative questionnaire 
to capture self-reported data to achieve the objectives of the research program; (1) to 
gain an insight into the perceived meaning and or language of Zero Harm among 
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employees and (2) to explore the manifestation of Zero Harm through self-reported 
data and potential influence between Zero Harm and improved individual, group or 
organisational safety behaviour. This research has a very high correlation with 
organisational safety culture and it has been identified that there are numerous safety 
culture and safety climate surveys or questionnaires that are available, including 
those developed and or evaluated by Diaz-Cabrera, Hernandez-Fernaud & Isla-Diaz 
(2007), Flin, Mearns, O’Connor & Bryden (2000), and Guldenmund, (2000). 
However, it has been identified that within the literature review there is no specific 
survey or questionnaire that has been academically reviewed and published on the 
specific perceptions of Zero Harm. It has also been identified through the literature 
review, that there is no single safety culture or safety climate survey that 
demonstrates its manifestation in the daily workplace, which is required to address 
the research questions within this research. 
Therefore, based on these findings and the lack of suitability of using current 
safety culture or safety climate surveys and the lack of a pre-existing validated 
instrument to measure the perceptions of Zero Harm, the development of the 
questionnaire (Appendix A) for this research project was self-developed and 
structured to reflect the nine constructs of Semler’s Alignment Model.  Of note, 
Semler’s alignment model was used as a framework to provide a structural guidance 
only, there was no intention to use Semler’s alignment model as a direct test of the 
model itself.  However, the use of the alignment model within this questionnaire 
enabled the exploration and degree to which the organisation achieves its goals 
through an environment that has been facilitated by the organisations strategies 
structure and culture (Semler, 1997). The question statements were informed by the 
theoretical outcomes from the literature review and supported by various adaptations 
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of current safety culture and safety climate questionnaires.  In particular the 
questionnaire of safety culture values and practices (QCS) as evaluated by Diaz-
Cabrera et al., (2007). Table 4.1 provides an example of the question statements as 
they align to Semler’s nine constructs.  
Table 4.1. 
Question Statement Examples and Semler’s Organisational Alignment Constructs 
Semler’s Alignment Model Construct Example Questions 
Environment What is your job title? 
Vision, values and purpose What do you believe is the meaning of zero harm? 
Strategy The company has a clear and objective safety strategy on 
zero harm 
Culture I believe that all incidents and accidents are preventable 
Structure and systems My company has a safety management system that 
provides procedures and processes that will ensure the 
safety of its employees 
Rewards The company rewards its employees for working safely 
Practices I can report an incident without fear of reprisal 
Behaviour I always use the correct safety equipment to do my job 
Performance Our company only measures injuries and incidents 
 
The questionnaire was also developed so that participants were required to rate 
each statement based on their individual perception or exposure to Zero Harm. To 
test the robustness of the questionnaire various questions statements were reworded. 
For example ‘I believe that all incidents and accidents are preventable’ was 
reworded to ‘It is inevitable that accidents and incidents will happen in this 
company. The development of the quantitative self-reported questionnaire included 
98 items, which were informed by the theoretical outcomes from a literature review 
 78 Study 1  
and were supported by various adaptations of current safety culture and safety 
climate questionnaires.  For example, safety questionnaires as evaluated by Diaz-
Cabrera, et al., (2007) were adapted and incorporated within the current study. This 
included the modification of questions so that they better reflect the context of the 
research and the language of the sample organisation. To demonstrate this, a question 
from Diaz-Cabrera, et al., (2007) was modified from “in my company, if a worker’s 
performance is safe, he/she obtains recognition from managers and workmates” to 
“my supervisor will provide me with positive feedback if I am working safely”. This 
was also supported by questions specifically exploring various aspects of Zero Harm 
including: (a) why is there a focus on Zero Harm, (b) who promotes Zero Harm, (c) 
what is the meaning of Zero Harm and (d) perceptions about the achievability and 
impact of Zero Harm.  
4.2.1 Participants 
The sample consisted of 299 workers within the research organisation and 
employed in various countries in the Asia Pacific region. Of the 299 participants, 
77% (n = 229) were male.  Participants were aged 19 to 68 (M = 38.44, SD = 10.04). 
The majority of participants (60%; n = 179) were classified as employees (e.g., 
machinist, field engineer, service technician, workshop technician, trade assistant, 
mechanic, accountant) and 36% of respondents (n = 108) worked in supervisory or 
managerial positions (e.g., operations manager, supervisor, regional manager). 
Participants’ experience in their current positions ranged from less than one year 
(.08) to 34 years.  On average, participants had approximately 5 years of experience 
in their current roles (SD = 4.96).  The largest proportion of the sample worked in 
Australia (n = 110; 37%), followed by Singapore (n = 46; 15%), Indonesia (n = 26; 
9%) and Malaysia (n = 20; 7%). Several participants reported working in more than 
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one country (n = 9; 3%) or across the Asia Pacific region (n = 5; 2%), as outlined in 
Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. 
Percentage of Participants by Country 
Countries Participated Total questionnaires 
received (n) 











Papua New Guinea  
Philippines  
New Zealand  
Myanmar  
More than one country recorded 


































The questionnaire was distributed by internal (organisational) mail, email, in 
person and/or at toolbox talks or team meetings to a cross section of the workforce 
that included management, supervision, general employees, tradespersons, and 
technical employees. Participation was voluntary. Participants individually 
completed the self-report questionnaire, which was made available either in hard 
copy paper format or via the Queensland University of Technology (QUT) online 
‘key survey’ electronic tool. Participation was confidential and anonymous.  The 
participants were required to respond to statements based on their perceptions and 
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experiences at their current workplace. In total, there are approximately 2,700 
employees within the sample organisation. Approximately 11% participated in the 
research project. The questionnaire was conducted primarily at the workplace; 
however the option to complete the questionnaire outside of the work environment 
was also provided. 
4.2.3 Data analysis 
Data analysis of the first phase of the research program was undertaken using 
IBM’s Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 21. Data analysis 
within the first phase of the research program included; descriptive, multivariate 
analysis including MANOVA’s, and a factor analysis. To reduce the chance of 
obtaining false positive type one errors, a Bonferroni correction adjustment was 
undertaken. 
4.2.4 Results 
Of the 98 questionnaire items in total, Table 4.3 shows the means and standard 
deviations of the four questionnaire items which participants were most likely to 
agree with.  For example, the two items that participants were most likely to agree 
with were ‘I feel that it is important to maintain safety at all times’ (M = 4.67, SD = 
0.52) and ‘I believe it is important to reduce the risk of accidents and incidents 
within the workplace’ (M = 4.66, SD = 0.52).  Given the items were measured on a 
five point scale, the responses indicate that participants generally recognised the 
importance of maintaining safety.  
Core Zero Harm questions 
The manifestation of Zero Harm is represented by core Zero Harm questions 
such as: (a) rationale and (b) contributors of Zero harm.  For the question ‘Why do 
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you believe your company has a focus on Zero Harm?’ participants were most likely 
to agree with the response ‘My company cares about their workers’ safety’ (M = 
4.49, SD = 0.56). For ‘Which of the following groups have a major role in 
determining the Zero Harm policy of your company?’ participants were most likely 
to agree with ‘Company senior management’ (M = 4.51, SD = 0.62).  For ‘What do 
you believe is the meaning of Zero Harm? participants were most likely to agree with 
‘No harm to anyone, anytime while at work (M = 4.73, SD = 0.52).   For ‘In your 
opinion how does your company measure Zero Harm?’ participants were most likely 
to agree with two responses, ‘No injuries (first aid, medical treatment or lost time)’ 
(M = 4.47, SD = 0.67) and ‘No lost time injuries’ (M = 4.47, SD = 0.67). Although 
participants were more likely to agree with the response that Zero Harm is “An 
aspirational goal’ (M = 4.18, SD = 0.89) rather than an “achievable objective” (M = 
4.11, SD = 0.88), this was not statistically significant. However, collectively this 
demonstrates a strong support for Zero Harm compared to participants that 
responded that it was meaningless e.g., it can never be achieved (M = 2.20, SD = 
1.16). . Participants were also most likely to agree with the statement that ‘The 
company’s safety strategy” was ‘communicated to all employees’ (M = 4.43, SD = 
0.63). Table 4.3 depicts means and standard deviations for core Zero Harm 
questions. 
Table 4.3. 
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for the Highest Ranked Questionnaire Items  
Item M SD 
1. I feel that it is important to maintain safety at all times 4.67 0.52 
2. I believe that it is important to reduce the risk of accidents and Incidents 
within the workplace 
4.66 0.52 
3. I believe that I have the right to challenge, or refuse to work when 
placed in an unsafe or at risk conditions without fear of reprisal 
4.58 0.57 
 82 Study 1  
4. I can stop my job if the job is unsafe 4.56 0.57 
Note. Each of these items was measured on a 5-point scale where:  
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral/unsure, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree. 
Paired sample t-tests were conducted on each of the core Zero Harm questions 
(see Table 4.4) to determine if there was a significant reduction in the means between 
the most favourable responses and the second most favourable responses.  Results 
showed that there was a significant reduction for ‘Why do you believe your company 
has a focus on Zero Harm? (t(285) = -3.22, p =.001); for ‘Which of the following 
groups have a major role in determining the Zero Harm policy of your company?’ 
(t(281) = 9.86, p =.000); for ‘What do you believe is the meaning of Zero Harm?’ 
(t(280) = -5.07, p =.000); and for ‘The company’s safety strategy...’ (t(283) = -4.16, 
p =.000).  
Table 4.4. 
Means and Standard Deviations of the Zero Harm Questions in descending order of 
Mean Scores 
Question M   (SD) 
Why do you believe your company has a focus on Zero Harm? 
     My company cares about their workers’ safety 
     My company does not want to be prosecuted 
     Community expectations 
     Company promotion 
     Shareholder expectation 
     Union pressure 
 
 
4.49   (0.56) 
4.30   (0.85) 
4.08   (0.74) 
4.08   (0.78) 
4.08   (0.79) 
3.24   (1.08) 
Which of the following groups have a major role in determining the Zero 
Harm policy of your company? 
     Company senior management 
     Legislators 
     Share Holders 
     The community 




4.51   (0.62) 
3.98   (0.81) 
     3.83   (0.91) 
3.72   (0.94) 
3.39   (1.05) 
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Question M   (SD) 
What do you believe is the meaning of Zero Harm? 
     No harm to anyone, anytime while at work 
     No injuries or incidents 
     No lost time injuries 
     No incidents (Environmental impacts) 
     I do not know 
 
 
4.73   (0.52) 
4.57   (0.64) 
4.55   (0.67) 
4.49   (0.75) 
1.71   (0.94) 
In your opinion how does your company measure Zero Harm? 
     No injuries (first aid, medical treatment or lost time) 
     No lost time injuries 
     No injuries or incidents 
     No Incidents (environmental impacts) 
     I do not know 
 
It is my belief that Zero Harm is: 
     An aspirational goal 
     An achievable objective 
     An organisational safety slogan to improve safety 
     A management safety slogan used positively and negatively to manage 
people 
     Meaningless as it can never be achieved 
 
The company’s safety strategy: 
     Is communicated to all employees 
     Provides actions to reduce or eliminate incidents and accidents 
     Provides me with direction to work safely to achieve Zero Harm  
     Used consistently to improve safety 
     Outlines how the company will achieve Zero Harm 
     Is just a promotional tool to get employees to work safer 
 
4.47   (0.67) 
4.47   (0.67) 
4.46   (0.63) 
4.35   (0.75) 
1.77   (0.95) 
 
 
4.18   (0.89) 
4.11   (0.88) 
3.78   (1.10) 
3.40   (1.15) 
 
2.20   (1.16) 
 
 
4.43   (0.63) 
4.30   (0.66) 
4.27   (0.70) 
4.18   (0.70) 
4.15   (0.80) 
2.83   (1.19) 
 
Note. Each of these items were measured on a 5-point scale where: 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral/unsure, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree. 
 
The impact of demographics on the core Zero Harm questions 
Five one-way between groups multivariate analyses of variances (i.e., 
MANOVAs) were conducted to investigate whether any differences existed on 
responses to each core Zero Harm question depending on job position, gender, age, 
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total years’ experience, and country. For the first question, ‘Why do you believe your 
company has a focus on Zero Harm?’, there were significant multivariate effects for 
all of the demographics, country (Pillai’s Trace = .14, F(12, 440) = 2.74, p = .001, 
partial eta squared = .07), gender (Wilks’ Δ = .926, F(6, 219) = 2.91, p = .010, partial 
eta squared = .07), total years’ experience (Wilks’ Δ = .771, F(36, 898) = 1.52, p = 
.027, partial eta squared = .042), age (Wilks’ Δ = .848, F(18, 608) = 2.03, p = .007, 
partial eta squared = .05), and job position (Pillai’s Trace = .076, F(6, 212) = 2.90, p 
= .010, partial eta squared = .08). The specific response of ‘union pressure’ was 
significant at the univariate level (using the Bonferroni alpha adjusted level of .008) 
for each of country (F(2, 224) = 8.87, p = .000, partial eta squared = .073), gender 
(F(1, 224) = 11.12, p = .001, partial eta squared = .047), age (F(6, 209) = 5.88, p = 
.000, partial eta squared = .14), and total years’ experience (F(6, 209) = 5.88, p = 
.000, partial eta squared = .144).  Specifically, workers from Australia, males, those 
aged over 50 years, and those with 31+ years total work experience were most likely 
to agree that union pressure is the reason their company focused on Zero Harm. 
There was no significant univariate effect for job position. 
For ‘Which of the following groups have a major role in determining the Zero 
Harm policy of your company?’, there was only a significant multivariate effect for 
job position (Pillai’s Trace = .09, F(6, 179) = 2.87, p = .011, partial eta squared = 
.09).  At the univariate level, using the Bonferroni alpha adjusted level of .008, 
supervisors/managers were significantly more likely to respond ‘union organisations’ 
than other employees (F (1, 184) = 8.45, p = .004, partial eta squared = .044).  For 
‘What do you believe is the meaning of Zero Harm?’ there were no significant 
multivariate effects for any of the demographic variables.  For ‘In your opinion how 
does your company measure Zero Harm?’ there was a significant multivariate effect 
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for country (Wilks’ Δ = .887, F(15, 571) = 1.70, p = .047, partial eta squared = .039); 
however using the Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .01, there were no significant 
univariate effects. 
In regards to whether Zero Harm was perceived as aspiration or achievable, 
there were significant multivariate effects for total years’ experience (Wilks’ Δ = 
.813, F(30, 926) = 1.64, p = .017, partial eta squared = .041), job position (Wilks’ Δ 
= .941, F(5, 238) = 3.01, p = .012, partial eta squared = .059), and country (Wilks’ Δ 
= .828, F(15, 679) = 3.21, p = .000, partial eta squared = .061).  At the univariate 
level, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .01, those who had over 31 years 
total work experience were most likely to believe that Zero Harm is ‘an 
organisational safety slogan to improve safety’ (F (6, 235) = 4.34, p = .000 partial eta 
squared = .100). For job position, supervisors/managers were more likely to believe 
that Zero Harm is ‘a management safety slogan used positively and negatively to 
manage people’ (F (1, 242) = 13.26, p = .000 partial eta squared = .052).  For 
country, there were significant univariate effects for the response, Zero Harm is ‘an 
achievable objective (F (3, 250) = 6.70, p = .000 partial eta squared = .074) such that 
workers in Australia were more likely to agree with this question.  There were also 
significant univariate effects for the response, Zero Harm is ‘an organisational safety 
slogan to improve safety’ (F (3, 250) = 5.75, p = .001 partial eta squared = .065), 
whereby workers in Australia were more likely to agree with this statement.  A final 
significant univariate effect was found for the response, Zero Harm is ‘a management 
safety slogan used positively and negatively to manage people’ (F (3, 250) = 4.63, p 
= .004 partial eta squared = .053).  No significant multivariate effects were found for 
gender or age. 
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For the final Zero Harm question, ‘The company’s safety strategy..’, there were 
significant multivariate effects for country (Wilks’ Δ = .850, F(18, 750) = 2.47, p = 
.001, partial eta squared = .053), age (Wilks’ Δ = .895, F(18, 730) = 1.63, p = .048, 
partial eta squared = .036), job position (Pillai’s Trace = .051, F(6, 256) = 2.74, p = 
.035, partial eta squared = .051), and total years’ experience (Wilks’ Δ = .800, F(36, 
1091) = 1.58, p = .016, partial eta squared = .037).  At the univariate level with a 
Bonferonni adjusted alpha level of .008, Australian workers were more likely to 
agree with the response ‘outlines how the company will achieve Zero Harm’ (F (3, 
270) = 4.72, p = .003 partial eta squared = .050).  For job position, there was a 
significant univariate effect, such that, managers/supervisors were more likely to 
agree with the response, ‘just a promotional tool to get employees to work safer’ (F 
(1, 261) = 11.43, p = .001 partial eta squared = .042).  There was also a significant 
univariate effect for total years’ work experience, specifically, those who had over 31 
years’ experience were also most likely to agree with the response, ‘just a 
promotional tool to get employees to work safer’ (F (6, 253) = 5.62, p = .000 partial 
eta squared = .118).  There were no significant univariate effects for gender and age. 
Factor Analysis of the self-reported Questionnaire 
A factor analysis was conducted on 83 items in the questionnaire that focused 
specifically on perceptions regarding the origins, aims and outcomes of Zero Harm. 
The Kaiser–Meyer-Olkin (KMO = .92) measure confirmed that the sample was 
highly suitable for the analysis and, similarly, Bartlett’s test of sphericity X2 (2145) = 
12056, p < .001 indicated that there were sufficiently large correlations between 
items to support this analysis.  An initial principal axis analysis with varimax rotation 
showed that 18 items did not load onto a factor and were therefore removed from the 
analysis.  A second principal axis analysis with varimax rotation was carried out 
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showing six factors that had an Eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1 as well as a 
minimum of 4 items making up each factor.  Together, these six factors accounted 
for 58.42% of the variance (see Table 4.5 for the individual factor loadings).   
Fourteen items loaded highly onto Factor 1 which represented the: (a) 
company’s commitment to Zero Harm and accounted for 37.78% of the total 
variance; fourteen items also loaded highly onto Factor 2 which represented: (b) 
worker self-efficacy to carry out Zero Harm principles and accounted for 6.69% of 
the total variance; four items loaded highly onto Factor 3 which represented the: (c) 
impact of the safety committee and accounted for 4.52% of total variance; five items 
loaded highly onto Factor 4 which represented: (d) negative work practices and 
accounted for 3.54% of the total variance; nine items loaded highly onto Factor 5 
which represented: (e) prevention of incidents and accidents and accounted for 
3.11% of the total variance; and ten items loaded highly onto Factor 6 which 
represented: (f) worker recognition and reward and accounted for 2.77% of total 
variance. Of note, there were a large number of participants from one country 
(Australia) in comparison to the other countries; therefore a t-test was conducted 
using factors one to six. Whilst it was observed that statistical differences between 
the countries existed, the results were not meaningful. 
 
Table 4.5. 
Factor Structure of the Zero Harm Questionnaire 
Item F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
My company has clear safety rules that support the Zero 
Harm vision  
.79      
I believe that the safety standards and rules of this 
company are very high and support the companies Zero 
Harm policy 
.78      
The company policy and goals clearly support its .77      
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Item F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
commitment to safety and incident injury free workplace 
The company’s safety programs and actions clearly 
support its commitment to safety and an incident injury 
free workplace 
.68      
This company demonstrates that it is very serious about 
improving its safety performance 
.65      
My company has a safety management system that 
provides procedures and processes that will ensure the 
safety of its employees 
.61      
My company ensures that all workers are instructed and 
trained on what their safety roles and responsibilities are 
.60      
My Supervisors / managers regularly discuss safety  .56      
Company has safety programs to improve safety that 
focus on Zero Harm 
.50      
Safety is considered first in every activity .50      
The company provides me with the correct training to do 
my job safely 
.48      
I have a formal performance review undertaken that 
includes my personal safety performance 
.44      
Incident investigations are undertaken and outcomes are 
communicated to all employees 
.43      
My supervisor will regularly ask me about safety 
concerns or ideas to improve safety 
.42      
       
I always follow the highest levels of safety when I carry 
out my job 
 .78     
I always use the correct safety procedure to carry out my 
job 
 .74     
I always use the correct safety equipment to do my job  .73     
If I observe a co-worker working unsafely or at risk, I will 
intervene.   
 .69     
I always place extra effort to improve the safety within 
the workplace 
 .67     
I always follow all safety rules  .65     
I voluntarily carry out tasks or activities that will help to 
improve safety within the workplace 
 .59     
I always report all incidents and accidents that I am 
involved in. 
 .57     
I will praise a co-worker if they are doing the job safely  .56     
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Item F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
I make an effort to promote Zero Harm within the 
organisation 
 .56     
I always undertake every effort to maintain or improve 
my personal safety 
 .54     
I can stop my job if the job is unsafe  .54     
My supervisor demonstrates high safety behaviours .40 .44     
My supervisor always ensures that safety is prioritized 
over production 
 .41     
       
The safety committee is actively involved in promoting 
safety 
  .80    
I am kept informed of the safety committees activities   .79    
My department has a safety committee   .75    
My department has its own safety improvement plan   .46    
       
My supervisor sometimes encourages at risk behaviour or 
overlooks hazards to get the job done 
   -
.66 
  
My supervisor will turn a blind eye if I have to do a job 
unsafely if the task is critical 
   -
.60 
  
Our company only measures injuries or incidents    -
.58 
  
If an employee is injured they will be blamed or punished    -
.58 
  
When my supervisor is not present, I tend to take more 
risks in doing my work 
   -
.57 
  
I believe that if an accident or incident does happen the 
worker will be blamed 
   -
.56 
  
I will take short cuts in my job due to work pressures    -
.55 
  
I believe that you will be injured at work during your 
working career whilst working with this company 
   -
.45 
  
It is inevitable that accidents and incidents will happen in 
this company 
   -
.45 
  
       
My workmates believe that all incidents and accidents are 
preventable 
    .76  
I believe that all incidents and accidents are preventable     .74  
I believe that Zero Harm is achievable within my 
company 
    .66  
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Item F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 
I believe that all operating exposures can be controlled 
and or safeguarded 
    .52  
If employees follow the company’s safety management 
system there will be no incidents or accidents 
    .46  
       
The company rewards it employees for working safely      .69 
Our company recognizes and celebrates safety milestones      .65 
I am praised by my manager or supervisor for working 
safely 
     .61 
My work team is praised for working safely      .55 
The company has a recognition program that is focused 
on improving safety and achieving Zero Harm 
     .42 
 
Table 4.6 shows the means and standard deviations for each of the six factors.  
Specifically, Factor 2 had the highest mean (M = 4.23, SD = 0.53), showing that, on 
average, participants agreed with the items regarding worker’s self-efficacy to carry 
out Zero Harm principles.  Factor 4 had the lowest mean (M = 2.49, SD = 0.74), 
showing that, on average, participants disagreed with the items regarding the 
existence of negative work practices.  
 
Table 4.6. 
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations for the Factors 
Factor M SD 
1. Company’s commitment to Zero Harm 4.22 0.55 
2. Worker self-efficacy to carry out Zero Harm Principles 4.23 0.53 
3. Impact of safety committee 3.63 0.88 
4. Existence of negative work practices 2.49 0.74 
5. Prevention of incidents and accidents 3.96 0.73 
6. Worker recognition and reward 3.80 0.77 
Note. Each of these items were measured on a 5-point scale where: 
1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neutral/unsure, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree. 
 
Manova Analysis Investigation for the Factors 
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Seven one-way between groups MANOVAs were conducted to investigate 
whether any differences existed on all of the six factors depending on job position, 
gender, age, years working at the organisation, total years’ experience, years in 
current job and country. For job position, a significant difference was found between 
employees and supervisors/management at the multivariate level, Wilks’ Δ = .935, 
F(6, 259) = 3.01, p = .007, partial eta squared = .07. At the univariate level, using a 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .008, there was a significant difference between 
the employees and supervisors on Factor 4 (i.e., existence of negative work 
practices).  Specifically, employees scored significantly higher (M = 2.62, SD = 0.73) 
than supervisors/management (M = 2.26, SD = 0.71), F(1, 264) = 13.37, p = .000, 
partial eta squared = .048, indicating they were more likely to agree that negative 
work practices existed.  
For age (grouped into 20-29 years, 30-39 years, 40-49 years, and 50+ years), 
there was a significant difference between the age groups on the multivariate level, 
Pillai’s Trace = .15, F(18, 736) = 2.31, p = .002, partial eta squared = .05.  At the 
univariate level, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .008, there was a 
significant difference between the age groups on Factor 3 (impact of safety 
committee), F(3, 265) = 4.10, p = .07, partial eta squared = .44. Inspection of the 
mean for each age group indicated that those aged 50+ were least likely to agree with 
the effective impact of the safety committee and those aged 30-39 years were most 
likely to think the safety committee had an impact on maintaining Zero Harm. There 
was also a significant difference between age groups on Factor 4 (existence of 
negative work practices), F(3, 265) = 4.14, p = .07, partial eta squared = .45.  
Inspection of the mean scores for each age shows that those aged over 50 years were 
most likely to disagree with the existence of negative work practices.   
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For total years’ experience, (grouped into 0-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 
16-20 years, 21 – 25 years, 26-30 years, 35+ years), there was a significant 
multivariate effect, Pillai’s Trace = .24, F(36, 1530) = 1.76, p = .004, partial eta 
squared = .04.  At the univariate level, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 
.008, there was a significant difference between the total years’ experience groups on 
Factor 4 (existence of negative work practices), F(6, 255) = 3.76, p = .001, partial eta 
squared = .08.  Specifically, those who had worked in the company from 21-25 years 
were most likely to disagree with the existence of negative work practices. 
For country (grouped into Australia and other countries), there was a 
significant multivariate effect, Pillai’s trace = .24, F (18, 807) = 3.96, p < .001.  At 
the univariate level, using a Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .008, there was a 
significant difference between the Australia and other countries on Factor 3 (impact 
of safety committee), F(3, 272) = 8.95, p = .000, partial eta squared = .09, Factor 4 
(existence of negative work practices), F(3, 272) = 4.16, p = .007, partial eta squared 
= .044, Factor 5 (prevention of incidents and accidents), F(3, 272) = 11.59, p = .000, 
partial eta squared = .113, and Factor 6 (worker recognition and reward), F(3, 272) = 
4.50, p = .004, partial eta squared = .047.  Specifically, those in other countries were 
more likely to agree with the existence of each of these factors. 
For years in current job (grouped as 0 – 5 years, 6-10 years, and 11+ years), 
there were no significant multivariate effects. Similarly, there were no significant 
multivariate effects for years working at the organisation.  With regard to gender, 
there was a significant difference between males and females at the multivariate 
level, Pillai’s trace = .06, F(6, 268) = 2.62, p = .017.  However, no significant 
differences were found between the genders at the univariate level.   
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4.3 DISCUSSION 
The aim of this component of the current study was to undertake a quantitative 
examination into a large global oil and gas contracting company in order to evaluate 
employees’ perceptions of Zero Harm, including its perceived meaning, is it 
attainable and its manifestation. Key findings emerged that will be sequentially 
discussed below. 
• RQ1: What is the meaning and priority of Zero Harm from an employee and 
employer perspective? 
Firstly, the majority of the participants interpreted the meaning of Zero Harm 
to be ‘no harm to anyone, anytime while at work’.  Participants also were most likely 
to report that the reason the company focuses on Zero Harm is because it cares about 
the workers’ safety rather than union pressure or shareholder expectations.  
Additionally, participants recognised that senior management have the major role in 
determining Zero Harm policy. The results also identified Zero Harm is measured 
through an examination of injuries including first aid, medical treatment and lost 
time injuries and that the organisations safety strategy is communicated to all 
employees.  Taken the above, these findings suggest that workers both understood 
and embraced the concept of Zero Harm.  Within the broader scientific literature, 
research has demonstrated that employees’ beliefs about an initiative are critical, as 
they can be an enabler or a barrier when organisations implement initiatives (Weiner, 
Amick, & Lee, 2008).  While research has generally overlooked these issues, it may 
yet be proven that workers  “are more likely to embrace initiatives that they believe 
will assist them in achieving a goal and to resist initiatives that they believe will have 
little utility in achieving goals” (Banks, Davey, Biggs, King, 2010, p.237).  
Preliminary research has demonstrated that employee’s perceived effectiveness of 
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interventions actually impacts upon safety outcomes (Matlow, Wray & Richardson, 
2012), and thus, there is a need to enhance a collective appreciation of safety goals, 
particularly at a safety culture level.  For example, Mohamed, Ali, and Tam (2009) 
conducted one of the few studies in the area and investigated a local Pakistani 
construction workers' behaviour, perceptions, and attitudes toward safety and found 
that their behaviour was aligned to their attitudes towards their own safety 
responsibilities and management's safety responsibilities.  It is well documented 
within the ‘theory of planned behaviour’ the impact of attitudes (Riebl, Estabrooks, 
Dunsmore, Savla, Frisard, Dietrich, Peng, Zhang, Davy, 2015) and the influence of 
attitudes and expectations, is no more clearly evidenced than in the placebo effect 
(Maybeck, Silva, Brannan, Tekell, Mahurin, McGinnis & Jerabek, 2002). As a result, 
the first finding of the study indicates that there was widespread support for the 
concept of Zero Harm, however, it is noted that some differences existed based on 
demographics.  For example, supervisors and managers were significantly more 
likely than employees to believe that ‘union organisations’ had a major role in 
determining the company’s Zero Harm policy.  This finding may indicate the level of 
influence trade unions have upon contracting companies in Australia, particularly at 
a management or supervisory level.   
• RQ2: From an employee and employer perspective is Zero Harm 
a relevant framework to promote safety? 
Secondly, a core aim of the study was to determine whether workers believed 
the concept of Zero Harm was purely aspirational or achievable.  Corresponding 
analysis revealed that participants were slightly more likely to agree with the 
response that Zero Harm is “an aspirational goal’ rather than an “achievable 
objective”, although the level of difference was not significant.  This supports 
 Study 1 95 
Workplace Health and Safety Queensland (2010), which postulated that Zero Harm 
is an aspirational goal, not a target.  A deeper exploration revealed between group 
differences, as supervisors/managers were more likely to believe that Zero Harm is ‘a 
management safety slogan used positively and negatively to manage people’ than 
workers.  Australian workers were also more likely to believe that Zero Harm is ‘an 
achievable objective” (compared to overseas workers), although no differences were 
found for gender or age.  The relatively small sample size and inclusion of only one 
organisation in the current study precludes definitive conclusions.  However, the 
results provide some preliminary evidence that workers (at least in the current 
sample) recognise that the concept is not only aspirational but it is achievable.   
• RQ3: From an employee and employer perspective, what are the 
manifestations of Zero Harm outcomes on safety behaviour and 
performance? 
There were some differences found on the Zero Harm core questions for some 
of the demographic factors.  Despite the positive findings previously discussed, 
workers from Australia, males, those aged over 50 years, and those with 31+ years 
total work experience were most likely to agree that ‘union pressure’ is the reason 
their companies focus on Zero Harm. As mentioned above, this may reflect the 
unique operating environment within Australia and/or the external forces that also 
influence organisational safety and performance. Regardless, further research is 
required in determining the organisational processes that are used in facilitating and 
maximising a collective motivation to improve safety.  Preliminary research has 
demonstrated that institutional forces can positively influence employees’ general 
perceptions of initiatives in the workplace (Susskind, Brymer, Kim, Lee, & Way, 
2014). Thus, supervisors and managers are likely to play a pivotal role in nurturing 
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and enhancing a strong safety culture.  The literature is well supported on the 
difficulties that are associated with measuring the nature as well as the impact of 
safety culture (Edwards, Davey & Armstrong 2013; Guldenmund, 2000). However, 
the concept has been increasingly utilised in directing the implementation of 
workplace health and safety initiatives (Edwards et al., 2013).  On a lesser note, 
employees were more likely to indicate that negative work practices existed 
(compared to the supervisors). This finding warrants further investigation 
particularly in regards to whether this perception stems from subjective or objective 
assessments and corresponding experience. The finding that older employees over 50 
years were most likely to disagree with the existence of negative work practices 
suggests that more experience either: (a) improves safety performance or (b) creates 
a stronger bond to the virtues of organisational safety.  
The final series of analysis demonstrated that within the factor analysis, the 
highest agreement among the participants was related to the company’s commitment 
to Zero Harm and this commitment was based on the foundation that the company 
cares about their workers’ safety. As one would expect, senior management was seen 
as the driving role in determining the Zero Harm approach for workplace safety 
within the organisation. Interestingly in regards to how the company measures Zero 
Harm, there was an equal opinion of ‘no injuries including first aid, medical 
treatments or lost time injuries’ and ‘no lost time injuries’. This finding demonstrates 
the importance of reducing lost time injuries. It is well established that the reporting 
of lost time injuries is problematic through misrepresentation and / or underreporting 
(Oleinick, Guire, Hawthorne, Schork, Gluck, Lee & La 1993; Probst 2008 & Young, 
2014).  It is also noteworthy that, on average, most participants reported high self-
efficacy levels to carry out Zero Harm principles, which suggests they are 
 Study 1 97 
empowered to (and believe they are capable of) taking responsibility for their own 
safety behaviours.  Within the broader behavioural change literature, self-efficacy 
has consistently been identified as a key attribute required in order to achieve desired 
outcomes (Hagger, Chatzisarantis, & Biddle, 2002). 
4.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed and presented the findings of the first study phase of 
the research program. This study phase used a quantitative approach to ascertain the 
participant’s perceptions and experiences to Zero Harm. The findings identified that 
whilst there is a lack of evidence to suggest that Zero Harm is an achievable end state 
or in fact that a concentrated effort on Zero Harm actually improves workplace 
safety.  
Within this phase of the research, it has demonstrated that workers have the 
potential to believe in the concept Zero Harm as well as embrace it through their 
individual occupational roles. Although there are likely to be differences across 
organisational workplaces and through employee demographics this phase of the 
research also demonstrated that there was strong support for Zero Harm and its 
application. The next chapter (Chapter 5) presents the second and final phase of the 
study within the research program. 
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Chapter 5: Study 2 
This chapter describes Study Two of the research program, namely the semi-
structured interviews.  This phase was qualitative in design and was structured so 
that it builds on the findings from Study One of the research program. This chapter 
also provides a detailed description of the study including the study aim and 
methodology utilised, as well as discussing the findings in addressing the research 
questions.  
5.1 STUDY AIM 
The aim of the second study, is to undertake a qualitative research through an 
enquiry to gain an in depth understanding of Zero Harm. This will be achieved by the 
undertaking of an exploratory examination of employee’s (including supervision and 
management) experiences and perceptions, seeking rich, thorough descriptions and 
interpretations into the aetiology of Zero Harm (Sousa, 2014). Thereby gaining a 
deeper understanding of the following research questions:  
• RQ1: What is the meaning and priority of Zero Harm from an employee and 
employer perspective? 
• RQ2: From an employee and employer perspective is Zero Harm 
a relevant framework to promote safety? 
• RQ3: From an employee and employer perspective, what are the 
manifestations of Zero Harm outcomes on safety behaviour and performance? 
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5.2 METHOD 
For this study, an exploratory approach in the collection of data was 
undertaken in order to conduct a further qualitative enquiry into workers’ perceptions 
and experiences on Zero Harm. To achieve this understanding, semi-structured 
qualitative individual interviews were conducted with a total of 23 volunteers within 
the organisation. This qualitative enquiry employed semi-structured interviews that 
allowed the researcher to obtain an in-depth understanding of participants’ 
perceptions of Zero Harm through open-ended questions with the goal of extracting 
or revealing rich detailed descriptions from individual perspectives. The Zero Harm 
questions for the semi-structured interviews were developed from the identified gaps 
within the literature review. The semi-structured interview questions were also 
designed to expand on the quantitative questionnaire results as discussed in Chapter 
4. To assist in the identification of the participants’ perceptions and experience of 
Zero Harm the semi-structured interview questions were framed around Semler’s 
nine constructs.  
5.2.1 Participants 
A total of 23 participants were included in the interviews. These participants 
were from the oil and gas contracting organisation as described in Chapter 3 and 
included a cross section of the workforce including 7 senior managers, 6 supervisors 
/ line managers and 10 employees. In total there were 16 participants from Australia 
and seven participants from Singapore. Participation was voluntary and the 
interviewees were selected either through their current job role or through a peer 
nomination process. The peer nomination process included a nomination by an 
organisational contact that had knowledge of the potential participants’ experience 
and position within the company.  Recruited participants represented a range of 
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organisational positions and responsibilities as previously described. Geographical 
locations and demographic backgrounds were considered with the intention to have 
an inclusive and representative sample as much as possible. 
5.2.2 Procedure 
As with the quantitative questionnaire, the semi-structured qualitative 
individual interviews were also structured around Semler’s alignment model of 
systematic agreement theory (Semler, 1997; 1999; 2000). Semler’s alignment model 
was used as a framework to provide a structural guidance only. As with Study One, 
there was no intention to use Semler’s alignment model as a direct test of the model 
itself. 
In total there were twelve interview questions, which enabled the exploration 
of Zero Harm from an individual perspective. As previously mentioned, the 
organisational contact had identified potential participants to participate within the 
semi-structured interviews. The researcher sought and gained approval to undertake 
the interviews from each participant. Initial contact was made by email. Those that 
agreed to be interviewed were followed up by a telephone call. The interviews were 
conducted over a three-month period and included face-to-face interviews as well as 
interviews made over the telephone. All interviews were conducted whilst the 
interviewee was at the workplace, during business hours and at an agreed mutually 
convenient time. As previously discussed, the interviews were voluntary and consent 
was gained through signing of the consent form. Prior to each interview, the 
participant reaffirmed his or her consent verbally. All participants were informed of 
the confidentiality of the interviews and that no identifying material will be recorded 
that could identify any individual.  
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The same questions were asked to each of the participants (see Appendix C). 
The questions were derived and designed from the initial literature review and from 
the responses received from the quantitative questionnaire as described in Chapter 4. 
All questions were open-ended and focused on drawing individual responses and 
experiences from each participant. Interview duration ranged from 30 minutes to 60 
minutes dependent on each of the participant’s willingness to participate and share 
their experiences and perceptions. Table 5.1 provides examples of the semi-
structured interview questions as they are aligned to Semler’s organisational 
alignment constructs. All interviews where recorded and later transcribed except for 
one interview due to electronic recorder failure. The interviews were also recorded in 
note format by the researcher. The transcribed text was then analysed and categorised 
into themes. 
Table 5.1. 
Semi-structured interview questions and Semler’s Organisational Alignment 
Constructs 
Semler’s Alignment Model Construct Example Semi-structured interview questions 
Environment Why do you believe your company has a focus on zero 
harm? 
Vision, values and purpose What do you believe is the meaning of zero harm? 
Culture What would you do if you were given an important task that 
needed to be done quickly but potentially would place you or 
others in harm’s way? 
Strategy Can you describe your company’s safety programs and their 
effectiveness on the organisations commitment to zero 
harm? 
Rewards How does your company recognise and reward its 
employees or the organisation on zero harm? 
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Structure and systems How do you use the company’s safety management system to 
enhance your safety at work? 
Practices Why do you always use the correct safety equipment to do 
your job? 
Behaviour If you think the activity that you are doing is unsafe, what 
would you do, and how would you do it? 
Performance How do you think your company proactively measures zero 
harm? 
 
5.2.3 Data analysis 
All responses to the qualitative semi-structured interviews were analysed 
through a thematic analysis. For this research, a thematic analysis was instrumental 
for investigating the perceptions of the participants towards Zero Harm. A thematic 
analysis is a widely used, highly flexible qualitative research methodology for 
identifying, analysing and reporting on themes or patterns within data (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). Themes capture the important aspects of the data that relates to the 
research and provides the ability to develop patterned responses and meaning within 
the data (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
A six-phase framework was used for the thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 
2006; Silverman, 2011). This involved, during phase 1, the transcribing of the 
interviews into written form and the reading and re-reading of the data. Phase 2 
involved the manual initial generation of codes from the data that was of interest to 
the researcher and the questions asked. Phase 3 was conducted after the initial coding 
and the identification of themes was undertaken based on relationships of codes and 
themes. Phase 4 involved the defining of the initial themes including the elimination 
of some themes due to lack of supporting data from the interviews and the 
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amalgamation of some themes into an overarching theme. During phase 5, these 
themes where then further defined and named. Finally, phase 6 involved the writing 
up of the analysis. 
5.2.4 Results  
Key themes are discussed and supported under the framework of Semler’s 
alignment model’s nine constructs: environment, vision value purpose, culture, 
strategy, rewards, structure and systems, practices, behaviours and performance. As 
previously mentioned, Semler’s alignment model was used as a framework to 
provide a structural guide only. Therefore the research findings are summarised 
under each of the main constructs of Semler’s alignment model. 
Environment 
As an independent variable, the environment construct sets the context within 
the organisation for the manifestation of its strategic capabilities, its values, 
behaviours and performance (Semler, 1999). Simplistically, the environment sets the 
scene. In the interviews, all participants were asked two questions; why do you 
believe your company has a focus on Zero Harm and why do you think your 
company cares about worker safety? Table 5.1 demonstrates the key themes to 
emerge from the analysis including: employee safety as well as client relationships 
and contracts. A clear theme that emerged from the interviews was a focus on 
employee safety. Participants clearly articulated that the company is committed to 
employee safety as stated by one participant “workers are the company’s greatest 
assets” (Interview 2) and “that everyone has really got this in mind, we want to see 
people to go home in the same way they came” (Interview 21). Interestingly, 
although there was significant support that the company was focused on employee 
safety, one participant stated that “individuals have a focus but I have not seen a 
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focus from the company” (Interview 9). However, there were some clear distinctions 
between Zero Harm and employee safety. One participant clearly articulated that “we 
are focused on reducing safety and environmental incidents; not Zero Harm” 
(Interview 11). Conversely, another participant succinctly stated in relation to why 
the company cares about worker safety, “so they don’t get sued” (Interview 23).  
Another central theme that emerged was that of client relationships and 
contracts and in particular in maintaining and securing new contracts. This theme 
was well engrained from management to shop floor employees. In this context, the 
majority of participants related the company’s commitment to Zero Harm and worker 
safety was focused on the company’s safety record and safety performance, as 
demonstrated by one participant who stated that “I think the company cares about 
worker safety but it is less humanistic place of caring and more on sound good 
business sense. First we care due to legislative reasons. Second, it is smart business 
sense, we care because the clients care and have to put things in place that the clients 
require us to have in place or has expectations around” (Interview 11).  
The relationship between clients, contracts and safety performance was very 
evident in the interviews, as various participants expressed we “need good safety 
statistics so that we can successfully tender for work” (Interview 8) and “from a 
company standpoint we will not survive in the industry if we do not have an 
impeccable safety record” (Interview 16). Also “if the company does not have a good 
safety record it will affect the businesses” (Interview 22).  
Conversely, another theme emerged through several interviewees who 
identified that the company had a corporate responsibility (Interviews 15, 16 & 22) 
and that “the company has a responsibility to look after employees” (Interview 22). 
From an individual perspective, one participant stated “as an internal stakeholder or 
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decision maker, I don’t want anything hanging over my head where someone has lost 
their life or someone has injured themselves and I will have to carry the guilt for 
that” (Interview 16). Another participant suggested that “I think it’s the right thing to 
do, it’s a corporate responsibility at the same time the results of that is that we are a 
good company and good employer and we look after our people and that will result 
in a better brand for the company at the same time” (Interview 15). This was 
supported by another interviewee who suggests “obviously it is a corporate 
responsibility and its one of our risks. It is definitely the right thing to do” (Interview 
15). 
Table 5.2. 
Themes associated with Environment 
Themes Examples 
Employee safety “They don’t want to see anyone to get hurt” (Interview 1) 
“No one wants employees to go home injured, we want everyone to go 
home safe” (Interview 4) 
“We should not be hurting people at work” (interview 6) 
“We want to protect our employee” (Interview 17) 
Client relationships and 
contracts 
“To keep clients happy and make us look good in the industry” 
(Interview 5) 
“For our company especially being in the service industry and that the 
fact there so much emphasis placed on (safety) from our customers we 
have no choice” (Interview 16) 
“There are also more practical reasons such as cost and relationships 
with clients” (Interview 1) 
“I think it is around the bottom line, making money, wining tenders, 
organisational reputation and they care for employees safety” 
(interview 10) 
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All participants were also asked if there were any barriers that they perceive 
associated with the company’s commitment to Zero Harm and worker safety. Two 
theme’s emerged; attitude and money. Interestingly, attitude was identified in a 
cross-section of participants with one participant suggesting, “definitely attitude of 
workers as it (safety) becomes mundane” (Interview 22). When asked can this be 
improved another participant responded, “yes listen to more voices. Management 
have their ideas but they don’t seem to listen and costs always seem to come 
involved when we want feedback” (Interview 21). This leads into the other 
significant barrier, money. The perception of organisational costs as a negative 
impact on the company’s commitment to Zero Harm and worker safety was clearly 
evident by most participants for example; “yes it still is a cost issue” (interview 21) 
and “yes time and money is always a barrier” (interview 10). This was challenging 
for one participant who responded with “they don’t want to see anyone hurt but they 
are not going to lose any sleep over it until its starts costing money” (Interview 23). 
Vision Value Purpose 
Semler’s alignment construct; vision, value and purpose focus on the 
organisations goal of the alignment, which defines the organisations purpose 
(Semler, 1999). All participants were asked three questions; ‘what do you believe is 
the meaning of Zero Harm’, ‘how does your company measure Zero Harm’ and ‘why 
do you believe that Zero Harm is achievable within your company?’ Table 5.2 
demonstrates the major themes to emerge from the analysis including themes: no 
injuries, incidents or damage; measurement by lagging indicators and achievable end 
state.  
All interviewees recognised that the meaning of Zero Harm was contextually 
focused on no injuries such as a “workplace where we are free of accidents, injuries 
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or incidents that affects our employees or contractors” (Interview 8) and “no harm or 
injury to anyone at work” (Interview 14) which was an overarching theme. Other 
interviewees provided additional clarity such as “Zero Harm is not just personal 
safety it is also the environment” (Interview 7) as well as “not just Zero Harm to 
personnel, but also to equipment and the environment” (Interview 19). This was 
supported by another interviewee who suggests, “Zero Harm is in the description it is 
no harm to employees, no harm to the environment it is absolute zero” (Interview 3). 
Another theme emerged during the interviews based on significant debate on 
how Zero Harm was measured with the majority concluding that it is measured by 
lagging indicators such as; first aid injuries, recordable injuries and lost time injuries 
(Interviews 1,6,9,11,). This suggests that a reduction in physical injuries is an 
indicator of achieving Zero Harm (Interview 12). Conversely, there were some 
specific comments that the company only focuses on high risk or severe incidents 
(Interview 5) and that this is reactive (Interview 7) and poorly undertaken (Interview 
5). In one particular case, this was further clarified that measuring Zero Harm was 
focused on measuring only recordable injuries rather than no harm (Interview 8). 
Interestingly, even though the consensus was that Zero Harm was measured by 
lagging statistical indicators, one participant suggested that “I don’t think it does 
measure Zero Harm, it measures a whole bunch of safety statistics such as medical 
treatments and lost time injuries and how many incidents there where but I don’t 
think they measure Zero Harm’ (Interview 11).  
Zero Harm as an achievable end state also emerged as significant theme when 
the participants where asked if they believe Zero Harm is achievable within their 
company. However, to provide some context and as one participant stated it 
“depends on exactly what are we looking at, is it LTI free or recordable free and one 
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step further is it first aid free” (Interview 6). This belief that Zero Harm is achievable 
has been based on individual experiences (Interview 5 and Interview 10) and the 
history of the company shows a forty percent decrease in the lost time injury 
frequency rate (Interview 12).  Further, the belief that Zero Harm is achievable is 
across all elements of the business with one participant commenting that “top down 
management who have come through the business believe it is genuinely achievable 
(Interview 1) and another (Interview 19) stating “I can’t speak for the whole 
company as such, but in my unit yes. I believe it is, as we have a close knit culture 
and we are looking out for each other”. This is supported by another participant 
(Interview 21) who, when asked if Zero Harm is achievable states, “yes, the process 
that we try and work to and the boys on the floor are quite intelligent and they do not 
want to hurt themselves”. This belief is also projected to the clients that the company 
is working for, as one participant states, “because we work with clients that have the 
same belief which is important and working towards the same outcome of Zero 
Harm” (Interview 7). However, another participant suggests “Yes, I think it is 
possible but it is only achievable for a certain amount of time. It is inevitable that 
incidents will occur and it’s about eliminating the chance of that occurring” 
(Interview 6). This may suggest that perhaps Zero Harm is only attainable for a 
period of time and is not a sustainable outcome.  
Table 5.3. 
Themes associated vision, value purpose (the meaning of Zero Harm, how it is 
measured and is it achievable) 
Themes Examples 
No injuries, incidents or damage “Zero harm is in the description it is no harm to employees, no 
harm to the environment it is absolute zero” (Interview 3) 
 
“Zero harm is around people’s personal safety. It is not hurting 
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Themes Examples 
our employees, no injuries and no sickness as a result of 
working for the company” (Interview 6) 
 
“All incidents are preventable” (Interview 4) 
Measurement by lagging indicators “Too many KPI’s, LTI’s recordable incidents” (interview 1) 
 
“The easiest method is through statistics such as first aids, 
recordable and LTI’s” (interview 6) 
 
“A couple of ways, LTIFR, TRIFR are the common ones to use” 
(interview 15) 
Achievable end state “Yes it is possible. Top down management who have come 
through the business believe it is genuinely achievable. Safety 
used to be a dirty word” (interview 1) 
 
“I believe it is achievable as I have seen pockets of excellence 
where we are not hurting people” (interview 5) 
 
“It is achievable if everyone cooperates. Safety is not about 
management not about leaders it is about everybody’s 
involvement” (interview 14) 
 
“I can’t speak for the whole company as such, but my unit yes. I 
believe it is as we have a close knit culture and we are looking 
out for each other” (interview 19) 
 
Participants were also asked if there were any barriers to achieving Zero Harm 
which developed into considerable debate. This resulted in another emerging theme. 
Several participants suggested that due to the high risk sector that they work in, there 
will always be a risk of injury (Interview 8). They do not believe that it would be 
considered to be attainable at present within the industry as a whole (Interview 11). 
One participant was quite adamant that he would struggle to get 10% of the people to 
believe that Zero Harm was achievable (Interview 23). Other comments from those 
that do not support that Zero Harm is achievable, sighted that although they are 
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always improving (Interview 2), “we are only human, as little a mistake might be, we 
all make mistakes” (Interview 17) that could lead to an incident. 
Culture 
Culture refers to “implicit and explicit preferences and judgments concerning 
what can be defined as qualitatively good or bad, desirable or undesirable within the 
organisation” (Semler, 1999, p.403). Cultural values of the organisation are 
transmitted from the organisations individuals to new members of the organisation 
(Semler, 1999). All participants were asked; ‘what would you do if you were given 
an important task that needed to be done quickly but potentially would place you or 
others in harm’s way and what are the enablers for this to happen?’ Table 5.3 
demonstrates the major themes that emerged from the analysis which was, Stop 
Work Authority. 
Throughout all interviews the major theme supported was that there was a high 
level of awareness on the requirements to ensure the safety of not only the person 
undertaking the activity, but the safety of those that the activity may affect. As one 
participant stated “there is no such thing as an important task that we should be doing 
if it has the potential to put people in harm” (Interview 16). For example one 
participant openly stated that they would “stop work and put a plan in place” 
(Interview 3) prior to commencing the activity. Another participant suggested that if 
they were forced to do an unsafe activity they would involve their supervisor or 
manager to review the tasks and if they were still required to do the task and it was 
still deemed unsafe then they would refuse to do the activity (Interview 4). 
Although there was a high level of awareness one participant suggest, “it needs 
to be considered in more detail. Everything has a risk to it; it just needs to be 
considered how big a risk it is. It has to be balanced and the employee has to take 
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some responsibility for themselves” (Interview 8). One participant stated that he 
would “try to find a happy medium by doing the job as safely as possible while 
ensuring there is no necessary risks” (Interview 23). Of concern was that this might 
suggest that safety is not considered fully prior to undertaking the task. This is 
supported by one participant who stated that they would, “explain and guide them 
through it and getting office people out of the way as well, as you sometimes need to 
do things that you would not do in your everyday tasks that if they were watching 
you would do things slightly different to make it look like you are trying to act safe. 
Like having tag lines and trying to guide something through a tight place, you would 
not do that, you would just hold it from the other end” (Interview 23). Alternatively, 
another participant stated, “in my role I am not often placed in a situation that I am 
put at risk specifically but I think the way I am at risk is psychologically and 
emotionally. So if I was given an important task that needed to be done quickly that I 
thought would put me or others under stress (harm) I would probably still do it” 
(Interview 11). Whilst this may not be a physical threat of harm, it is still a form of 
harm, psychologically and emotionally.  
To enable employees to stop work, the majority of the participants identified 
the ‘stop work authority card’ as a major theme which was highly effective and 
empowered. The ‘stop work authority card’ or simply the ‘stop work card’ is a 
physical pocket card that is issued to all employees. Printed on the card is “use this 
card to empower you to stop any situation you feel is unsafe, where unsafe 
conditions exist, and/or where you feel there is a weakness in the HSE System”. The 
card also provides the contact details of the most senior manager of the company. As 
various participants explained, they have the authority to stop work through the “stop 
work card, nothing should be done that is that important that it cannot be done 
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safely” (Interview 9). As another participant suggests the “stop work card which 
allows any employee to stop work if they feel that any job is unsafe” (Interview 15). 
However, it is interesting to note that one participant suggests, “Stop cards are used 






Themes associated with culture 
Themes Examples 
Stop Work “Stop work and put a plan in place” (interview 3) 
 
“If I was forced to do it I would get my supervisor or manager 
down to walk through the task including the take 5 and JHA, if 
there was any concerns I would get my manager involved and if 
they still wanted it to happen I would refuse to do it” (Interview 
4) 
 
“I have never been in that situation before but if I had to be in 
that situation it would not progress it has to be stopped if it 
places myself or others in harm’s way” (Interview 15) 
 
“That’s simple I would not do it. I would just stop the job take 5 
have a look at it have a discussion about it” (interview 19) 
 
“This is pretty common and happens almost every day. I have 
been trained to get the task safely done, it does not matter if it is 
delayed, you just need to get it done safely” (Interview 22) 
 
“Stop work card, nothing should be done that is that important 
that it cannot be done safely” (interview 9) 
 
“Stop work card which allows any employee to stop work if they 
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Themes Examples 
feel that any job is unsafe” (Interview 15) 
 
 
As with the previous interview questions, all participants were asked if there 
were any barriers to stopping work if the activity has the potential to place them or 
others in harm’s way. This also generated much debate. Another theme that emerged 
from various participants suggested that there may be pressure from management or 
supervisors (Interview 6 and Interview 12) or that the job just has to be done 
(Interviews 14 & 22) regardless. Intriguingly one participant suggests “the biggest 
barrier is making sure that our managers actually accept that if an employee comes 
up to them with a safety concern they should be encouraged not to do something 
unsafe that includes us or our customer” (Interview 16). However as another 
participant stated, “I do not think there are any barriers everyone is aware of it” 
(Interview 15). 
Strategy  
Strategy is focusing and designing the organisations direction to be in an 
advantageous position this includes planning and communicating the organisations 
goals within all levels of the organisation (Semler, 1999). All participants were 
asked; can you describe your company’s safety programs and their effectiveness on 
the organisations commitment to Zero Harm, what exposure have you had to these 
programs and how do you think these programs can be improved? Table 5.4 
demonstrates the key themes to emerge from the analysis of data resulting in policies 
and training emerging as the major theme. Overwhelmingly the majority of 
participants were able describe the company’s safety and training programs which 
was a major theme, such as the ‘rules to live by’ (Interviews 2, 9 & 14); ‘8 GEMS’ 
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(Interviews 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19 & 22); ‘4 Tenets’ for 
environment (Interviews, 3, 14, 16 & 17). The ‘rules to live by’ are a set of 
commitment statements under eight different safety categories which are called the 8 
GEMS. The acronym GEMS stands for Getting Everyone to Manage Safety. The 4 
Tenets also include commitment statements under four different environmental 
categories. 
As stated by one Interviewee “these programs are preached daily, we have 
posters to increase employee’s awareness. We even talk about them in our toolbox 
meetings” (Interview 14). These training programs are also supported by specific 
safety and training policies (Interview 2 and Interview 3) as well as specific 
programs that address the highest injury or incident causation such as manual 
handling (Interview 4). Overall, as one participant stated, “I think our safety 
programs are good. I don’t think they are state of the art, I think that they are similar 
to what other industries are doing and the basics. I don’t think they are highly 
influential to influence cultural change around safety. I think it is rather around 
gathering data, informing people and doing investigations and making sure that we 
do whatever the clients expect us to do. I don’t think it is around changing safety 
behaviours. So I don’t see safety programs around actual safety behavioural change. 
I think there is a lot of information around the rules to live by and posters, not to say 
this is clever stuff but I don’t think this helps change our people’s behaviour” 
(Interview 11). 
All participants were also asked what exposure they had to these programs. 
Respondents stated “every month there is a focus on the 8 GEMS rules to live by” 
(Interview 2) and that there is “regular roll out of RADAR and the 8 GEMS” 
(Interview 8). As well as that “there is a lot of exposure to everybody right from the 
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inductions to the screen saver reminders for the 8 GEMS s they are constantly being 
refreshed” (Interview 16). RADAR is an acronym for Recognize, Approach, Discuss, 
Agree and Report. RADAR or more generally referred to as RADAR cards is a 
hazard reporting tool. When asked on what improvements could be suggested for 
these programs, one participant responded with “sometimes too many programs. Not 
enough one on one mentoring” (Interview 1). The programs could be improved by 
“workshops, lunches, photography shoots and senior management visits” (Interview 
3).  As well as “more examples of people doing it and showing people how it should 




Themes associated with strategy (policy and safety training) 
Themes Examples 
Policies and training “Policies including 8 GEMS and the rules to live by which keep 
people focused” (Interview 2) 
 
“We operate under a series of policies, OEPS, rules to live by 
and the 8 GEMS based on safety including policies and 
procedures. We also have our environmental policies including 
4 tenants” (Interview 3) 
 
“We do have effective safety program. We have rolled out 
manual handling, which is the highest causing incidents and we 
are having safety leadership meetings to drive safety programs” 
(Interview 4) 
 
“We have a number of different safety programs. 8 GEMS is the 
big on, 4 Tenants from an environmental standpoint. Stop work 
cards is still out there” (Interview 16) 
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Continuing with the same format as approached in the previous questions all 
participants were asked if they were any barriers associated with the organisations’ 
policy and safety training. In answering this question, one participant responded with 
“I don’t think there are any barriers to training, I think people are willing to 
undertake training or send them to training, but I do not think it is at a highly 
sophisticated highly mature philosophy” (Interview 11). However, other participants 
responded with “over the last 12 months the focus has not been there, and as not as 
strong as it once was” (Interview 4). As well as, “getting the mindset for employees 
to use these programs. It was also suggested that “to get the program right you also 
need the right carrot and stick” (Interview 16). Other themes identified barriers such 
as “peoples attitude” (Interview 20) and a “lack of time and workloads” (Interview 
23). From another perspective, one participant suggested, “this year we have not 
really focused on safety as we believe the next step change in safety is a focus on 
quality service. If we get people doing the job right this will lead on to less harm. If 
people were doing what they were supposed to be doing then they would not hurt 
themselves” (Interview 5). 
Rewards 
Rewards include benefits, incentive programs, promotion and disciplinary 
systems that provided tangible and intangible incentives or disincentives to 
individuals within the organisation (Semler, 1999). All participants were asked; how 
does your company recognise and reward its employees or the organisation on Zero 
Harm and what is your exposure to being personally recognised for Zero Harm or 
safety and how can this be improved? Table 5.5 demonstrates the key theme to 
emerge from the analysis of the data; recognition. A major theme to emerge was the 
poor recognition of its employees by the company (Interviews 1, 5, 10, 13, 16, 17, 
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21, 22 & 23). As one interviewee suggested “I think it is very sporadic on what 
awards are attached to safety. I think each geo market manager and their personal 
view drive it” (Interview 11). For example, in the Australian geo market it was 
identified that the Western States hold monthly safety meetings including reward and 
recognition presentations whereas in the Eastern States there is no reward and 
recognition (Interviews 4 & 9). As demonstrated, one interviewee who suggest that 
in the Western States they hold monthly safety meetings and monthly awards which 
is attended by every person at the facility, whereas on the Eastern States they hold 
meetings but there is no recognition to employees (Interview 4). 
Conversely, another theme emerged that there was some cynicism in the 
responses including comments such as “I am sure the company does not know” 
(Interview 1) in relation to the business achieving an injury free milestones and “we 
are still recording the wrong stuff, we are focussed on statistics” (Interview 5). Other 
comments include “I don’t think we do this right” (Interview 16) and “on occasions 
they have the monthly safety awards but I don’t see this too much” (Interview 21) as 
well as you will get your “quarterly bonus as long as we cover up all of our injuries” 
(Interview 23). There was also an acknowledgment that the company’s employees 
have been awarded and recognised from outside the company by clients when they 
have achieved a significant milestone such as a full year without a lost time injury 
(Interview 1, 3 & 11). This was reinforced by one interviewee who states “I think our 
clients do it better than us and that in fact our clients recognise our own people” 
(Interview 11). 
When asked what was the methodology for the selection for reward and 
recognition, in general the responses where through; RADAR cards (Interviews 2, 6, 
7, 12, 15, 16 & 23), hazard hunts (Interviews 7, 12 & 22) and statistics such as injury 
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free periods and in particular lost time injury free milestones (Interviews 3, 5, 6, 7 & 
18). A hazard hunt is a localised area inspection that proactively looks for hazards. 
Not surprisingly, one interviewee suggested that the company is too focused on 
safety statistics and they don’t promote the good stuff that they do (Interview 5). 
The major types of reward and recognition provided included; monetary 
vouchers or merchandise (Interviews 2, 12, 14, 15 & 22) and thank you cards or 
accommodation letters (Interviews 9 & 14). From a management perspective, reward 
and recognition for safety performance is directly related to their annual management 
bonus, which as suggested by one interviewee is about 30% of their total bonus 
(Interviews 7 & 8). Some interviewees have been personally recognised for safety 
(Interviews 9, 10 & 19). Whereas others have been recognised as a group for 
example; achieving an injury free milestone or hazard hunt (Interviews 6 & 22). 
However, as one interviewee also pointed out that although he has been with the 
company for over 10 years and has never had a lost time injury he has never been 
rewarded or recognised. 
Table 5.6. 
Themes associated with rewards 
Themes Examples 
Recognition  “I do know that a client/operator gives us recognition when 
working on their rigs” (Interview 1) 
 
“We have been awarded from outside of the company such as 
when we have achieved a full year without a LTI which is 
considered a significant milestone” (Interview 3) 
 
“We recognise in the past employees through our radar card 
system when we have achieved goals such as recordable free or 
one year LTI free. With recent times with the cost cutting we 
have reduced the individual awards” (Interview 6) 
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Themes Examples 
“I think our clients do it better than us and that in fact our 
clients recognize our own people.” (Interview 11) 
 
“Currently I would say in terms of recognition just a letter of 
accommodation. Previously there was monetary rewards” 
(Interview 14) 
 
“In the past we would give out safety awards but I have not 
been exposed to that anymore and not sure if we are doing that 




All participants were again asked if they were any barriers to a reward and 
recognition program. Overwhelmingly the major theme was the lack of consistency 
in the application of the reward and recognition program, which is compounded by 
the lack of funds and resources to support the program. This lack of consistency 
includes the reward and recognition program being poorly implemented or not 
implemented at all (Interviews 1, 5, 16, 21 & 23). As stated by Interviewee 11 “if a 
geo market manager is very focused on safety he is more likely to showcase 
somebody doing a great thing around safety and therefore give them recognition and 
possibly rewards. Some country managers don’t do anything”. A lack of funds was 
also identified as a barrier (Interviews 6, 10, 17 & 22). For example “given the 
current climate in the oil and gas industry, a barrier is the lack of funds” (Interview 
17).  
Structures and systems 
Structures and systems represent the organisations structure and systems that 
are designed to process inputs such as information, matter and energy to produce a 
desired output. (Semler, 1999). All participants were asked; how do you use the 
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company’s safety management system to enhance your safety at work and what are 
the enablers and barriers? Table 5.6 demonstrates the key theme to emerge from the 
analysis which is; controlled documents and tools. Throughout all interviews a theme 
emerged that there was a high level of awareness of the existence of the safety 
management system as one interviewee stated, ‘it is basically the bible that I use’ 
(Interview 12). However, not all interviewee’s utilised the safety management 
system or they used it sparingly (Interviews 1, 4, 7 & 23). The reasons for this 
included a belief that the safety management system did not add any value (Interview 
1), its focus had dropped off (Interview 4), there was a paperwork overload 
(Interviews 8, 23) and it is very tedious and not practical (Interview 8). Also, as 
identified by one interviewee there was too much information within the safety 
management system (Interview 8). Yet another interviewee suggests that it is 
incomplete as some documents are not within the system yet and not everything can 
be found within the safety management system (Interview 12). 
Access to the safety management system is primarily through the internal 
internet portal (Interviews 2, 14, 15, 17, 19 & 20).  Other minor themes that emerged 
were that the safety management system is used as repository for documents that 
provide guidance and instruction (Interviews 2, 6 12 & 20). The major 
documentation that is accessed within the safety management system are reporting 
tools (Interviews 4 & 10), as well as risk assessments, journey management forms, 
tool box talks (Interviews 3, 10 & 11), stop work cards, and permit to work 
(Interview 7) and radar cards (Interviews 7, 21 & 22). 
Table 5.7. 
Themes associated with structure and systems (safety management system) 
Themes Examples 
Controlled documents and tools “The SMS helps by having controlled documents to provide 
 Study 2 121 
Themes Examples 
guidelines” (Interview 2) 
 
“As a guideline and quick reference to our policies and risk 
management tools and communication. A quick reference guide 
when we are on the job. Also when we are requested by the 
clients” (interview 6) 
 
“I use it but not to the full extent, it can be sometimes over the 
top. I use I to ensure that the right information is passed up and 
down the organisation” (Interview 8) 
 
“It is basically the bible that I use. I can always find the 
guidelines and instructions. It is easy to use” (Interview 12) 
 
“We have to use the safety management system in our daily 
works” (interview 14) 
 
Again, as with the previous interview questions, all participants were asked if 
there were any barriers to the safety management system in enhancing their safety at 
work. Two major themes that arose out of these questions were paperwork (Interview 
6). Including comments such as “it is too paper driven and very tedious and not 
practical” (Interview 8) and “it is painful, I cannot stand the paperwork involved” 
(Interview 23). The second theme was access to the safety management system. It 
seemed that throughout the interviews whilst the safety management system was 
primarily a repository for documentation to maintain safe work practices as 
previously mentioned, there was an obvious concern in relation to workers access to 
the safety management system including computer access (Interview 21). For 
example, one interviewee stated “shop hands do not have their own laptops and 
getting access to the system” (Interview 14) and “some of the off shore personnel 
may not have log on or do not have access or laptops” (Interview 15). This could be 
potentially very problematic. However, it is noted by one interviewee who suggested 
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that people might be penalised for using the safety management system correctly by 
recording everything such as all incidents (Interview 16). 
Practices 
Practices include cultural assumptions that are in action and how they are 
applied daily within the organisation (Semler, 1999). All participants were asked; 
why do you always use the correct safety equipment to do your job and can you 
describe a situation where you have not used your safety equipment? Table 5.7 
demonstrates the key themes to emerge from the analysis which are; personal safety, 
standards and cultural. Not surprisingly, the majority of the interview respondents 
suggested that their personal safety was a major theme and the driving factor for 
them to use the correct safety equipment (Interviews 1, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22 & 23).  However, it is somewhat perplexing that 
another theme emerged from a significant number of these respondents, who 
identified and openly stated that whilst they use safety equipment within the work 
environment they did however not use safety equipment within the home 
environment (Interviews 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 20, 21, 22 & 23). This included gardening and 
house maintenance (Interviews 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 20 &21) such as mowing lawns, 
using tools and ladders and household chemicals. One respondent also identified that 
he previously did not wear a motorcycle helmet and boots when riding a motorbike 
(Interview 23). 
During the interviews there was a consistent theme around the use of correct 
safety equipment within the work environment.  One interviewee stated, “I always 
use correct safety equipment. There is no question about that. It might take longer 
but it will be done safely’ (Interview 1). As stated by another interviewee when 
questioned on why they use the correct safety equipment, “that’s a no brainer, to do 
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the job safely or correctly’ (Interview15). There was an inference to the organisations 
safety requirements for example “to minimize the risk of me being getting injured 
and we have to” (Interview 20), in response to being asked the same question. 
Furthermore, the use of correct safety equipment is not confined to those who are 
working in operational areas only, as stated by one participant, “I work in the office, 
but I have a bag that has my coveralls, gloves, safety glasses etc. and I take this with 
me on my travels and when I am going to a base. If I did not have the right 
equipment then I would not actually go out into the work zone” (Interview 16). This 
was supported by another participant who suggests, “I don’t use a lot of safety 
equipment due to my role and office based. I am always conscious of the safety rules 
and what PPE is required when I visit workshops” (Interview 5). 
Some participants also identified the value and the use of correct safety 
equipment as an opportunity to set standards and provide direction for new and 
current workers. As one participant suggested, using the correct safety equipment 
will “make an example to new workers and show them the right way of doing it” 
(Interview 21) and “at work I try to set an example” (Interview 13), when questioned 
on why they use the correct safety equipment. This was further exemplified by 
another participant who stated, “when I am on site I always ensure that I wear all the 
right PPE, as a manager I cannot preach about it if I am not wearing it. I always 
make sure I am wearing the correct safety equipment” (Interview 4).  
Table 5.8. 
Themes associated with practices (using safety equipment) 
Themes Examples 
Personal Safety “Because I want to give myself the maximum protection. The 
wrong safety equipment can potentially harm myself and my co-
workers” (Interview 12) 
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Themes Examples 
“I want to go home safe” (Interview 14) 
 
I always do because I think of the consequences because I don’t 
want to be injured” (Interview 17) 
 
“Safety equipment is there for your personal safety so I always 
make sure the equipment is inspected and tagged” (Interview 
19) 
 
“Minimise the risk of me getting injured and we have to” 
(interview 20) 
 
“Definitely for my own safety, you are more effective you save 
time and get the things done with not damaging the equipment” 
(Interview 22) 
 
“Stop being injured” (Interview 23) 
 
Standards “When I am on site I always ensure that I wear all the right 
PPE. As a manager I cannot preach about it if I am not wearing 
it. I always make sure I am wearing the correct safety 
equipment” (Interview 4) 
 
“To do the right thing, At work I try to set an example” 
(Interview 13) 
 
“Make an example for new workers and show them the right 
way of doing it” (Interview 21) 
Cultural 
 
“It is a cultural thing and something that I have been trained on 
for a very long time” (Interview 3) 
 
“I believe that we have a well engrained safety culture that if I 
don’t use the correct safety equipment, I feel very 
uncomfortable”  (Interview 7) 
 
Again, and following the same theme as with the previous interview questions, 
all participants were asked if they could describe a situation when they have not used 
 Study 2 125 
the correct PPE. Only one participant indicated that they did not always follow the 
PPE requirements and stated (Interview 21) ‘I will admit at work I have taken my 
gloves off occasionally to do what I need to do”. However, another participant 
indicated that there is the potential to not comply with PPE requirements through 
either not knowing client site requirements or not having the PPE requirements 
communicated to you (Interview 8). Of interest, a theme that emerged was that 
various participants acknowledged that historically they did not use the correct safety 
equipment but this has now changed. As one participant states “basically I was use to 
wearing a baseball cap and short sleeve shirt when I started” (Interview 10) and 
“back in my old wire line days, there were some activities that you could not use 
your gloves due to grip dexterity so you would take your gloves off to screw in a 
screw” (Interview 9). As well as “in the past I have not used PPE at home but I 
certainly do now” (Interview 5). This evolution from non-compliance to compliance 
in the use of correct safety equipment has been identified as a cultural change as 
discussed by one participant “it is a cultural thing and something that I have been 
trained on for a very long time” (Interview 3) and “I believe that we have a well 
engrained safety culture that if I don’t use the correct safety equipment, I feel very 
uncomfortable” (Interview 7). 
Behaviours 
Behaviours are the observable activity of individuals or groups within the 
organisation. These behaviours may or may not contribute or be intended to 
contribute to the organisations’ goals (Semler, 1999). All participants were asked; if 
you think of an activity that you are doing is unsafe, what would you do, and how 
would you do it as well as what are the enablers and barriers? Table 5.8 depicts that 
the key theme to emerge from the analysis was; empowerment. 
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Overwhelmingly a major theme emerged that the majority of participants 
(Interviews 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22 & 23) stated that 
they would stop the activity if they thought it was unsafe. As stated by one 
participant I would “stop, we are all empowered to stop work” (Interview 3). Again 
there was an overwhelming response from the participants that once they have 
stopped the activity they will then try to find an alternative process (Interviews 2, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21 & 23) to achieve the activity safely 
including self-analysing how to do it safely (Interviews 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20 
& 21). This is achieved by discussing the activity with co-workers (Interviews 2, 6, 
11 & 14) or their supervisor or manager (Interviews 4 & 15) and completing either a 
JHA (Job Hazard Analysis) (Interviews 4 & 9) or a Take 5 (Interviews 6, 14, 19, & 
23). A Take 5 is a personal risk assessment tool. 
When asked what are the enablers to allow the activity to be stopped, the major 
theme that emerged identified the tools within the safety management system which 
included risk assessment tools such as JHA’s and Take 5’s (Interviews 4, 6, 9, 10, 
14, 15, 16, 18, 19 & 20) as well as the stop work card (Interviews 3, 11, 13, 15, 16, & 
17). The final enabler identified was management support (Interviews 1, 3, 17 & 22). 
As stated by one participant “management support me to stop the job” (Interview 1). 
Further, as another participant reported, “the company encourages me to do this (stop 
the activity if it is unsafe). Even if the supervisor wants me to get it done (the 
activity) management will support me (to stop the job)” (Interview 22). 
Table 5.9. 
Themes associated with behaviour (to stop the work if unsafe) 
Themes Examples 
Empowerment “I would stop the job” (interview 1) 
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Themes Examples 
“Stop we are all empowered to stop work” (Interview 3) 
 
“Stop the job and do a quick take 5 if I have not done one 
already, step back and if it is a group tasks get the guys 
together and have a chat and do a risk assessment” (Interview 
6) 
 
“I would not do it” (Interview 22) 
 
“The company encourages me to do this. Even if the supervisor 
wants me to get it done, management will support me” 
(Interview 22) 
Again, and following on as with the previous interview questions, all 
participants were asked if they were any barriers. A note of concern, was one 
participant’s comments “I think the barrier is that people still have a hesitancy to use 
the stop work. I have spoken up and said let’s stop as this does not feel right to me, 
maybe there is something wrong. I haven’t had a positive response in doing that and 
therefore that makes you less likely of doing that later on” (Interview 11). Another 
participant reported, “sometimes your supervisor does not think that it is that much 
of an issue” (Interview 22). Other barriers identified were time constraints placed on 
the activity (Interviews 2, 6 & 23) as well as the lack of available equipment and 
personal protective equipment (Interviews 17 & 20). 
Performance 
Performance is the collective output of individual and group behaviour within 
the organisation. (Semler, 1999). All participants were asked; how do you think your 
company proactively measures Zero Harm, do you think it can be enhanced and are 
they any barriers to measuring this? Table 5.9 demonstrates the key theme to emerge 
from the analysis; performance measure. 
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During the interviews an emerging theme was that several participants did not 
believe that the company proactively measures Zero Harm (Interviews 1, 5, 7, 11, 15 
& 20) and that the company measures Zero Harm poorly (Interviews 5, 6 & 10). Of 
those participants that responded that the company does proactively measure Zero 
Harm indicated that this was achieved through measuring statistics (Interviews 6, 9, 
13, 14, 16, 18, 21, 22 & 23) and recognition of milestones (Interviews 2 & 4). 
Several participants suggested that leading indicators (Interviews 10, 12, 17 & 19) 
were used to proactively measure Zero Harm such as RADAR cards, hazard reports 
and internal audit reports. 
Various participants indicated that the company does not proactively measure 
Zero Harm which was exemplified by one interviewee who was adamant that “we do 
not measure Zero Harm” (Interview 11). Others were somewhat less committal and 
made comments such as “I do not think they do this” (Interview 1) or “we do not 
proactively measure it. We are measuring the statistics for one purpose but I don’t 
think we are proactively measuring it” (Interview 15). Two participants reflected 
their frustration with the measurement of Zero Harm with one stating that “to be 
honest at this point in time all measures are reactive measures and there is no 
proactive measures in place” (Interview 7) and the other stating, “we do not measure 
this properly. We are starting to measure recordables but we are not measuring zero 
harm” (Interview 5). 
This theme was continued with participants, who suggested that they believe 
the company does proactively measure Zero Harm, but indicated that this was 
achieved by measuring the company’s safety statistics including lost time injuries 
and recordable injuries. As explained by one of the interviewees, “they look at the 
stats and the number of incidents last month and try to compare it to last year, they 
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are trying to bring that figure down every time” (Interview 22). However, as 
suggested by another interviewee, there is some scepticism around measuring safety 
statistics. They explain that “we have weekly safety stats and monthly safety 
meetings, I see lots of injury reports that show that this person had a laceration and 
this person had a fracture, but there is no LTI. So this makes me think that they are 
not proactively measuring anything but they are just covering up as many LTI’s as 
possible for clients” (Interview 23). Several interviewees suggested that the company 
proactively measured Zero Harm through leading indicators including RADAR 
cards, hazard reports and internal audit reports. Although, as one interviewee 
suggested that even though we measure “leading indicators, hazard reports, (and 
have) a better internal audit reporting system. (However) I don’t think it has been 
measured very well” (Interview 10). 
Discussion around how the company could proactively measure Zero Harm 
revealed a mixture of responses. Proactively measuring Zero Harm can be improved 
by “being out on the floor and giving positive feedback. If we recognise more project 
rather than hazard hunts focusing on how they improved safety will achieve more 
behavioural change” (Interview 4) to focusing on undertaking more audits (Interview 
10) and reviewing RADAR cards (Interviews 2 & 12). As previously noted, there 
were various comments around the company not recording Zero Harm (Interviews 5 
& 15). As well as that “there is no proactive measure in place” (Interview 7) for Zero 
Harm or that the company is to working on proactive measurements (Interview 12). 
Finally one interviewee showed some frustration in the measuring of Zero Harm and 
responded that the clients should be more realistic (Interview 23) in measuring safety 
performance. 
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Table 5.10. 
Themes associated with measuring Zero Harm performance 
Themes Examples 
Performance measure “I do not think they do this” (Interview 1) 
 
“We have just had a 2 years LTI free BBQ and 12 month 
Australia LTI free BBQ” (Interview 4) 
 
“We do not measure this properly. We are starting to measure 
recordables but we are not measuring zero harm” (Interview 5) 
 
“We are not recording zero harm yet” (Interview 5) 
 
“Stats and trending of radar cards and audits” (Interview 9) 
 
“I don’t think it has been measured very well” (Interview 10) 
 
“We do not measure zero harm” (Interview 11) 
 
“We are not working on the measurement itself” (Interview 12) 
 
“We do it monthly, we have measurements of LTI’s” (Interview 
14) 
 




Finally, and following on as with the previous interview questions, all 
participants were asked if there were any barriers to the current methodology of 
measuring Zero Harm proactively. As identified, there are several interviewees who 
do not believe the company is currently measuring Zero Harm proactively 
(Interviews 5, 7, 12 & 15). Furthermore, there were some interesting comments 
around people’s perception that Zero Harm is not possible (Interview 11) and that 
some people may not be committed to the concept (Interview 9). However, the major 
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theme that emerged was the lack of reporting incidents and hazards (Interviews 14, 
16, 22). As one interviewee stated “employees need to have an attitude of reporting 
every incident and behaviour” (Interview 22). There was also dissatisfaction that 
measuring Zero Harm “at the moment is a numbers game” (Interview 19) and that “it 
is all measured by the guys upstairs and not the guys on the floor without them really 
knowing what is going on” (Interview 21). One interviewee demonstrated 
considerable frustration around proactively measuring Zero Harm and the need to 
“stop covering up injuries, but once you start doing this you will start losing clients 
and people will start losing jobs and everything gets even worse” (Interview 23). 
5.3 DISCUSSION 
The aim of this phase of the research program was to undertake a qualitative 
examination into the sample population in order to conduct a deeper exploration into 
employees’ (including supervision and management) perceptions of Zero Harm, 
including its perceived meaning, priority and its manifestation. Key findings that 
emerged from study two will be sequentially discussed below. 
RQ1: What is the meaning and priority of Zero Harm from an employee and 
employer perspective? 
As discussed above, a major theme from all of those interviewed (employees, 
supervisors and managers) recognised that the meaning of Zero Harm was 
contextually focused on no injuries within the workplace. This was supported with 
further minor clarification that Zero Harm also considered no harm to personnel, 
environment and equipment. The rich descriptions provided from the participants 
builds on and supports the findings from Study One of the research program. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the majority of the participants interpreted the meaning of 
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Zero Harm to be ‘no harm to anyone, anytime while at work’.  This is important, as 
when a goal such as ‘Zero Harm’ is well communicated, employees are committed 
and even though it may be a stretched goal, the more challenging the goal the more 
effort individuals will apply (Cooper, 1993; Gomez-Minambres, 2012; Latham et el., 
2006; Locke et el, 1990; Wood et el, 1987). 
From an organisational perspective there was a clear message and theme that 
the priority for employee’s safety was the significant driver for the prioritisation of 
Zero Harm. However, from an employee as well as supervision and management 
perspective, it was also identified, that there was also a priority placed on the 
organisations client’s expectations and the need for the organisation to have ‘good’ 
safety statistics to ensure continuing and future work within the industry and in 
particular with their current clients. This focus on client’s expectations is not 
surprising as contractor’s performance is a significant contributing factor to client 
satisfaction (Palaneeswaran, Ng & Kumaraswamy, 2006). From an organisational 
level, the organisations commitment to employee safety also has a significant 
influence on positive safety outcomes and culture (Ng, Cheng & Skitmore, 2004; Ng 
& Tang, 2001). Furthermore, it has also been suggested that organisational safety 
leadership will not only lead to better safety outcomes but can also reduce injuries 
and incidents (Blair, 2003; Cooper, 1998; Wu, 2008).  
In contrast to the above, considerable debate emerged with the quantification of 
Zero Harm with various examples of injury rates being used to suggest that the 
company is positively measuring Zero Harm through the lack of, or reduction in, 
injuries. Alternatively, it was also suggested that the organisation measures its injury 
rates although, it does not measure Zero Harm. However, the majority consensus 
from the participants indicated that Zero Harm is measured by injury rates such as 
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lost time injuries and recordable injures.  This supports the findings from Study One 
of the research program as discussed in Chapter 4. Although the finding 
demonstrates the importance of reducing lost time injuries when striving for Zero 
Harm, this is problematic as the setting of Zero Harm as a numerical target has the 
potential for misrepresentation, manipulation and underreporting (Dekker, 2015; 
Oleinick et al, 1993; Probst et al., 2008; Young 2014) which has previously been 
discussed within the literature review in Chapter 2. Lagging indicators such as lost 
time injury frequency rates (LTIFR) and or the total recordable injury frequency 
rates (TRIFR) are arguably the most prevalent safety measure (O’Neill, et al., 2015). 
However, as identified in Chapter 2, it is also argued that an accident outcome 
measure does not reflect the organisations commitment to safety and that it provides 
only minimal information on the organisations workplace health and safety 
performance (Blewett & O’Keeffe, 2011).  
RQ2: From an employee and employer perspective is Zero Harm 
a relevant framework to promote safety? 
Managers and supervisors had the strongest belief that Zero Harm is achievable 
compared to employees. It is noteworthy that reflecting on the analysis of the 
quantitative data from Study One of the research program as discussed in Chapter 4, 
it suggested that the participants of the survey, although not statistically significant, 
were slightly more likely to agree that Zero Harm is “an aspirational goal’ rather than 
an “achievable objective”. Therefore, when supported by the qualitative results, 
through the semi-structured interviews, this cements and provides some preliminary 
evidence that participants recognise that the concept is not only aspiration but also it 
is achievable. As previously discussed within Chapter 2, having an influential vision 
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or goal has the potential to motivate workers (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; James 
& Lahti, 2011; Lowe, Kroeck, Sivasubramaniam, 1996). 
Zero Harm, as a framework to promote a positive safety culture, was 
underpinned by the organisations commitment to employee safety, which was 
identified as a significant theme.  It was also not surprising that the majority of 
participants indicated that individual attitudes, as well as the organisations safety 
initiatives, safety programs and safety management systems are all constructs that 
will assist in the reduction of injuries and improve the organisations safety culture as 
well as improving the organisations overall safety performance. It is proposed that 
this can be best demonstrated by the Ells River project (Andreschefski & Geersten, 
2010) that was discussed in Chapter 2. This identified that the attitude of its 
workforce, including the collective belief that Zero Harm is achievable, is an 
indicator of acceptance to the organisations safety initiative and an indicator of the 
safety climate within that organisation.  
The participants overwhelmingly supported that the organisation had sufficient 
safety rules, which are communicated on a regular basis and also provide adequate 
training to its employees to support these safety rules. Safety rules are indispensable 
and intrinsic to support good safety management (Weichbrodt, 2015). Safety rules 
and training are the cornerstones of risk control from a management perspective 
(Hale & Boyrs, 2013). Organisational safety rules are based on risk identification and 
rule compliance, these concepts are not mutually exclusive but are complimentary 
(Hopkins, 2011). As stated by Namian, Albert, Zuluaga & Jaselskis (p.3, 2016), 
“safety training is one of most widely adopted interventions to improve workplace 
safety”.  Therefore the implementation of the organisations safety rules through 
training will promote and encourage the implementation of those safety rules. 
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Further, as suggested by Hale & Swuste (1998), safety rules are part of the 
organisations SMS that provide a defined way of behaving in response to a predicted 
situation and provide clear ways to respond to that situation. 
There was a high level of awareness from all participants on the company’s 
SMS with a major theme of ‘controlled documents and tools’ used to provide 
guidance and instruction. As discussed in Chapter 2, a SMS is a systematic approach 
to addressing workplace risks (Matinov-Bennie et al., 2014) and reflects the 
organisations commitment and priority to safety (Fernandez Muniz et al., 2007), 
through policies and practices that positively influence employee’s attitudes and 
behaviours (Fernandez-Muniz et al, 2007). Again as identified in Chapter 2 within 
the research conducted by Zou (2011), SMS are a core construct of zero target 
programs.  
A major theme that emerged was the measurement of Zero Harm and 
organisational safety performance was through a plethora of lagging indicators such 
as LTIFR and TRIFR. However, the majority of participants indicated that the 
organisation does not actually measure Zero Harm or does this poorly. This is of 
concern as safety indicators are critical in providing safety related information on the 
organisations performance as well as providing a motivating factor for improved safe 
work behaviours (Reiman & Pietikainen, 2012). 
Interestingly, the perception of the organisational clients’ (major oil and gas 
companies) opinions on the organisations safety performance and its commitment to 
achieving Zero Harm has been ranked highly by the majority of the participants.  
This identifies, at least within these participants, that the contractors’ safety 
performance is a critical factor to be successfully selected by a client, or to maintain 
current work. If a competitor’s safety performance was superior then they are at risk 
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of losing or not wining work. This confirms that contractor performance is of 
significant importance to client satisfaction (Palaneeswaran, Ng & Kumaraswamy, 
2006). Furthermore, that when selecting contractors, the use of contractor 
performance information is used to identify value and minimise risk to the client 
(Kashiwagi & Byfield, 2002). As suggested by Egemen & Mohamed (2006), clients 
have more of a choice in selecting contractors as there are more players competing 
for the same markets. 
RQ3: From an employee and employer perspective, what are the 
manifestations of Zero Harm outcomes on safety behaviour and performance? 
All employees, supervisors and managers overwhelmingly reported 
empowerment for high self-efficacy levels for Zero Harm outcomes and safe 
behaviours as a major theme. This is noteworthy, and was also identified in Study 
One of the research program through the quantitative questionnaire. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, the reporting of high self-efficacy suggests that they are empowered to 
taking responsibility for their own safety behaviours. By enabling empowerment this 
will optimise the skills and expertise of the workers and increase job satisfaction 
(Lautizi, Laschinger & Ravazzolo, 2009), as well as influencing safety behaviour 
(Zwerling, Daltroy, Fine, Jonston, Melius & Silverstein, 1997). Again as identified in 
Study One of the research program, self-efficacy has consistently been identified as a 
key attribute required in achieving desired outcomes (Hagger, Chatzisarantis, & 
Biddle, 2002).  
Reward and recognition for safe work behaviours and achieving safety 
milestones such as achieving a predetermined period without a lost time or 
recordable injury was recognised and discussed within this chapter. However, this 
element did receive criticism due to its ad hoc application and lack of regularity. It 
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was also identified that supervisors and management are more concerned than 
employees, on the lack of recognition of safe behaviours. Organisations can only 
ignore reward and recognition programs at great peril to themselves, as they are 
deemed to be critical to the safe operations and the organisations safety culture 
(Brick, 2012). As suggested by Smith (2005) rewards for efforts exerted are a basic 
human requirement and recognition has positive effects on safety behaviour. 
Rewards are behavioural focused with the aim of maintaining the desirable behaviour 
(Geller, 2006). Although there are opponents to reward schemes such as Kohn 
(1993) who suggest that reward programs only attain temporal compliance, and 
Smith (2005) who suggests opponents of reward and recognition programs, believe it 
is contradictory to reward someone for what they should be doing in the first place. 
However, reward programs are becoming more prevalent in industry (Brick, 2012). 
As discussed by Geller (2006) incentives are intended to motivate behavioural 
change. An incentive, as described by Geller (2016, p.62), “is a stimulus event that 
precedes a behaviour to announce the availability of a reward following the 
occurrence of a designated behaviour”. Incentive programs have been known to be 
manipulated and drive unintended behaviours (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Kohn, 1993; 
Salie & Schlechter, 2012) such as not reporting injuries (Frederick & Lessin, 2000; 
Smith, 2005) resulting in some government jurisdictions to introduce specific 
legislation to deter such manipulation. For example, the OSH Act (Section 11(c)), 
which is supported by the Employer Safety Incentive and Disincentive Policies and 
Practices memorandum (2012) (Occupational Safety & Health Administration, 
2012). From an organisational perspective, the adoption of a reward and recognition 
programs is recommended for consideration (Ng, Cheng & Skitmore, 2005). This is 
supported by various studies which have demonstrated that reward and recognition 
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programs will increase motivation and performance (Presslee, Vance & Webb, 2013; 
Salie & Schlechter, 2012). 
The majority of respondents consistently indicated that the main driving theme 
for safe behaviours was for their own personal safety rather than the organisations 
safety rules and requirements. However, it was recognised that there were some 
perceived barriers to safe behaviour outcomes through the impact of non-supportive 
supervision and time constraints placed on the activities. Of particular note, a strong 
theme emerged on the wide acceptance and use of personal protective equipment. It 
is widely known that the correct use of PPE can reduce injuries and illness (Akbar-
Khanzadeh, Bisesi & Rivas, 1995; Breisch, 1989; LaBar, 1990).  
5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has discussed and presented the findings of the second qualitative 
and final study of the research program. The purpose of this second phase was to 
undertake a complementary deeper exploration into the experiences and perceptions 
of Zero Harm from the participants. This chapter presented the research phase 
background, method and results as well as a discussion on the findings. The findings 
revealed a multidimensional aspect of Zero Harm through confirming the 
quantitative results of Study One as well as identifying the presence of high self-
efficacy levels for  
 
Zero Harm outcomes and safe behaviours. The findings identified that there is 
a lack of evidence that demonstrates Zero Harm is attainable and there is also 
confusion in its measurement. However, there is the potential for Zero Harm to make 
significant inroads to improving organisational safety performance. 
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The next chapter (Chapter 5) presents the conclusions that have been drawn 
from Study One and Study Two. A synthesis of the findings will be presented as they 
relate to the research questions. Practical implications, as well as the research 
strength and weaknesses, will be discussed as well as recommendations for future 
research.  
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Chapter 6: General Discussion and 
Conclusions 
This final chapter presents and discusses the general findings as they relate to 
the research program as well as any practical implications, including the research 
strengths and limitations. The chapter will conclude with recommendations, 
including future research.  
Chapter 1 provided an introduction into the research program including 
background information on workplace safety, Zero Harm and its application. Chapter 
2 included a literature review that contextualised the foundation of the research 
program. Chapter 3 provided the conceptual framework that was utilised to guide the 
research as well as the research design and methodology. Chapter 4 discussed the 
quantitative research through a questionnaire that explored the perceptions and 
experiences of the participants to Zero Harm. Chapter 5 presented and discussed the 
qualitative semi-structured interviews that further explored the participant’s 
perceptions and experiences to Zero Harm. Finally, Chapter 6, as discussed above, 
will discuss the research findings as they relate to the research questions. 
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The research program’s aim was to gain a comprehensive understanding and 
insight to the application of the Zero Harm concept within the specified organisation 
with a view; from an employee’s perspective (including supervisors and managers): 
(1) to gain an insight into the perceived meaning and/or language of Zero Harm and, 
(2) to explore the manifestation of Zero Harm through self-reported data and 
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potential influence between Zero Harm and improved individual, group or 
organisational safety behaviour. This aim was achieved through the results of the 
following research questions. 
Research question 1: What is the meaning and priority of Zero Harm from an 
employee and employer perspective? 
Zero Harm, as a priority of the organisation, was evidential within both studies. 
Overwhelmingly the findings supported that the overarching priority placed on Zero 
Harm was management’s commitment to ensuring the safety of its employees. 
However, other benefits of adopting Zero Harm have also emerged within the 
research, such as a competitive advantage through client relationships and improved 
organisational safety performance and employee safety behaviours. This supports 
early research undertaken by Smallman & John (2001), who identified that the 
management of workplace health and safety was moving from a compliance 
approach and moving to competitive advantage as a priority where safety is not 
viewed in isolation but as a consequence of broader factors that target improved 
organisational outcomes. As supported by previous research, the identified improved 
organisational outcomes within this research study include, enhanced client 
satisfaction (Palaneeswaran & Kumaraswamy, 2006), seeking and attaining future 
work (Kashiwagi & Byfield, 2002) and the capability to become more attractive as 
an employer of choice (Zwetsloot, et al., 2010).  
The research findings indicated a consistency in the understanding of how Zero 
Harm is measured within the organisation, which was predominately through the use 
of injury statistics and injury rates. As previously discussed, measuring outcome 
measures such as injury numbers and injury rates are exceptionally problematic 
(Cooper & Phillips, 2004) potentially resulting in the under-reporting of injuries and 
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incidents (van Kampen, et al., 2014) as well as the reclassification of the severity of 
injuries (Dekker, 2015; Sherratt, 2014). It should also be noted that within this 
research no organisation has yet achieved a Zero Harm target (zero injuries). The 
case study undertaken by Young (2014) in the implementation of ZAV, measured the 
organisations success on the reduction of lost time injuries. Andreschefski & 
Geersten’s (2010) case study, measured the success of the ZIA intervention based on 
TRIR and days away from work. Although, both of these case studies postulated the 
success of Zero Harm interventions, neither organisation achieved an injury free 
work environment. Further, the difference in measurement indicators within these 
two case studies also supports that currently there is a lack of standardised industry 
accepted safety performance indicators (O’Neill, et al., (2015).  
Within Study One and Study Two, the findings indicated that the majority of 
the participants collectively agreed that the meaning of Zero Harm was ‘no harm to 
anyone at work’. Having a shared understanding of the meaning of Zero Harm is 
quite important. For example; the ability to have the same shared understanding of 
work can be a motivating factor that can improve performance (Hoeft, Jentsch, 
Smith-Jentsch & Bowers, 2005). Whilst a shared understanding of the meaning of 
Zero Harm is present, of concern is the indicators (outcome measures) that are used 
in the measurement of Zero Harm as discussed above. When measuring Zero Harm 
using tangible numbers, there is the potential to focus only on the number, rather 
than safety practices or the person behind them (Sherratt, 2013). Taken the above in 
answering research question one, the research identified that the majority of the 
participants indicated that in their opinions, the meaning of Zero Harm is ‘no harm to 
anyone at work’ and that the prioritization of Zero Harm was based on the 
organisations and management commitment in caring for its employees. Although, it 
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is important to recognise that the participants could only select answers from the 
options that were provided and thus the definitions are comparative rather than 
absolute. 
Research question 2: From an employee and employer perspective is Zero 
Harm a relevant framework to promote safety? 
Whilst there are some nuances, the finding from the current study aligns, in 
general, with the research undertaken by Zou (2011). Zou (2011) identified seven 
common constructs that are intuitive to a framework for Zero Harm, which is 
discussed in Chapter 2. When combining Study One and Study Two, the research 
identified that the majority of the participants indicated that it was their belief and 
opinion that Zero Harm was an achievable goal. This is also an important finding as 
previously discussed within the Chapter 2, which revealed that the literature on goal 
setting for the management of behaviour is substantial (Marsh, Robertson, Duff, 
Phillips, Cooper & Weyman, 1995). When goals are well communicated and 
employees are committed, even if the goal is challenging, the more effort will be 
exerted to achieve that goal (Cooper, 1993; Gomez-Minambres, 2012; Latham & 
Locke, 2006; Locke & Latham, 1990; Wood, Mento & Locke, 1987).  
Both studies demonstrated that management was seen to be a driving role in 
the organisations commitment to Zero Harm. Organisational leadership has the 
potential to mould employee’s perceptions of safety behaviours (Gahan, et al., 2014). 
Leadership is about engaging employees to perform the required work in the right 
way (Krause & Weekley, 2005). As an enabler of this, it was also identified within 
this study that management and supervisors are inclined to use the Zero Harm 
concepts as a tool for the management of workers through the use of safety 
programmes such as the organisations eight GEMS, ‘rules to live by’ and the 
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RADAR program.  The findings showed overwhelmingly, that the majority of the 
participants knew, understood and participated within these safety initiatives, which 
are regularly delivered and supported. Again, this is of importance, as research has 
demonstrated an intrinsic strong correlation between safety programme 
implementation (training) and improved organisational workplace health and safety 
performance (Aksorn, Hadikusumo, 2008). 
The findings from this study also identified that the organisations safety 
management system were deemed to be an effective support tool for the management 
of safety. Although it was identified that there was a high level of awareness of the 
safety management system, it was found that the safety management system was not 
fully utilised and potentially has some limitations. One of the most prevalent safety 
interventions for improved safety behaviour and organisational safety performance, 
are safety management systems (Wachter & Yorio, 2014). Safety management 
systems have also been identified as one of the seven constructs of Zero Harm (zero 
target) intervention programmes (Zou, 2011). There is a plethora of research on 
safety management systems as discussed within the literature review including 
Bottani et al., (2009), Fernandez-Muniz et al., (2007) and Gunningham & Sinclair 
(2011). However, it must also be noted and as demonstrated by the Esso Longford 
Gas plant disaster, an organisation may have a ‘best in class’ safety management 
system but, that in itself, could not avoid the catastrophic events that occurred 
(Hopkins, 2000). 
Taken the above, in answering the second research question, the findings have 
indicated that although they are some nuances, there is alignment within the current 
research program and with the Zero Harm framework as identified by Zou (2011). 
The findings also indicated a strong belief that Zero Harm is achievable among the 
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majority of participants and that management are committed to employee’s safety 
through safety programmes and a safety management system. Interestingly, although 
the findings identified a high awareness of the core safety interventions including the 
organisations 8 GEMS and RADAR as well as the organisations safety management 
system there was however, some limitations to the adoption and use of the system.  
Research question 3: From an employee and employer perspective, what are 
the manifestations of Zero Harm outcomes on safety behaviour and performance? 
As previously identified, and in particular within Study One, it was noteworthy 
that on average the majority of participants indicated a high level of self-efficacy 
levels in carrying out Zero Harm principles.  In particular the ability and 
empowerment to stop or not commence an activity that they believe would put 
themselves, or others in harm’s way. The findings identified that, within this 
research, the self-efficacy foundational belief is an expectation from the organisation, 
and one that is supported by management, where no task shall be undertaken if there 
is an uncontrolled risk that may impact on the safety of an employee or others. 
Research has revealed that self-efficacy is a core component of achieving 
behavioural change (Bandura, 1997). As previously identified within the literature 
review, behavioural change intervention programs, as with safety management 
systems, are two of the most commonly adopted safety intervention programmes 
adopted by industry (Watcher & Yorio, 2014). There is an abundance of research on 
behavioural safety programs such as Chen & Hanzhi (2012); Cox, et al. (2004); 
DePasquale & Geller (1999) and Zohar & Luria (2002), which have all identified 
improved safety behaviour through the adoption of behavioural change programs. To 
achieve this improved safety behaviour, it was also identified within the findings that 
the organisation provides the necessary safety management tools such as the ‘stop 
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work card’, RADAR cards and the 8 GEMS, which are communicated to all 
employees. The findings also identified that a significant theme of this self-efficacy 
and employee safety behaviour is the commitment from each worker on his or her 
own personal safety and not putting themselves at risk. However, it must be noted 
that whilst not prevalent across the wider workforce, it was observed that there was 
some participants under the age of 50 years of age, in non-supervisory or 
management roles, indicated that negative work practices have been present.  
Within the research conducted by Zou (2011), it was identified that one of the 
key constructs of Zero Harm (target zero) intervention programmes is the capability 
to reward safety behaviours. The findings from both studies identified the 
recognition of employees is ad-hoc and very poorly undertaken. However, positive 
recognition from clients on the organisations safety performance was identified 
which created some cynicism with the employees, due to the lack of their employer 
recognising their own safety performance.  Whilst it was identified within this 
research that there is the potential for reward and recognition program to encourage 
underreporting (Frederick & Lessin, 2000; Smith, 2005), rewarding workers for safe 
behaviour however, has the significant potential to motivate and maintain safe work 
behaviours (Geller, 2006).  
When questioned on how the organisation proactively measures Zero Harm the 
response were more nebulous with several suggesting that they do not measure Zero 
Harm, or if they do, it is done so poorly. This may suggest that within this 
organisation, Zero Harm success is dependent on the measuring of absences, such as 
lowering the injury numbers and or incident rates which are problematic (Cooper & 
Phillips, 2004) as previously discussed. Taken the above and in answering the third 
and final research question, the findings have indicated self-efficacy through safe 
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behaviour and worker empowerment are crucial to a successful adoption of Zero 
Harm. 
6.2 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
There are various practical implications that must be considered by 
organisations that intend to implement Zero Harm as a concept for improved safety 
performance. An ambition to create an accident-free workplace requires personal 
commitment from every individual person within the organisation (Zwetsloot, et al., 
2013). This was supported by the research findings but in particular it was identified 
that organisational, management and supervisory commitment is critical in 
permeating an atmosphere and environment were the workers feel that the 
organisation cares for its employees.  
Developing a framework for Zero Harm and its implementation should be of 
high priority, as this will provide structural guidance on the individual constructs of 
Zero Harm. Recent research conducted by Zou (2011) identified the most common 
constructs for Zero Harm intervention these constructs are; (1) human factors 
including attitudes, beliefs, values, mindsets (2) a belief and value of workers and 
management that all incidents and injuries are preventable and unacceptable, (3) 
strong commitment from top management, (4) engagement of all stakeholders, (5) 
the development of safety risk management systems and reviewing safety 
performance, (6) clear authority and accountability and rewarding safe behaviour, 
and (7) establishment of a safety knowledge database for capturing lessons learned 
and identifying corrective actions.  
Management must also develop and communicate with clarity, credibility and 
impact (Vecchio-Sadus, 2007) the meaning and objectives of Zero Harm from an 
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organisational perspective. Within this research, it was identified that the objective 
and or meaning of Zero Harm is not always clear and that this may lead to confusion 
such as is Zero Harm a goal, an ethical aspiration or is it an imperative (Swuste, 
2012). This is further compounded when statistical measures such as incident rates or 
injury numbers are incorporated within the application of Zero Harm.  As previously 
identified within the literature review, injuries and accidents are not synonymous 
(Sherratt, 2014) and low incident rates or injury numbers are not predictors of safe 
work environments such as demonstrated at the BP Deepwater Horizon disaster. 
Therefore caution should be considered where incident rates are used as a target, as 
they may take the focus off critical risks (BP Deepwater Horizon disaster) and also 
suppress the reporting of incidents or other safety issues (Frederick & Lessin, 2000). 
It is also well known that measures such as the LTI and LTIFR have the inherent 
potential for manipulation such as under-reporting, hiding or reclassify injuries 
(Dekker, 2015; Oleinick, Guire, Hawthorne, Schork, Gluck, Lee & La, 1993; Probst, 
2008). If outcome measures, such as incident rates or injury numbers, are to be used 
as organisational measures in achieving Zero Harm, then they should be clearly 
defined and communicated to all employees. This will minimise confusion and 
scepticism. However, it has also been acknowledged within this research, that 
incident rates and injury numbers are an important currency when they are used to 
promote a reduction in injuries to the workforce. As such, if organisations use 
workers incident rates or injury numbers as a measure of Zero Harm then clear, 
understandable process should be developed to avoid the potential of under-reporting 
or the possibility of injuries being reclassified to a lower level. For example, can the 
measure of Lost Time Injury or Recordable injury be replaced with the total number 
of injuries that does not identify the injury classification? Furthermore and as 
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previously discussed, there is no clear nexus between the absence of injuries and the 
organisations efforts to improve safety; therefore the use of leading indicators such 
as the use of safety climate should be incorporated within an organisations matrix on 
Zero Harm. As previously identified, the use of safety climate as a measure of safety 
performance can be a reliable and valid indicator that has the potential to provide 
information prior to a safety problem developing in to a safety incident. 
Another important implication for organisations when implementing Zero 
Harm is that the employees may not believe that Zero Harm is an achievable target. 
This can be problematic and may have implications for the successful 
implementation of a Zero Harm program. Although within this research, the findings 
mainly supported that employees believed that Zero Harm is achievable. However, it 
was also identified within the literature review and in particular within an actual case 
study that those workers did not consider Zero Harm was an achievable target 
(Sherratt, 2014). As previously discussed, to achieve a Zero Harm environment 
requires personal commitment from every individual person within the organisation 
(Zwetsloot, et al., 2013). Research has also demonstrated that communication and 
training are extremely important determinants for improved workplace health and 
safety performance (Kath, Marks & Ranney, 2010). Therefore, organisations 
considering Zero Harm should consider how it communicates Zero Harm to its 
employees. For example and as previously discussed, is Zero Harm an aspirational 
goal or a numerical target, each within themselves, will require differing 
communication strategies.  As suggested by Galonek (2013) to maximise the 
effectiveness of the communication strategy, organisations should consider branding 
their safety program. Branding Zero Harm within the organisations has the potential 
to cement the organisations commitment to safety as an organisational cultural 
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artefact (Stensaker, 2007). Benefits of Zero Harm branding include a demonstrable 
and visible approach that encapsulates the organisations commitment to safety that 
has the potential to motivate and engage the organisations employees. This in-turn 
has the ability to provide a platform for the potential collective behavioural change of 
the organisations employees (Alvesson & Berg, 1992). The use of branding as a 
strategy should also be supported by identifying what Zero Harm intervention 
programmes will also provide the most effective employee buy-in and commitment 
as well as being readily identifiable to the Zero Harm brand. 
6.3 STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS 
There are number of strengths and limitations that need to be acknowledged 
within this research program. From a strength perspective, the research has 
contributed to the empirical knowledge on Zero Harm and its implementation within 
an industrial setting. The research was guided by a conceptual framework that was 
structured on organisational alignment theory and more specifically, Semler’s 
Alignment Model. Semler’s alignment model was not utilised as an operational 
framework to both test and confirm hypotheses, but rather, it was incorporated as an 
overarching framework to conduct an initial exploration into the research area of 
interest. Future scientific endeavours may benefit from utilising the model in a more 
structured and quantifiable manner. Although the conceptual framework that was 
utilised was not a test of the model itself and was used primarily to provide a 
structured framework, the adoption and implementation of this framework enabled 
the collection of data including self-reported data as well as employee perceptions 
and experiences of Zero Harm as it potentially pertains to organisational alignment. 
Alignment is not only important for developing strategies but also for their 
implementation (Joshi, Kathuria & Porth, 2003). The research also employed a 
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mixed method approach to data collection involving quantitative and qualitative data, 
which provided a more comprehensive inquiry of Zero Harm.  
There are various limitations associated with this research. First, the research 
program only involved one organisation. The use of only one organisation does not 
represent an industry perspective on Zero Harm and thus there are limits to the 
generalisability of the results. Although, as identified within the literature review, 
various case studies generally supported the use of Zero Harm as an organisational 
mantra for improved safety performance, this research did not undertake a direct 
comparison to another organisation therefore the findings may not be representative, 
thereby limiting the generalisability of the results to other industry. It is also noted 
that the dynamics of safety culture may fluctuate between private and public 
companies, and as no between-group analysis was incorporated within the current 
study of research, the results may not be generalizable to the wider ‘high risk’ oil and 
gas industry. A further outcome of only using one organisation is that, not only did it 
restrict the responses to one organisation, but it also affected and restricted the 
sample size for the research program. In total there were 299 responses to the 
questionnaire from a total of 2700 potential participants, which resulted to an 
approximate 11 per cent participation rate. This low response rate may not truly 
reflect or represent the participating organisations wider workforce perspectives of 
Zero Harm. Another compounding limitation of the use of only one organisation for 
this research is the lower number of employees from various countries other than 
Australia who completed the questionnaire. This was likely amplified by the use of 
only 2 countries from the 13 countries within the Asia Pacific Operations of the 
organisation, which was used within the interview stage. Therefore the qualitative 
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findings within this research have the potential to not truly be representative of the 
organisations Asia Pacific Operations.    
The second limitation is that the project relied solely on self-report data, and 
did not consider recorded incident or injury data.  As a result, the data may have been 
influenced by a range of biases, including self-report (both impression management 
and self-deception) that has been demonstrated to spuriously affect statistical 
outcomes (Wahlberg, 2009). The administering of self-reported questionnaires may 
also impact on participant motivation through a lack of understanding of the 
importance of the response as well as participation fatigue (O’Connor, Buttrey, 
O’Dea & Kennedy, 2011).  
A third limitation to the research program included the questionnaire 
instrument distribution and the undertaking of the semi-structured interviews. Due to 
the various countries within the research program, and the knowledge that not all 
sites had computers for operational employees to use, the use of a paper-based 
questionnaire was used alongside the electronic questionnaire instrument (QUT Key 
Survey). Further, the semi-structured interviews were conducted either face-to-face 
or over the telephone. For this research, due to the geographical locations of the 
participants, the majority of the interviews were conducted by telephone. It is noted 
and as suggested by Novick (2008), telephone interviews have been categorised as 
lacking visual cues resulting in a lack of contextual and nonverbal garnishing of 
information. However it has also been argued by Novick (2008), that telephone 
interviews also provide an environment that participants will disclose sensitive 
information due to the relaxed atmosphere of not having a face-to-face interview.  
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A fourth limitation of this research program was the research design which was 
cross sectional in design, a longitudinal study with a comparison group would have 
strengthened the inquiry into the impact of Zero Harm. 
The fifth limitation notes that the current research candidate was previously 
employed with the organisation. While the program of research utilised an objective 
mixed method approach, it is noted that the candidate’s previous working relationship 
with the organisation may have subtly influenced both the design and interpretation of 
the results. 
The sixth and final limitation of this research was that there was not actual 
injury data collected as a potential measure of Zero Harm. As identified within the 
research, the use of outcome injury rates or numbers as a measure of Zero Harm does 
not truly reflect the efforts placed by the organisation into its effort or commitment to 
Zero Harm and are problematic in collecting as well as classification. However, the 
use of such measures would have provided an indicator that may have also 
strengthened the research into Zero Harm. 
6.4 RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In light of the findings of this research program there are several 
recommendations for future research to be proposed. These recommendations are 
focussed on and aligned within the gaps that were identified from the findings of this 
research study.  
Further research is required to identify what are the constructs of Zero Harm 
intervention programs (zero target programs) and is there any commonalities 
between differing organisations that adopted Zero Harm. This research identified 
various case studies as well as the constructs that the sample organisation has 
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employed. As determinants of Zero Harm, the ability to garnish a synthesis of 
common identifiable Zero Harm intervention programs or constructs would be 
beneficial to industry that aspire to be a Zero Harm company. As this research did 
not compare general industry standard safety programs to safety programs that have 
been adopted by Zero Harm organisations, future research will also aid in identifying 
if they are any specific differences. Alternatively are Zero Harm programs just an 
extension of the current suite of safety programs that industry currently use which 
have been rebranded as Zero Harm? 
Another research opportunity would be to identify if there is a common 
methodology of measuring Zero Harm that would enable standardised industry 
comparison so as to evaluate the success of such programs. Industry is fixated on 
outcome injury and incident measures and as previously discussed whilst these do 
indicate the health, in regards to safety, within an organisation, there is a significant 
gap on what and how to measure Zero Harm. This opportunity may be achieved 
through case studies of various organisations that have adopted Zero Harm and 
evaluate their experiences and the effect that Zero Harm has had on the safety 
performance of each organisation.  
Further research opportunities include the undertaking of an examination of 
Zero Harm compared to other alternative safety improvement frameworks including 
their constructs, implementation and an evaluation of organisational safety 
performance and individual behaviours between these frameworks.  
Finally, this research program has laid down a foundation for future research in 
the evaluation of organisations that have adopted Zero Harm across different industry 
sectors, demographics and countries and in doing so enabling the evaluation of the 
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effectiveness, implementation, and acceptance through workers perceptions and 
attitudes within varying industry sectors, demographics as well as countries. 
6.5 CONCLUSION  
This research has contributed to the practical understanding of Zero Harm and 
its contribution to workplace safety. Zero Harm is a growing phenomenon and one 
that is being adopted by industry as paradigm shift in the management of safety 
where organisations proudly display their commitment to protecting their workers. 
Further from an academic perspective, Zero Harm is attracting more attention and 
research. 
Ethically, Zero Harm has been suggested as the only acceptable approach to 
workplace, however it has also been suggested that Zero Harm is not an attainable 
goal and that worker’s do not believe that Zero Harm is achievable. This research has 
confirmed that within the sample organisation, Zero Harm is truly embedded within 
its culture. Whilst there are nuances in relation to its meaning, measurement and 
attainability, it has been overwhelmingly accepted within this organisation. 
Furthermore, the research has identified that Zero Harm has influenced self-efficacy 
and empowerment, which has the potential to encourage and support safe behaviours.  
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